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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Alfred Frankowski 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Philosophy 
 
June 2012 
 
Title: The Cassandra Complex: On Violence, Racism, and Mourning 
 
 
The Cassandra Complex is a work in the traditions of critical philosophy and 
psychoanalysis. In The Cassandra Complex, I examine the intersection of violence, racism, 
and mourning. I hold that analysis of this intersection gives birth to a critical view on the 
politics of memory and the politics of racism as it operates in its most discreet forms. What 
makes violence discreet is that it escapes identity or is continually misidentified. I call that 
structure of violence that escapes being identified as such “White violence” and argue that 
this structure of violence undermines our normative ways of addressing racist violence in 
the present. This creates a continual social pattern of misidentification, mistaken memory, 
and mistaken practices of thinking about the violence of racism, both past and present. The 
present form of this misidentification could be called post-raciality, but it is specific to how 
we understand and remember our own history of anti-Black violence. I argue that post-
racial memory produces memory only to facilitate forgetting and thus is only seen as a 
social pathology in the public sphere. The term “Cassandra Complex” provides an identity 
for the type of social pathology that appears at the critical edge of political discursivity.  
From the analysis of this social pathology, I argue that aesthetic sorrow, allegorical 
memory, and a sublime sense of mourning disrupt the normative functioning of the social 
pathology. Indeed, I argue that aesthetic sorrow makes the present strange by making the 
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politically unbearable aesthetically unrepresentable. This sense of loss constitutes its own 
history, appearing first as an aesthetics of anesthesia, then as a memory that is also an 
amnesia. Thus, I hold that a robust notion of allegory can be translated into the public 
sphere as a way of exposing the degenerative effects of post-racial memory. Moreover, I 
hold that allegory allows for a social analysis of those political conditions that make public 
that which has gone silent. I argue that an understanding the political significance of that 
continual movement of silence is the task of understanding the present form of violence in 
the post-racial.   
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CHAPTER I 
THE GREAT EVASION: WHITE VIOLENCE, NEGATION, 
AND THE STRUCTURE OF POST-RACIAL MEMORY 
All the decisive blows are dealt left handed. Walter Benjamin, 
One-way Street 
 
While the theme of racist violence has often been addressed by political 
philosophers, it is rarely addressed as part of aesthetics. I argue that, from the standpoint 
of aesthetics, violence needs to be understood as a force that silences or anestheticizes 
discursive domains having to do with race, violence, and memory. The Cassandra 
Complex attempts to rethink the extent to which White violence can be determined 
aesthetically. I examine how discreet forms of violence that now seem to escape 
recognition as violence, nonetheless, have deep implications for the forms of racism that 
are deeply entrenched in our social norms. Throughout the dissertation, I refer to 
“Cassandra” to describe a social complex, because Cassandra was the prophetess whose 
prophesies related to the history of a culture’s violence. Unlike many philosophers who 
have employed this term, I take it up as indicating problematic relationships to history, 
memory, and politics in general. Post-racial discourse erases, as much as it amplifies, the 
appearance of public discussions of race. Therefore, it presents unique set of paradoxes 
that would not appear otherwise. I examine some of these paradoxes as they occur within 
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the context of public memory or memorialization. I further argue that at present, race 
discourse is undergoing a paradigm shift that can be called the ‘post-racial.’ Since this 
dissertation will focus on how present violence relates to the past or to history, I will 
focus on post-racial memory.  
I take up the problem of post-raciality from the side of public memory by 
examining the social meaning of memorialization, to argue that memory for post-racial 
discourse means something different. While we normally think of memorialization as an 
act of reconciling the present with the past, post-racial memory memorializes only to 
further indicate a disjoining of the present from the past. The effect of this is two-fold. 
First, one has many representations of the past and one can even have public 
demonstrations against present forms of White violence—but these are left at the level of 
mere appearance. They result in the appearance of political activity without the result of 
political action. Second, one can argue that the violence of racism from the past no longer 
applies to the present, but this signifies a deeper rupture with history. Thus, we may think 
we are no longer a racist society or that racism has changed. I concede that to a good 
extent it has changed, but it is questionable whether or not it has not lessened.   
The dissertation also examines the ways in which the Cassandra complex 
responds to its own pathology. Toward this end, I argue that aesthetic sorrow, allegorical 
memory, and a political form of mourning are all ways in which the aesthetic responds to 
the post-raciality of the Cassandra Complex. If the space of representation facilitates 
forgetting, aesthetic sorrow responds to post-racial memory by making that absence of 
memory itself disclose the way the present remembers by forgetting.  
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 Throughout the dissertation, I also develop claims about the relevance of a 
political notion of mourning. Mourning is recovered as a way of highlighting how the 
public conceals the disjoint that has come to identify post-racial memory. I close this 
discussion with considerations of how that the intersection that reveals how aesthetics 
traces the anestheticization of memory relates to how memory is transformed into 
mourning.  
The structure and progression of the chapters develop the foregoing themes. Chapters 
I and two are intended to show the structure of post-racial memory as a symptom of the 
Cassandra complex, while chapters three and four are intended to show a critical shift 
between aesthetic and political meanings that unnerve the anesthetizing of memory and 
history. In Chapter I, I argue that post-racial memory allows for memory in 
representation, but from representation we also have forgetting. I attempt to show that 
post-racial memory is characterized by the way that the presence of memory facilitates 
forgetting. It is within this context that I resituate the aesthetic meaning of memory 
relative to anti-Black violence. We find that the meaning of memory and forgetting is 
altered in significant ways in the present, requiring that recognition of the past is part of 
our understanding of history. But, we fail to connect this with current anti-Black violence 
and anti-Black sentiments. And furthermore, we fail to see how post-racial memory 
operates on a political level, devaluing even discourses that take racial violence seriously. 
By further developing this line of thought in Chapter II, I argue that at a deeper level, 
memory indicates something essential about the legibility of present violence through 
memorialization. I ask: Why is memorialization significant? What meaning does it hold 
for resolving the violence of the past? What potential does it have for producing 
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understanding of the present? I work through this problematic in three ways. First, I 
examine the meaning of memorialization in general and then argue that there is a political 
meaning that we need to be attentive to. Because of this, I argue that memorialization in 
post-racial memory needs to be attentive to how it depoliticizes memory and aesthetics. 
Second, I argue that this de-politicization is somewhat different if we compare it to the 
shifting meanings of memorials addressing similar forms of violence. Here, I examine 
Holocaust memorials and Rwandan memorials. What is distinctive about these memorials 
is that they connect the present to its own suffering by making the violence committed 
against itself a definitive part of the present. Third, I argue that because post-racial 
memory disconnects suffering, we see a corollary to the way contemporary philosophical 
politics seems to depend on depoliticizing history. This is clear in several contemporary 
Black political theories. I conclude with a challenge to recognition politics to attempt to 
re-understand its own activity. 
From this point on, I attempt to consider what implicit forms of response are already 
operative in the Cassandra complex. Chapter III develops the potential of aesthetic 
sorrow and allegorical memory. I argue that in Black aesthetics, there has been an often-
overlooked tradition of aesthetic sorrow that ties violence to our anxiety of being present 
to this violence through memory. I show that this insight is central to W.E.B. Du Bois’s 
“The Sorrow Songs,” songs which were intended to be the message of the slave to the 
world. In connection with Du Bois, I show that Walter Benjamin’s development of 
philosophical aesthetics in regard to allegory shares many of the motifs of aesthetic 
sorrow. But, placing Du Bois’s aesthetic sorrow in conversation with Benjamin’s notion 
of allegory also illuminates a response to the lack of memory present in post-racial 
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memory and what goes silent; both build from loss, absence, crisis, and rupture to situate 
a present anxiety that has its deepest implications in the public sphere and not in 
individual psychologies. Further developing allegorical memory, I argue that Benjamin’s 
political notion of mourning is also a form of redress. Last, I examine Billie Holiday’s 
song, “Strange Fruit,” as an example of a memorial derived from aesthetic sorrow that 
mourns through allegorical memory. 
Chapter IV engages Kantian aesthetics. I briefly develop Kant’s aesthetic of the 
Beautiful and the Sublime. My intention in this chapter is to show that Kant not only 
racialized the public sphere through aesthetics, but that he mapped out a type of response 
to violence that is surprisingly contemporary in regard to post-racial memory. Much of 
the chapter works to connect Kant’s aesthetics to his philosophy of history and 
anthropology. But, I do this to show where Kantian aesthetics foreshadows an imminent 
critique, disclosed in his understanding of the aesthetics of the Sublime. I argue that the 
aesthetics of the sublime resituates the public sphere relative to what it cannot show 
itself. While the post-racial community may produce history, it goes silent to memory. 
This silence, I argue, is what raises mourning from a disruptive politics to a clue to the 
state of disrepair of the public sphere. I argue that the work of mourning that takes place 
aesthetically where the political is liquidated in the public sphere as anything more than 
the representation of political activity. In contrast, the political sense of mourning works 
on the public sphere to redefine itself relative to the violence it misidentifies. For this 
reason, the present work is not simply a meditation on violence and racism that is 
disclosed through memory, but it is also an analysis of where mourning becomes 
political.  
6 
 
I suggest that the reflected interior of the meaning of history that is negligent of its 
violence can only be responded to by the exteriorization of mourning. This does not 
imply that mourning loses its subjective meaning, but rather that mourning can also be 
viewed from the side of non-subjective meaning as well. The result of this is to view that 
public domain (let’s call it the public sphere) where sociality is always progressing as 
long as no one refers to how the present reiterates the contradictions and violences of the 
past, from the side or back, to view it at a distance, and as something disenchanted. To be 
sure, this work retraces an enchanting dance. But I do this from the perspective of its 
exterior, which is to say that this dance is viewed as the ensemble of a series of abhorrent 
convulsions. The result of this effort is only to bring into view how the counter-
movements that make the convulsion appear as a dance are more essential to giving a 
context to the whole of the movement. 
1. White Violence as a Social Complex 
The Cassandra Complex is a philosophical meditation on the aesthetic and political 
intersection of violence, racism, and mourning. However, this is not a meditation on the 
nature or essence of violence. This is not a meditation on violence toward the politically 
constituted Other. Rather, in this dissertation, I focus on that form of violence that 
appears only in how it is directed against its own population. I am interested in violence 
in this form because it often fails recognition. For this reason, in what follows, I attempt 
to identify the nexus through which violence escapes its own identification.  
To suggest that something escapes our recognition as violence is to call our normative 
way of understanding the term violence into question. I am not interested in violence in 
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its singularity, but rather in how it forms a network or “complex” through aesthetic and 
political forms of negation. I will argue that the philosophical significance of this social 
“complex” lies in how it identifies a mechanism of misinterpretation that makes explicit 
violence’s turn from the particularity of the instance of brutality to the systemic dispersal 
of oppression.  
Two questions follow. First, how can one give analysis of discreet violence that turns 
away from our general way of recognizing and identifying it as such? Second, what is the 
significance of providing a philosophical structure for this? To identify violence that 
turns away from the political and aesthetic sense of recognition seems to present an 
anomaly to most, if not all, philosophical politics. Whether we adhere to Recognition 
politics, Identity politics, Reconciliation politics, or a Distributive Justice approach to 
politics, we must be able to identify violence as such before we regard present state of 
affairs as politically or socially problematic.
1
 These approaches to political analysis are 
well suited for addressing the pastness of violence in most of its previous forms. They are 
adept at addressing the wrongness of the mass murders of the twentieth century like the 
Holocaust, Kosovo’s Ethnic Cleansing, or the Rwandan Genocide. But I want to suggest 
that these theories have  a tendency to understand violence a bit too retroactively and 
without further analysis, they are at a loss as to how to theorize violence in its present 
form, without the braces of the past. Once the former violence changes its mode of 
expression, say from overt practices of discrimination in hiring to discreet preferential 
patterns of hiring, the term ‘violence’ itself appears to be out of place in regard to these 
newer practices. The problem of the violence of institutional discrimination appears to be 
addressed by legislating discriminatory practices, but, we should also be attentive to how 
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this merely marks the transformation of practices from overt discrimination to more 
covert forms of discrimination. In the transformation of practices we see a way in which 
violence avoids being identified as such.   
Aesthetics seems to require that one think through the problem of violence as a 
present agitation with appearance, intelligibility, or articulation. Aesthetics regards the 
politics of violence at its leveling activity, meaning, and relationality. Jacques Rancière 
argues that the political starts where that part that has no part makes a claim to inclusion.
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He writes: “For all time, the refusal to consider certain categories of people as political 
beings has proceeded by means of a refusal to hear the words exiting their mouths as 
discourse.”3 According to Rancière, the political is properly the intensification of a public 
through a re-sensitivization toward those groups that are excluded. He writes that, 
“Political activity is whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes the 
place’s destination. It makes visible what had no business being visible, and makes heard 
a discourse where once there was only place for noise; it makes understood what was 
once only heard as noise.”4 He argues that the negative aesthetic of oppressed groups 
interacts with the political as a type of dissensus or resistance that puts the conditions of 
normativity in question or places these terms out of play relative to what traces a negative 
relation to politics in aesthetics.
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By following the negative trace of aesthetics through politics, we find a resistance 
that is attempting to articulate itself as politically significant, as publically present. This is 
always the harbinger of violence at the aesthetic edge of publicality. One can recall a time 
when child abuse had no name or escaped under the double guises of “punishment” and 
“domestic matters” and yet there still existed a need for a way to address the politics of 
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this violence and there was still a need to make this pattern of acts public as violence. 
Likewise, we might recall the subtle misinterpretation of sexualized language, behaviors, 
and attitudes that made up the workplace prior to the Anita Hill and Clarence Thomas 
hearings. The violence of sexual harassment escaped under the guise of “boys will be 
boys” or “that is the price of admission” and other clichés. Both states of affairs required 
a shock to the political façade that penetrated deep into the social formation that resisted 
the changes required at the level of law. Both transformations required that a socially 
pathological set of behaviors be recast in the public as violence. The normativity of a 
pathology that conceals practices as normative suddenly appeared to reorganize the 
public sphere’s sensitivity toward that domain that had not received public attention. 
Whether or not one can argue that it was only through an equal shock to the social and 
objective domain of aesthetics that they arrived at successfully transfiguring a mute 
subject to become audible as violence, I will argue that something of this nature is 
necessary for understanding the most persistent violence of racism in the present.   
This dissertation is about anti-Black violence because it is now that the significance 
of discourses about anti-Black violence is in danger of being completely loss in a public 
sense. Currently, discourses that address anti-Black violence appears misinterpreted, 
misshaped, ill informed, and out of place. I call this transformation of public meaning 
that governs this shift the post-racial and I identify the structure as a social complex, 
called “The Cassandra Complex.” Thus, the post-racial is only a symptom of a social 
complex. The post-racial is distinct in how it does not require or relate to our general 
ways of identifying racism, present or past. It is a structure that shapes public 
intelligibility, frames the oppositions that appear as available in response to violence, and 
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then negates the essential politicizing factor in the discourse. The Cassandra complex is 
about that violence that escapes recognition as political, but extends into aesthetics.
6
  
But why is this social transformation philosophically meaningful? This is a question I 
cannot answer straight away. I can only suggest that without a way of reframing many 
philosophical questions about the violence of racism, we will reproduce something 
philosophically ineffective. For instance, without the post-racial aspects of memory or 
identity, one can say that white violence is a matter of invisibility. It is a matter of not 
being included or not recognized as having a body that matters.
7
 One can also say that 
white violence is perpetrated through a restricted form of recognition. One can be 
recognized but only as that which is misinterpreted.
8
 All of these lead to a way of 
thinking about white violence as dependent on appearance, knowledge, or recognition. 
What happens when you have recognition but you still have the residual violence of 
negation as well? The problem persists, while the method of address seems to conceal 
and leave unproblematic that which is necessary to illuminate the problem. 
 Again, we might argue that white violence is a matter of habit. The habit can be of 
privilege or of ignorance.
9
 Whichever it is, there is a passive relation to violence that is 
conceded. White violence loses its agency, or it is a matter of habit. To address it all we 
need is education or the reshaping of habits. Yet again, it is conceivable that we can 
educate a person to eliminate the explicit forms of racism, while leaving the more 
discreet forms of violence intact. Moreover, in the post-racial era, ignorance and habit 
work as safe-havens for White violence.  
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We can see this clearly in the case of anti-Black violence. If we think that anti-Black 
violence is a matter of ignorance or misunderstanding, then we would have to account for 
how a history of lynching and a present of anti-Black violence is accounted for as a 
matter of ignorance rather than merely a lack of empathy. How can a history of anti-
Black violence be available to a relatively educated public and yet, not known at the same 
time?  
If the type of violence this study articulates is discreet and works through negation, 
then my objective is not to give analysis to those annoyances or offenses of everyday 
(Black) life. My goal is to trace how aesthetics pulls away from and negates the political, 
and likewise how the political pulls away from and negates the aesthetic. And while this 
study is cast in the mode of analysis of critical philosophy, it does not result in a 
synthesis, but rather I think it forms the basis of an exploration of what remains in how 
these two positions of the aesthetic and the political terminate in a negation of one 
another.  
 
a) Social Pathology as Harmonized Negation   
I call that violence that escapes identifying itself as such White violence. I call that 
social formation that continually misinterprets this White violence as violence a 
Cassandra complex. I mean this in its fullest Freudian sense. The term “Cassandra 
complex” suggests that there is something about social formation itself that cultivates a 
pathological aversion to drawing the discreet violence that grounds the most destructive 
and sustaining elements of racist violence into public discourse. I will argue that the 
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Cassandra complex is a work of aesthetics to the extent that it traces how our sensibilities 
are brought into conflict with themselves; and how this conflict establishes a type of 
normativity. The Cassandra Complex traces that pattern of social conditions that make 
the politically unbearable align with that form of aesthetics that presents itself as the 
anesthetic extreme of aesthetics. That is to say that the Cassandra complex is the series of 
social formations that appear where representation loses its meaning and becomes equal 
to the loss of representability.  
We can think of this as a limit to politics in that politics has become insensate to 
violence directed against itself via aesthetic negations. Therefore, aesthetic analysis of 
objective forms of anti-Black violence is just as necessary as political analysis. Why can 
one only talk about political progress in terms of representation, and only within this 
sphere in a limited sense? Why must our collective social memory redistribute and 
exchange memories that pay heed almost exclusively to the most salient images of this 
progress, or to the most brutal signs of its failure? I think there must be something like an 
implicit thesis operative that bolsters claims of social progress. While explicit attack, 
segregation, and discriminatory practices appear to be out of style politically,
10
 
discriminatory behavior seems to be only mildly legislated.
11
 This combination results in 
the same old political conclusion for Blacks: Black bodies are as disposable politically 
and aesthetically. Moreover, this implicit thesis makes sense of the claim that the social 
sphere is prey to that unresponsiveness that now has a similar result and a similar 
meaning to the unresponsiveness of the most explicit forms of racism prior to the human 
and civil rights movements. For civil rights era politics the violated body could be used 
effectively as a symbol to generate political awareness of dehumanizing circumstances, 
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and motivate political activity against the former un-articulated violence.  This does not 
seem to be the case in post-racial discourse. Now, while the symbol animates a social 
response, it also withholds political responsibility and political meaning through the 
visibility and recognizability of the violence itself. That is to say that the symbol and the 
activity itself appear as a harmonized negation. 
If we consider any of the recent cases of anti-Black violence, we see both racial and 
post-racial dynamics at play. For instance, consider the case of the murder of Trayvon 
Martin. Trayvon was a Black, seventeen-year old boy, who was stalked by George 
Zimmerman, a neighborhood watchman. After a brief confrontation, Trayvon was shot by 
Zimmerman. The police did not arrest Zimmerman for over a month. In this case, we can 
see at least two junctures of politics and aesthetics. First, we can see that the explicit 
violence of law and social recognition work to make Black bodies disposable at play. 
This is what identifies the case as involving some form of racism. But we can also see 
that there is a subtle violence that appears in how the case, once visible and public, fails 
to reach the level of public response. Likewise, political comments showed the same 
problem. President Barrack Obama addressed this case, by playing between the extremes 
of this juncture. He appealed to general sentimentalities between himself, his family, and 
by extension all families. He took a grotesque political failure and put a human face on it. 
He was quoted in the news as saying: “Obviously this is a tragedy. I can only imagine 
what these parents are going through. When I think of this boy, I think of my own 
kids.”12 He went on to say that: “If I had a son, he would look like Trayvon.” And he 
concluded by saying that “As Americans we all need to do some soul searching and have 
a serious conversation about race in this country.”13 While he humanized the victim and 
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personalized the situation, he also de-politicized the problem by making it public—at 
least aesthetically. Did that make it public enough? It may not have, because in post-
raciality, one can have demonstrations, conversations, or protests against such violence, 
but the law is not compelled by such displays. White violence merely modernizes itself, 
without being brought into contact with itself.   
While the explicit violence targeting Blacks in America appears intermittently as a 
reminder of the presence of White violence, institutionalized erasure, violation, and 
displacement have maintained a steady force. However, this mechanism is not restricted 
solely to the Black male population. I will argue that, (a) the object of the mechanism is 
to change its subject into a Black object, and that (b) the mechanism remains one of 
White violence no matter whom or what is responsible. 
 
b) The Politicization of Amnesia and  Mourning 
I hold that our present discourses on anti-Black racism are cast in historical terms, yet 
we seem to be caught in a time where we know history but do not recognize it as 
something we live with. We come to know our present violence as if it were a memory. 
Starting in this chapter, I will argue that the Freudian notion of a “complex” is powerful 
here, because it illustrates the social condition where we are alienated from memory on 
the one hand, and equally estranged from the most politically charged formations in our 
present, on the other.  
By tracing the memory that negates itself until it is only expressed in terms of 
misunderstanding, I draw the themes of the dissertation into comparison with the tragic 
Greek figure of Cassandra. Cassandra is the anti-hero of this dissertation because she is 
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the figure in Greek literature that underwent, and retold this history of Greek violence to 
the Greeks who in turn, misinterpreted her prophecy and thereby reinforced their 
complex. Her prophecies required that the Greek’s own history be heard as the exterior of 
a meaning reflected into the interior of the meaning of the present. It is the chorus who is 
the target of Cassandra’s prophesies.14 This is important in that the Chorus, which is the 
representative of the general public, suffers its own amnesia and insensitivity to its 
former explicit violence. It is Cassandra who bears the weight of making the general 
public sphere see itself as a pathology that has been repeated to the point of making its 
discord interpreted as harmony. It is Cassandra who appears to them to be the 
pathological subject. Unlike the chorus in Greek tragedies, I hope that we are better 
suited to recognize the import of that same old question that is being asked anew in both 
its harmony which it lives by, its discord by which that life is threatened, and what 
escapes at either end.  
Cassandra’s impact in the Oresteia is not only in how she articulates a past or a 
future, but also in how, with her, there is a failure to encounter the memory of violence. 
Let us remember that for the Greek political play to signify a progressive story that 
reconciles all past conflicts, each death must be accounted for and placed properly in the 
memory of the new Athens. But, what can we say about Cassandra? She is never 
mourned in the play. This may be that because she is such a minor character her death is 
insignificant. However, she is far more significant than might appear at first blush, and as 
such it is through her that the tragedy that purports to reconcile itself is interrupted by that 
aesthetically forgotten moment that is equally a political negation, a form disclosed only 
through mourning. In mourning the activity of political violence is the object of 
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interpretation, even when it can only be disclosed as a memory and its impact only felt 
aesthetically. Still the breakage it signifies remains very real. 
 
2. Forgetting and Its Shadow 
To look at memory from the side of its negation means that we need to focus on 
where memory is intertwined with forgetting. The classical way of characterizing the 
relationship between memory and forgetting is to think of them as being in opposition to 
one another. In Milan Kundera’s The Book of Laughter and Forgetting, for instance, he 
writes “The struggle of man against power is always the struggle of memory against 
forgetting.”15 If Kundera is right, the struggle of memory against forgetting is not 
analogous to the struggle that the powerless wage against the despots of power. It is 
analogous to struggle that gets waged once one’s power is recognized as becoming 
powerless. But, is this the same parallel that is most suited to the politics of memory in 
our time? It depends upon the memorability or forgettability of some dynamic that is 
raced, classed, and gendered. It is as much a matter of telling the story as it is a matter of 
tracing the fault lines that contribute to a collective repression. 
Let us approach the analogy from the side of aesthetics, since from this standpoint 
forgetting appears as a form of memory. We can start with the assumption that 
aesthetically, memory is the making present of something lost. As Augustine holds in his 
Confessions, memory is a process of returning from a state of being unsettled, at a loss, 
out of joint to one’s sense of self and time.16 Its meaning is closed as it reconciles the 
present with the recollection of the past. Memory is tied to a process of recognition that 
makes sensate that which only belongs to something gone. Augustine further suggests 
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that memory is the tracing of forgetting. He writes, “…when I remember memory, my 
memory is present to itself by its own power. But when I remember forgetfulness, two 
things are present, memory by which I remember it, and forgetfulness, which is what I 
remember.”17  This is to say that in the broadest sense, memory is relative to mourning. 
This is what distinguishes memory from mere cognitive habit, on the one hand, and mere 
narrative, on the other. He argues that forgetting is a memory that retains its form, but is 
at a loss as to its content. When I try to recall something, my memory presents the 
forgetting and cannot reproduce what is forgotten. Forgetting follows memory like a 
shadow, but what follows forgetting? Forgetting is a negation of our relation to the past, 
and as such, it is the disclosure of a type of anxiety externalized through memory and 
what negates itself from remembering. 
But is forgetting really a type of memory that is at its own limit, or is what we are 
talking about a different type of limit? Is this really the limit between memory and 
forgetting or forgetting and mourning? Mourning, according to Freud, makes the 
normativity of our life appear perverse. For Freud, mourning is the incorporation of 
absence in the present through return to that content that is no longer part of the life-ego 
structure.
18
 Mourning does not reconcile or console. While we might say that forgetting is 
the suffering of the way we negate the past, this negation may also be the only part left to 
play by memory. But in this sense, the question brought to the foreground is not a 
question of memory, but rather a question of history, which is the externalization of the 
whole domain of memory into the public sphere.  
History and memory have a unique aesthetic and political relationship in regard to 
what is negated from memory, history, or both. In “On the Concept of History,” Walter 
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Benjamin writes that history is not a matter of getting the telling of the past right. He 
argues, “Articulating the past historically does not mean recognizing it “the way it really 
was.” It means appropriating a memory as it flashes up in a moment of danger. ”19 He 
points out that history and memory are not simply a matter of narrative for narrative sake. 
Rather, our present relation to the past provides the material that may augment the 
aesthetically banal in the present, in a way that is politically active and in some cases 
toxic. According to Benjamin, the lost memory, however, politicizes the present to the 
extent to which its ideological content requires that we aesthetically relate to the past in a 
depoliticized manner. He states, “Everything about history that, from the very beginning 
has been untimely, sorrowful, and unsuccessful, is expressed in a face—or rather a 
death’s head. And although such a thing lacks…all humanity—this is the form in which 
man’s subjection to nature is most obvious…”20 The negation from the material traces a 
history that retains its dialectic in its stillness. Mourning traces a negation of memory 
against the boundary line of meaning and memory. Mourning makes aesthetic a 
regression of memory and meaning. What meaning appears at the intersection of memory 
and mourning? What meaning appears where memory is disclosed only as a forgetting? 
 What seems to be disclosed in ‘mourning’ is a resituating of the question of meaning 
and memory in light of aesthetic regressive formations. In The Gift of Death, Jacques 
Derrida poses a question of memory and mourning as a question of why we suffer from 
an ignorance of our history.
21
 He argues that to be haunted by a problem that retreats 
from the ontologizing conjuration of metaphysics is to be left out of joint.
22
 But our 
“being out of joint” demarcates the sphere of being itself that is non-synchronic with 
time; this condition enacts its own disarrangement. Derrida suggest that this 
19 
 
disarrangement is what brings forward questions of right (Recht) and questions of justice 
which dialectically terminate the normativity of law and justice.
23
 It brings these forward 
as questions, but memory remains the anesthetic to these questions.    
The violence that memory mourns in the regressive social formations of the present is 
the continuation of White violence as a symptom of the Cassandra complex. In a sense, 
we are all distorted by a subtle form of White violence that places us at odds with 
ourselves. I want to show this displacement by engaging how white violence appears in 
how we depoliticize the objective side of memory, the objective side of mourning, and 
the objective meaning of aesthetics. I will consider mourning further over the course of 
the dissertation, but for now I want to focus on the anxiety that is disclosed at the juncture 
of aesthetics and politics. 
 
a) Negation in Place of Memory 
The relation of the activity of memory to mourning suggests that discreet violence is 
always legible in that it can always be traced by analysis of the structural conditions that 
identify its locus of activity and how it is embrocated in a network of undisclosed 
meanings. It also suggests that discreet violence is always enacted by some set of 
material and objective forms of negation. If we restrict our analysis of violence solely to 
its most explicit forms, then we lose much in that we never arrive at its dialectical 
completion. Violence denotes a break with law, morality, or normativity. It is given to 
particulars, regardless of whether it indicates a particular group, or a single agent. In this, 
we leave open the door through which it retains the ability to escape. For instance, when 
we think of violence committed against the state as embodied in the image of “the Middle 
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Easterner,” the social ego is in a state of non-identity. But the same is true of images of 
the most explicit White violence against Blacks. If we look at the image of White police 
officers using dogs to attack Black children, the ego reverts to a state of non-identity or 
negation from identification. In negation, however, we will see how one side of this 
relation retains its meaning to memory or history, while the other side only retains its 
meaning in the way that it pulls away from the other. But in this pulling away, we can 
trace the negation that is foundational for its meaning—and it is this relational negation 
identifies the philosophical form of mourning that is politically oriented. 
Mourning suggests that what lay reconciled in memory is active. On the one hand, we 
have a synchronic representational memory of history. But, raising a critique to this, 
Benjamin states, “Historical ‘understanding’ is to be grasped, in principle, as an afterlife 
of that which is understood; and what has been recognized in ‘the afterlife of works,’ in 
the analysis of ‘frame,’ is therefore to be considered the foundation of history itself.”24 
History, in this sense, is productive; it bears a relationship to knowing and the known. It 
embodies a power of representation in that it is synchronous with a will to represent. He 
states, “Every present day is determined by the images that are synchronic with it: each 
‘now’ is the now of a particular recognizability.”25 But as Benjamin further points out, 
synchrony is not the basis of political progress, solely because it can be a sign of 
progress. He argues that what appears as progress can also be a sign of decline. 
Moreover, Benjamin states, “History decays into images, not into stories”26 and “In other 
words: the image is dialectics at a standstill.”27 In this standstill that effaces the dialectics 
of memory, the political potentialities of history are reduced to its symbolic referent, 
referring to nothing other than itself. For Benjamin this presents the very real danger of 
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detaching meaning and appearance. What is important for us, at this point, is that he 
provides a critique of history in a way that orients us toward the negations that remain 
active and in dialectical motion, despite their displacement. While this former approach is 
better suited for post-racial memory, we need to build it out of a memory of White 
violence itself.  
 
b) The Dialectic of Racial Memory and Forgetting  
The dependence of White violence on a relation to memory and history can be seen in 
the way the history of anti-Black violence changes from overt social forms of segregation 
to the erasure or devaluation of Black history. In one of the few studies on African 
American memorials, Civil Rights Memorials and the Geography of Memory, Owen 
Dwyer and Derek Adlerman point out that,  
…the contributions of African Americans to American history were largely neglected 
prior to the 1970s, with the significant exception of the various Frederick Douglass 
high schools and Dunbar parks that dotted the segregation era’s landscape. Since the 
appearance of King Streets, the historic invisibility of African Americans on the 
cultural landscape has seemed to be in retreat —and, this is a situation impossible to 
conceive of without the broad political and social change ushered in by the [Civil 
Rights] Movement.
28
  
The advance that Dwyer and Adlerman point out here is significant, but the violence 
itself changes its form. When ignoring memory seemed to fail, defunding it seemed to 
prevail. Defunding had the advantage of allowing someone to claim the memorial had 
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value, but denying its existence. In 1981, when M.T. Billingsley petitioned the 
Chattanooga City Commission to name a street after Martin Luther King Jr., there was 
public agreement to the naming of a street after King, but disagreement on where and 
why. Billingsley intended to rename Ninth Street (East and West) to commemorate the 
birthday of King and as a symbolic recognition of recent civil disturbances in the Black 
community. The year before, three White men were charged with shooting four Black 
women on that street. But, two of three White assailants were acquitted, and this sparked 
riots in the community. The street was to be in honor of Martin Luther King, but it was 
also intended to be a gesture of reconciliation for the violence on that street. At the time, 
T.A. Lupton, a local developer, stated that although he was in favor of honoring Martin 
Luther King by renaming a portion of Ninth Street after him, “West Ninth Street is not 
related to Dr. King…. [It] is no longer a solid Black street. It is no longer a residential 
street or a rundown business street. It is a top class business street that can play a great 
part in the future of Chattanooga.”29 But this signals a deeper sense of the present’s 
relation to memory as forgetting. 
Forgetting the past violence constituted a particular form of White violence that 
seemed to only be operative on the level of aesthetics because institutionally, anti-Back 
violence continued in the form of a visible lack. From the early 1980’s to the present, 
there has been general recognition of a lack of sites to African American memory, as one 
of the many results of the history of anti-Black racism. Several responses have followed, 
such as: the acknowledgement of Black history through a month of education and/or days 
of service, the production of several sites for memorializing the civil rights movement 
throughout the American South, and several forms of honoring specific civil rights 
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leaders such as Rosa Parks and Martin Luther King Jr. The general fear that the history of 
the African American experience of racial violence may be forgotten seems to have been 
corrected by these efforts. The suggestion that images to the African American past is 
now a sign of progress effaces a deeper problem suggested in Benjamin’s comments on 
history, namely, that the image that is permitted is still the distorted image that a racist 
society desires.
30
 It has changed from the humble slave groveling at the feet of the 
benevolent slave master, to images that emphasize the role of Whites in “the good fight” 
of the civil rights era. These tend to be permissible images of White violence in the past. 
But even in the recognition of White violence something undergoes a principle negation.   
The permissible images of history may be seen further in the struggle to produce 
memorial arts that represent the complex structure of this negative aesthetic space. For 
instance, to some extent, memorials to African American history have become 
synonymous with memorials to the civil rights movement. These are distinctly 
representative of the time and events beginning with the Brown versus the Board of 
Education decision, 1954, to the Martin Luther King Jr. assassination in 1968. Many of 
the memorials dedicated to African American history commemorate King’s life and the 
places of the civil rights movement that relate to him.
31
 Contrary results follow from this. 
While the iconic status of King’s image marks a great form of recognition, it also works 
to obscure the complexity of the social criticism of the inhuman social treatment of non-
white people in America, against which the civil rights movement erupted. 
If the problem of racial violence that appears to be connected to the lack of memorials 
were solely that there is a need for increased visibility, then Dwyer and Adlerman’s 
conclusion is correct—and to some extent they are correct. For instance, it may not be 
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that White and Black communities disagree that the production of memorials are 
important. However, arguments based on aversion allow one to be in favor of the 
production of memorials to honor Black history, but they are against any form that this 
may take. Any proposed form of commemoration may be resisted because it is not 
enough, or it is not the right time, or that any place may not be the right place for the 
representation to be established. Black memorial sites are important, but they must be 
restricted to the part of the city that can be avoided by White economic interests. This 
violence is not simply the violence of restriction and devaluation in the general sense, but 
particular to the effects of the intersections between aesthetics, politics, and memory. 
 
c) White Forgetting/ White Ignorance 
Recognition politics is often paired with standpoint epistemology. In the context of 
the philosophy of race, racism is a matter of knowing or not knowing. It rarely identifies 
the former type of racism which was perpetrated as a knowing de-humanization. In 
Charles Mills’s The Racial Contract, this negation is cast in terms of the positive 
development of both contract political theory and the flourishing of Western culture on 
the backs of Black labour. In light of this, however, Mills argues that what was violent 
about slavery was not the cultural exploitation that motivated its continuance, nor was its 
violence essentially the erasure of political affectivity. Rather, he argues that the essence 
of its violence was an initially aesthetic negation: the force of the violence of slavery was 
in his or her acceptance of his/her own self-negation of personhood.
32
 The subtle violence 
of custom, regulation, and, in short, the totality of social practices employed to render the 
Slave as Slave (i.e. the negation of person) were part of the violence in addition to the 
25 
 
most explicit acts of beating, whipping, and burning, etc. This makes it a matter of 
aesthetics, on the one hand, and the interpretation and knowledge of history, on the other. 
Mills argues that a willful ignorance to the African American past is an effective form of 
violence, reproducing the Negro the White community wants to see, and causing an 
aesthetic poverty that retains the violence of the former explicit violence.
33
 He writes: 
“Racism as an ideology needs to be understood as aiming at the minds of nonwhites as 
well as whites, inculcating subjugation.”34 And while this violence underscores a 
negative aesthetic relationship within the community, to itself, Mills’s point reflects how 
a broader historical view of the violence directed against African Americans is 
synchronic with a political ideology of progress. 
Advancing from Mills’s view, however, we can say that forgetting in terms of 
ignorance of the past is no longer a legitimate refuge of White violence. Rather, with the 
bloom of memorials to the African American past, such a basis seems to be dissipating 
quickly. But the overuse of civil rights images for the purposes of addressing the lack of 
memorial sites to African American history seem to address the former violence of 
forgetting through the erasure of memory, while facilitating another form of forgetting by 
supplying memory. Therefore, we have to venture on a new way of thinking about the 
discreet and objective side of violence. For if we posit that the violence is due to a lack of 
visibility, we can see evidence to the contrary in the proliferation of sites of memory. But 
we might notice that only a selected type is in proliferation. And in this we would have to 
posit that while the original discriminatory violence reduced visibility, the new 
discriminatory violence increases visibility. This can be seen in the way MLK streets are 
traditionally located in traditionally poor and/or traditionally Black neighborhoods, while 
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reassigning non-Black names to streets in traditionally White and emerging prosperous 
neighborhoods.  
The counterexample of the segregation of memory is found in the Martin Luther King 
memorial located in Washington D.C.’s Memorial Park, where one can see that the 
dialectical interpretation of memory as forgetting is fully on display. On the one hand, the 
symbol of civil rights is now located in the national capitol and comparable to 
monuments symbolizing historical power and progress. This symbol of MLK distorts our 
relationship to history as much as it reminds us of our past. The inclusion of MLK in 
Memorial Park signifies a present point at which we, as a community, can recognize our 
past. But it also conceals the extent to which White violence penetrated and still 
penetrates our social and aesthetic environment. Dialectically, the image of MLK is 
surrounded by passages from his speeches. Many visitors to the initial viewing of the 
monument commented that his words sounded like he could be talking about today. 
Oddly enough, then, this memorial introduces a sense of loss that is contemporary and is 
represented as memory. It introduces a memory that also mourns. But it is this strange 
impasse through which memory facilitates forgetting that identifies the post-racial, which 
is the discursive tactics that displaces discourses on race. While there is much to be said 
about post-racial discourse, I will focus mainly on how this discourse relates to public 
memory and designates a distinct discourse itself as post-racial memory. 
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3. Post-Racial Discourse, Post-Racial Memory 
Epistemic ignorance and White forgetting (or White amnesia) is conducive to 
concealing the post-racial. What is denied in the memorial discourse is changed into the 
saturated content that forms a deafening effect in post-racial discourse. In either case, 
memory shows up as the anesthetic of politicization. The post-racial characterization of 
the history of American racism allows for the present community to hold that the racist 
past need not be a locus of present cultural identity. This sensibility further forecast a 
series of post-racial gestures that demarcate the way race, racism, and oppression have 
come to be forms of discourse that are out of style in the present political context. 
However, I think that such a sensibility misconstrues the dynamics of racism in relation 
to history and politics, in general, and conceals a deep and subtle crisis that brings into 
close relationship the bestial past that this “humanitarianism” wishes to disown. Post-
racial discourse has several striking features that form the basis of a power structure or a 
complex. 
Mills argues that White ignorance underwrites a form of erasure that appears as a 
denial of knowledge, or a form of amnesia in regard to the history of White violence 
against Blacks.
35
 Mills claims that ignorance is both a belief in a false notion and the 
absence of a right notion.
36
  He explains that “white ignorance” is attributed equally to all 
groups, despite one’s standpoint, since it is the poverty not only of what can or should be 
known, but the poverty in knowing what is known generally. He states,  
The erasure of the history of Jim Crow makes it possible to present the playing field 
as historically level, so that current black poverty just proves blacks’ unwillingness to 
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work. As individual memory is assisted through a larger social memory, so individual 
amnesia is assisted by a larger collective amnesia.
37
  
Mills argues that through a form of epistemological ignorance, White indifference to 
Black suffering is not only a matter of a lack of historical consciousness, but a matter of 
aesthetics. What follows from Mills’s argument is a critique of forgetting as part of White 
violence. Is this merely a struggle for recognition or the legitimacy of a knowledge 
claim? Is this not also the struggle of memory against forgetting? And, is this struggle 
really a matter of making the past present or keeping memory retained? Or, rather, is this 
struggle a matter of establishing meaning within the social appearance of negation? If, so, 
then I think that Mills’s understanding of ‘White amnesia’ is code for a poverty of 
meaning and not simply a lack of memory. This suggests that the amnesiac is both the 
conduit of anti-Black violence and the champion of the post-racial at the same time. The 
result is that the negation of Black political power is concealed via the anesthetic effect of 
memory, reducing the history to a series of symbols without content. This is to say that 
post racial discourse is involved in the de-politicization of memory. The content of 
memory is regarded as a matter of absence, even when there is representation; it is 
regarded as a matter of ignorance, even when there is knowledge. 
We can consider post-racial discourse from the side of politics. The political emerges 
as a type of exception, i.e. an exception to a history of racism.
38
 In post-racial discourse 
we can see how our use of memory as forgetting foreshadows a type of crisis.
39
 We can 
also see that this use of memory moves against the main theses of the political philosophy 
of oppression, in that this philosophy relies heavily on the philosophy of history. In the 
United States, post-racial discourse may be a sign of a politics that furthers the politics of 
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White supremacy by both removing the legitimacy of race-discourse in the present and 
from the present and removing the politics of White supremacy from history.  
In part, what goes unsaid in post-racial discourse is that the post racial is only 
possible if the history of White supremacy as a political institution is cast in innocent and 
a-historical terms. Furthering this argument, in Paul Taylor’s “After Race, After Justice, 
After History,” he claims that the present post-racial political discourse aggrandizes the 
present community as the culmination of the achievements of civil rights era politics and 
ideals.
40
 He argues that this is a way of enacting disaffiliation with a violent and inhuman 
past rhetorically without having to enact it politically as well.
41
 Post-racial discourse, 
therefore, may capture the anti-racist’s ideals of society, but all too often, it politically 
benefits the embedded ideals of White supremacy by eliminating the position from which 
renewed efforts that focus on the dynamics of race and power may be waged legitimately. 
To be more precise: what is negated is the ego-identity, on the one hand, and the broader 
politicization of this sphere, on the other. Because of this effect, White violence needs to 
be seen more directly as a power structure and a structuring of politics that also results in 
a structuring of the way the present society relates to its history.  
If present political interests intervene in representations of history, then that which 
goes unsaid in these interventions needs to be made explicit. When White supremacy is 
ignored as a power structure and its history abandoned, the political becomes conditioned 
as another form of White supremacy. Post-racial discourse that takes into account the 
present historical and political stakes may provide more analytic focus on the way that 
the history of anti-Black racism is intertwined with the present symptoms of a politics. 
By thinking of the post-racial as a conditioning of public discourse, we will see how 
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White violence is wedded to a systemic social form that conceals the presence of itself. 
But this unfolds only within the development of a suspicion of the role of representation 
in memory, in general, and the difference between aesthetic domains of the political, in 
particular. Hence, the analysis of sites of memory and what they reveal about the 
reproduction of the violence of oppression in terms of aesthetic analysis of the role of 
representation, recognition, and absence.  
Cultural amnesia constitutes a form of poverty that extends beyond social and 
economic poverty and inequality; it is a type of poverty that retains the impoverished 
within a condition of vulnerability to certain forms of disaster. Likewise, Naomi Zack 
argues that despite the elimination of explicit and overt forms of racism, in the context of 
disaster, racist forms of inequality are magnified.
42
 What also follows is that this 
vulnerability repeats the former disaster as a rupture with the space and time of cultural 
memory. Thus, a production or reproduction of cultural amnesia leads back to 
consideration of the way that past explicit violence of anti-Black racism continues in 
present forms of absence, erasure, and misperception. 
Both Mills and Taylor identify the key features that enable the shift of racist discourse 
to post-racial discourse by bringing the content of history and the present unifying forces 
of the community into contact with its own self-negation. However, they retain then 
analyses appropriate to the most explicit forms of violence and envelop their insights 
under the umbrella of White supremacy. I think we can only see this correctly by thinking 
about it on its most subtle and most widespread level—we need to consider its effects in 
their negations, which is to say that we need to consider it as a social pathological 
complex, a set of symptoms that we have just described as negations.  
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I want to show that the set of negations that allow post racial memory to be effective 
conceal racial discourse by reproducing its image everywhere. The symptoms of this are 
not matters of repression, but evade the ego identity via aesthetic anesthetics.
43
  The 
Freudian concept of repression applies directly to the aesthetic analysis of the social 
pathology of anti-Black racism, because it is continually that which is “turned away,” or 
the object of aversion.
44
 Freud states that repression “demands a persistent expenditure of 
force.”45 Repression also indicates a domain of history, but its aesthetic apparatus is a 
form of aesthetic absence. However we should revisit this one question: What is the 
significance of a history of anti-Black racism that affects the aesthetics of the memory of 
the past and the significance of memorial arts? I will examine this question at length in 
the next chapter.  
When the domain of memory and history is also the space of displacement particular 
to nonwhite racial groups, White violence needs to be further understood as a power 
construct facilitating both overt and discreet forms of racism.
46
 The aesthetic aspects of 
the philosophy of the history of anti-Black racism does not seek mere representation, nor 
mere inclusion, but attempts to disentangle the act of suppression of memory from the 
mere lack of memorial sites. The resolution of the politics of memory in regard to anti-
Black racism is not simply one that can be solved by mere inclusion, but rather, requires 
recognition of the way aesthetics retains a history of violence reproduced in the tradition 
it is a part of. Similarly, Angela Davis argues, “The civil rights movement demanded 
access, and access has been granted to some. The challenge for the twenty-first century is 
not to demand equal opportunity to participate in the machinery of oppression. Rather, it 
is to identify and dismantle those structures in which racism continues to be 
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embedded.”47 Identifying the discreet ways White supremacy continues to be reproduced 
along aesthetic and political grounds is nothing short of the identification of the continual 
forms of normativity of this violence, which continue to be reproduced. 
 
4. The Cassandra Complex 
As I have said, the Cassandra Complex is not a work overly concerned with 
memory although this seems to be its main object. It is concerned with a type of relation 
that appears dimly in the present. To describe racism under the rubric of a complex is not 
to show how it does not involve personal responsibility, or personal choice; it does. But I 
want to restrict the analysis to exactly those aspects of racism that are objective. 
Complexes in Freud are objective; they indicate a relation of the ego to itself, by 
negation. It is in the foregoing sense that the dynamics of remembrance indicates the 
social pathological complex that is the Cassandra complex.
48
 Furthermore, if, as Freud 
suggests, pathology can be analyzed from egological forms of aversion and unconscious 
tactics of evasion and protection, then the way White violence continues as a social 
pathology needs further examination. This complex can first be seen in how the political 
use of forgetting and memory take shape in aesthetic analysis of the past. 
Furthermore, the analysis of memory is essential to understanding the present 
forms of pathology. The pathological, according to Freud, appears and is recovered 
through the psychoanalyst’s ability to provoke forms of remembrance in the analysand, 
making the remembrance representable for the subject’s cognition. According to Freud, 
the pathology is not contained in what the analysand remembers, but in what the 
analysand repeats unconsciously; it is what he or she cannot stop repeating in his/her 
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neurotic behavior.
49
 The neurotic behavior forms a symbolic pattern for the 
psychoanalyst, which allows identification of the context through which the complex is 
maintained and reproduced. Thus, a social pathology appears only in terms of how the 
public discourse evades recognition of its own violence.   
Similarly, “aversion,” in this sense, describes a social pathology that illuminates 
the significance of present forms of anti-Black racism. I think the symbolic parallel for 
this complex is found in the mythic figure of Cassandra. Cassandra is a particularly 
effective symbol of the social pathology that forms out of a history of anti-Black racism, 
because of the way she is represented as the object of oppression, torn from her historical 
and ethical context, primarily because of her relation to the field of representation and to 
the violence of the present and the violence of history.
50
 What I am describing as the 
Cassandra complex is the condition where violence becomes a normative mode of 
perception that hides from public sites of recognition and, in this case, appears only in the 
way the community or culture divests itself from the object of recognition. It is in the 
way the aesthetic and the political form a political ontology that pathologically hides the 
way former violence is inscribed in the present. 
The examples that I have provided in this chapter indicate how the aesthetic 
analysis shows the continuity with which a destabilized politics is reproduced. They also 
show the extent to which aesthetic forms of violence become part of the normative 
function of social consciousness and social sensibility. The problem of assuming that the 
production of memorials is sufficient for reconciliation moves too quickly to a distortion 
of history in the memorial representation, by rendering the past forgettable. This form of 
aversion to the production of memory conveys a broader defense of a political structure 
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that remains largely one indebted to the benefits of white supremacy. As a result of these 
arguments and strategies, white supremacy appears to enclose itself in strategic forms of 
negativity, but it is in negation that the politicized content appears. Furthermore, social 
pathology does not indicate the actuality of a pathology in any particular member of the 
society, because any particular member may be able to function perfectly fine within the 
conditions of the society. Rather, it is a description of social modes of behavior that one 
does not find one’s ego invested in and the way what counts as functioning on the 
cultural level is a series of tactics, some of which reproduce the violence of former times, 
some of which reproduce the conditions that benefit a system of White violence, and 
some of which that hide both of the former benefits altogether.
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Cassandra reveals a social pathology that thrives on willful misunderstanding, 
which is an understanding that is in negation of itself. The essence of Cassandra’s tragic 
figure is twofold in that it consists in her being misunderstood, and going to her death 
without being mourned. But the misunderstanding is produced by the social sphere’s 
pathological formation in negation. When Cassandra first appears in Aeschylus’ 
“Agamemnon,” Clytemnestra (Agamemnon’s wife) regards her as close to being 
inhuman, because she believes she cannot speak or understand Greek.
52
 Rather she has 
nothing to say to individuals. Her presence can be described as a sensible absence and, in 
this way she symbolizes the inability to confront the products of one’s own connection to 
the production of violence. When she does speak, she says to the Chorus, “And yet, I 
know the Greek language (logos) all too well.”53 She knows not only the Greek language, 
but also its meaning, its reasoning, and its violence—that is to say she knows what the 
Greeks mean to themselves via their violence.  
35 
 
What does Cassandra speak about? What does she wrest from silence to transform 
into the audible space of the public? What dialectical content is moved from the death of 
repression into the life altered state of remembrance? In general, she speaks about the 
history of violence attached to that specific Agamemnon’s house, and how this violence 
is repeated within the present. The history of the violence is a known object for the 
hearers, but they fail to recognize it as the history one identifies with. Thus, when they 
fail to understand Cassandra, they are also disavowing any relationship to that past and 
can be said to be reproducing a political ontology of neglect. In this sense, the Cassandra 
complex reveals an aesthetic relationship to the reproduction of a political ontology of 
negation. Likewise, Benjamin points out that “Dialectical images are constellated 
between alienated things and incoming and disappearing meaning, are instantiated in the 
moment between death and meaning.”54 He argues that the condition in which death goes 
without recognition, but enfolds a history that resists recognition (thymos). But, just this 
tension between the image and absence, absence as image, that makes the political 
violence appear where aesthetically memory pulls away from representation. All 
complexes bring life close to that point where it is most vulnerable and the same applies 
to politics.   
The completion of the complex rest on the fact that Cassandra goes to her death to 
mourn, but is not mourned in return. When Cassandra passes through the doorway of 
Agamemnon, she goes to face her death. The chorus wonders how she can be so brave as 
to know her death and willingly go in and face it.
55
 She is driven back from 
Agamemnon’s door because “It is the smell of an open grave.”56 Thus, when Cassandra 
hesitates before the door of Agamemnon’s house, she is going to mourn the opposite side 
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of the social dynamics that produce and require her own death. She is not only bravely 
going in to face her fate, but she enters into the halls that produce that inverted time, time 
folded back on itself, from whence memory cannot escape.  
As an analogy to the politics surrounding African-American memory within a White 
supremacist politics, the countermovement of memory generates a present in which the 
past, and possibly the present, cannot mourn. Just as Cassandra enters the space where 
masculine supremacist powers control her life and death, but also into the space where 
her death will not be mourned, so too, aesthetic sorrow indicates this relation in the 
dynamics of African American memory in light of the unintelligibility, misperceptions, 
and amnesia associated with the Cassandra complex.  
Furthermore, Cassandra seems to be the complex that reminds one of a politics too 
heavy to bear, and so, must become aesthetically antagonistic against all that can be made 
aesthetic or inaesthetic—she is the symbol of negation within presence.57 This is to say, 
that which is repressed from appearing is a sign of what may be unrepresentable, 
shameful, or what precedes the cognition of judgment. What precedes the cognition of 
judgment is the aesthetics of judgment. It is the way in which the social tears away from 
memory and at the same time tears away from that which is unmemorable. In turn, what 
can only be remembered in its movement of evasion, in its being torn away, constitutes 
the symptom of the pathology and the formation of an undisclosed memory that the social 
sphere forms against and continually puts out of play. Let me further suggest that while 
post-racial memory allows for the proliferation of memorials, it does so only to facilitate 
forgetting. Post-racial memory is a problem in how the public sphere exhibits a form of 
amnesia when it comes to remembering anti-Black violence, on the one hand, and 
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anesthesia, when it comes to recognizing the political reiteration of former violence in the 
present. The next chapter will trace how the post-racial allows for the representation of 
memory to appear, while the meaning of that memory appears only insofar as it is 
anesthesized.   
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CHAPTER II 
THE RETURN OF THE AMNESIACS: POST-RACIAL 
MEMORY AND THE DEPOLITICIZATION OF MEMORY 
Forgetting is no mere vis intertiea as the superficial imagine, it is 
an active and in the strictest sense positive activity of repression, 
that is responsible for the fact that what we experience and absorb 
enters our consciousness as little while we are digesting it (one 
might call the process “inpsychation”) as does the thousandfold 
process involved in physical nourishment—so called 
incorporation. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals 
To illustrate the amnesia of post-racial memory, I will refer to the public memory 
of anti-Black violence of pre-civil rights memory as a contrast. In the summer of 1955, a 
14 year-old Black boy named Emmitt Louis Till travelled from his home in Chicago to a 
small town in Alabama to visit his cousins. Till was brutally murdered during his stay in 
Alabama for “whistling at a white woman.” The incident became the hallmark 
representation that made White violence a public matter. For some reason, despite a 
history of being indifferent to Black suffering, Till’s murder punctured the public sphere. 
The event is credited with being the precursor for civil rights politics and the source of 
reigniting collective efforts to lessen the effects of White violence against non-Whites.  
Like any other memorial, the documentary, Untold Story of Emmitt Louis Till, 
serves as much as a work of memory for the public. It keeps alive the memorial event of 
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his open-casket funeral that was to be, according to his mother, seared in the memory of 
all Americans. The documentary goes further. It chronicles the events surrounding his 
death. The documentary records the reflections and recollections of relatives and the 
memories that came to be characterized as normative of the time. It outstrips memory; it 
re-lives suffering from the standpoint of each relative. Emmitt’s mother recalls that he 
was aware of the differences in the racism of Chicago and the racism of the Deep South.  
The documentary humanizes the boy beyond the initial images and 
representations. It gives Emmitt Till a family and a life before his death. But, it also does 
less than the funeral did. The documentary also seems to make the event a private matter 
of recollecting. It is a trauma experienced by the family, and less so by the public sphere. 
It also seems to be indicative of a violence we no longer suffer from. The documentary 
frames the memory as historically important, but no longer relevant, and there is 
something true and something false in this. This chapter will focus on how memory 
appears as a broken site of resistance to present suffering.  
While I trace post-racial amnesia, I want to also trace the depoliticization of 
memory in the public sphere. There is something contemporary about the way many of 
the memories in the documentary conclude with some politicizing or de-politicizing 
feature. For instance, Emmitt’s mother recalls that prior to his trip to Alabama; he was 
coached as to what to be aware of in the South. He was reminded to keep himself safe, 
which meant to keep away from White violence. He was specifically coached on how to 
act around White people. He was reminded of the importance of policing his behavior in 
front of White people—especially in front of White eyes and White tongues, and of what 
to do to escape the grasp of White violence. None of this was enough, however. In an 
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instant, the boy who was described by his family as the beautiful, enthusiastic, and well 
mannered boy from Chicago somehow was transposed into that decaying historical figure 
of that nigger from the North. And, while we might cringe at the level and extremes of 
violence in lynching, what hits the deepest chord here is the way that this violence also 
symbolizes the discreet violence that Whites, Blacks and every other person lives 
through.  
Blacks are often trained to be aware of authority in particular ways that Whites 
are not. This training, then, as much as now, is as much about history as it is about the 
present and its relation to history. Blackness equals vulnerability. Blackness as 
vulnerability is the condition that one becomes aware of being born into, a condition that 
is always already there, which is to say that the Black body comes to know itself as 
always already ensnared in a circuit of White violence that masks the objectivity of the 
violence itself, and appears merely subjectively.  
How does post-racial memory relate to the former mode of White violence that 
Till suffered through? Why was memory a meaningful way of addressing this violence? 
In what way is it not meaningful anymore? What do we need to bring to the foreground 
for understanding a present mode of White violence through memory? The 
depoliticization of memory not only holds critical implications for memorial arts, but also 
for Black politics. In this chapter, I want to start by considering the meaning of memory 
in how it addresses former violence. Unlike the last chapter, however, I want to situate 
the meaning of memory by asking what remembers and what forgets in and through the 
memorial. I will then take up the question in the broader context of memorials to mass 
murder and then return to the issue of anti-Black violence. I will close these reflections 
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with critical considerations of the impact of depoliticization of memory and history for 
contemporary Black political theory. 
 
1. Amnesiacs and the Residue of Violence 
What is memory’s public relation to the violence it commits against itself? This 
was more or less our orienting question. Memory has a representational and passive 
meaning as well as an active and public meaning. In what way does the activity of 
objective memory reach a unity of these two meanings? Throughout the course of this 
chapter, I want to suggest that the relation of the present to past violence is one that slips 
between its political significance and the way we erase the aesthetic impact of that 
violence. The result is that memory may be public, but it appears as mere memory, which 
is to say that it appears depoliticized. But, let us examine what memorialization or 
commemoration means in its activity. 
 
a) Meaning, Memory, Memorialization  
One might say that the activity of memorialization has a phenomenological effect 
on the structuring of interpersonal dynamics of community through a shared 
representation of history. In Remembrance, Edward Casey claims that memory not only 
structures our experience and perceptions, but that it also structures a deep sense of place 
in the world.
1
 In this sense, the meaning of shared memory constitutes a “background” 
through which the place gains both internal and external significance to members of a 
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community, but this is an activity that is passively a there for the community.
2
 The 
background provided by the public’s memory is active in how it presents the conditions 
through which the present can be interpreted. The public’s memory, however, is both an 
indication of how the present values the past and a presentation of its own ability to 
empathize with the varying elements of its own community.
3
 The activity of memory, 
however, represents a past as much as it disciplines a collective present’s relation to 
history. The representation is not the most active signification of memorialization, 
because this signification remains secondary to how, and in what, way the memory 
implaces or disciplines what is disclosed in the present. 
While Casey overlooks the disciplining function of the public’s memory, he 
rightly focuses on the significance of memorials for communities in the activity of 
memorialization. He holds that the monuments, or rituals associated with commemorative 
acts, re-introduce the past into the present; they act as enduring (perduring) symbols, 
which promise that the memory will remain.
4
 Reconciling the past seems to require this 
type of acknowledgement, promise, or agreement that the past condition or violence has 
been overcome or resisted. The significance of the activity of commemoration is found in 
how it restores a sense of unity to community.
5
 Casey argues that this is achieved in 
memorialization because the act of memorialization allows for the community to form a 
new public identity, post-violence.
6
 Conversely, what a community cannot commemorate 
has not come to an end in a significant sense.
7
 All of this suggests that the activity of 
memorialization is complete when it compensates, repairs, or redresses the violence that 
shaped a former political or social identity. We can say that it raises the gesture of 
apology to a public aesthetic level. 
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While for White memory, commemoration may remain passive and insensitive to 
the way it relates to history, this is not the case for a group beset by violence in its history 
and in its present. We must be attentive to the way memory is also a critical tool for 
politicizing the public sphere. Houston Baker, in “Critical Memory and the Black Public 
Sphere,” argues that critical memory is the very faculty of revolution. He writes, “Critical 
memory, one might say, is always uncanny, it is always in crisis.”8 And it reshapes the 
discursive possibilities in the public sphere. He warns that memory and violence are 
always already political and can be used to promote conservative politics that fall into 
nostalgia. Aesthetics, in this sense, is used to depoliticize the public relation to history. 
But, Baker is equally not attentive to how post-racial memory achieves the same end. 
Memorials to Martin Luther King signal an aesthetic revolution, but not a political one. If 
we are to pursue what is at heart critical in memory, we need to be more critical about 
what this form of memory means to the dynamics of our public sphere. 
At least two problems follow Casey and Baker, however. First, the activity of 
memorialization may have as its end unification, but there is no reason why this end can 
only be achieved by reparation or resolution. If the memorial has as its goal the unity of a 
community, it only entertains the goals of reconciliation as long as the symbol aligns with 
the interest of the community. Therefore, it may unify by facilitating forgetting, just as 
much as it may unify through memory in its most passive form. Second, Casey fails to 
address what happens with memory while the history that has been torn out is under 
censure, or repressed, which is to say that he fails to address the depoliticization of 
memory. This complicates the way in which historically abused groups relate to the 
politics of history, and it complicates the aesthetics of memory. It is a problem in how the 
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violence is embrocated between the depoliticizing of memory and the social implications 
of forgetting in order to unify a present; violence disappears from the social aesthetic 
landscape with the result of continuing to exert the former explicit violence in a more 
dispersed way. How does the White violence of memory appear as a form of redress, on 
the one hand, and amnesia, on the other? 
Memory suffers amnesia to resolve an anxiety that appears only at the limit of the 
public sphere. The public sphere is central to understanding where anestheticization 
occurs. It is not just part of social discourse, but discourse that is public and informs the 
deepest structures of publicality. The question of the meaning of the activity of memory 
in relation to violence reveals a discreet consequence that is not foreign to anti-Black 
violence, but is amplified in post-racial memory. We will see how this is at play in 
contemporary discourses that show an anxiety about the making racist dynamics of 
violence public. 
 
b) The Anesthetics of Memorials: Tulsa Oklahoma   
Although it has been almost forgotten in both local and larger consciousness of 
the public sphere, before there was Emmitt Till there was the Tulsa Oklahoma “race 
riots” of 1921. As opposed to publicality of the Emmitt Till case, the Tulsa massacre was 
largely ignored in the public sphere. It has become an enduring symbol of White 
indifference because, although when it is referred to it is known as the most violent 
incident of lynching in U.S. history, it has also been the most extreme case of public 
amnesia.
9
 In 1921, race riots ensued after some charges that a Black man raped a White 
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woman. No foundation was ever found for these charges. The white mob mobilized, and 
the riot resulted in an estimated 300 Black deaths in a single night. It is also estimated 
that over 8,000 inhabitants were left homeless. Forty blocks were destroyed, resulting in 
approximately 1,256 destroyed homes. Businesses were burned to the ground, leaving 
only the traces of the railway tracks that used to neatly serve as the stitching that bound 
the two thriving parts of the town together.
10
  
Periodically, around major anniversaries, someone would write an article or begin 
a campaign for recognition of the debt owed to the survivors of this event. One might 
recall that the racial dynamics of the city had not always been how they are now, for 
instance. This seems to suggest that something of the decimation survived as memory. As 
a response, Tulsa gathered funds to construct a memorial called “Reconciliation Park,” 
which was completed in 2005. The John Hope Franklin Center for Reconciliation serves 
as a community center, park, and has a museum component that documents the city’s 
history, including the documents of the riot. No legislative or legal form of address has 
been established and no reparations have been paid to the survivors. Now approximately 
40 survivors remain living and although there are increasing efforts to provide iconic 
forms of remembrance, the park still stands as a memory in its most alienated form.
11
  
Tulsa, Oklahoma is not unique simply because it is the site of the most extensive 
lynching in U.S. History; it is also the site of the most extensive campaign to forget 
history. No one was ever charged with the murders. No one was ever held accountable. 
Worse yet, no reparations have ever been paid to the families or to the survivors. And still 
worse, the incident has been all but erased from the history and the collective memory of 
the nation and the people of Tulsa. But the curious aspect of this campaign of forgetting 
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is that it is helped along by the symbolic memorialization. The park works to remind 
symbolically, but it also allows for memory to serve as the basis of forgetting. It is not 
that there is a lack of information, or an absence of representation: the stories have been 
written or retold, the memorial exists, but there is still a pattern of neglect which 
constitutes waiting for the memory to die. At heart, it is not ignorance, but something that 
can only be thought of as an anesthetic of memory. The result is not simply that the past 
is not remembered, but that history is depoliticized. 
If the park does not actively instigate memory, then what is its activity? I think we 
can answer this in two ways. First, at its basic level, the symbol, in the form of a park, is 
there, but the memory that the park symbolizes is still not public. Because it is not public, 
the memorial does the remembering, while the general population does the forgetting. 
Second, it remains politically impotent. Although the event makes the news every so 
often, it is not a matter of forgetting or amnesia or ignorance. It is a matter of 
anesthetization to history—or, to say this in a different way, history is reduced to the 
facts about the past, or is aesthetically important, but inept in the present. Therefore, 
history is depoliticized, even while it remains socially present. 
 
c) The Anesthetics of Politics in the Case of Trayvon Martin 
The past is not the only disclosure of memory, but also an indication of the 
present. The same slippage of memory can be illustrated in the case of the murder of 
Trayvon Martin. Trayvon, who was murdered by the self described neighborhood 
watchman, George Zimmermann, illustrates the extreme case of that general mechanism 
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that makes all Black bodies vulnerable as a resource for devaluation. Much like Emmitt 
Till, Trayvon was murdered for suspicion based on his race. While the law was explicitly 
against the actions of George Zimmerman, he was apparently immune from it. Much like 
the Emmitt Till murder, for a while, Trayvon’s murderer appeared to be immune from 
charges and legal and moral responsibility. Again, in the way that the black body 
becomes devalued, it is not simply the murderer who is excused, but the structure of 
White violence.  
We should notice that Zimmerman acted and justified his actions as if he were the 
law. It matters little that Zimmermann is not White in characterizing his actions as White 
violence. He mimicked the social position that has the authority to negate Blackness, 
which calls the appearance of Blackness suspicious or attaches to it an implicit threat. 
Zimmerman profiled, stalked, and operated as the law, even if he did not officially have 
this authority. This mattered little to the law officials, because if they were in a similar 
situation, they likely would have done the same thing. His actions as violence escaped 
through a mechanism of ego-identity. Moreover, the violence of his action is only 
questionable, and may ultimately disappear, if blackness appears in the public sphere as 
violence in itself. White violence leaves open the appeal and the ability to respond, 
without corresponding responsibility. 
The activity of memory is also an interruption vis-à-vis history. Trayvon Martin’s 
murder legitimates itself in the same way that Emmitt Till’s murderers legitimated 
themselves, not only by finding a safety haven in the law, but by making clear the 
mechanisms of White violence in the way it erases its violence, disconnects its form from 
its content, and requires a particular form of amnesia to set the limits of social discourse. 
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While the body, in both cases, was an object of White violence rendering it disposable as 
a material object, it also appeared as indispensible, as a political symbol that re-
instantiates the order of White violence, which is never out of view, but always out of 
sight—and this is the negation that links these failures to the post-racial dynamic of 
present society.  
But we still have to deal with the splitting of aesthetics from politics and of 
politics from aesthetics, in the activity of memory. The Martin case has received a record 
amount of attention, representation, and recognition. But “attention” and “recognition” 
are not really at issue here. In what way does recognizing violence in this case depend 
upon the politicization or de-politicization of history? While the outrage against this 
violence is laudable, and it is not insignificant that 900,000 people marched in protest of 
this violence and demanded the arrest of the assailant, what remains protected is the 
subtle way that this violence connects to a history of displacement, disposability, and 
cancelation of Black politics. One still has the appearance of Black politics, but in terms 
of post-racial memory, this appearance is only a means for forgetting. One forgets that 
this results in the same ends that lynching sought, that the political response to Black 
deaths by the violence of Whites is a repetition that ricochets through every decade of 
this country. One forgets that this is not only a matter of killing Blacks, but a matter of 
how we relate to our racism through aesthetics. While the event is outrageous from the 
perspective of our contemporary mores, its truth about the political remains historically 
consistent.  
In the following sections I will argue that it is within the form of anesthesia that 
unfolds within memory, where we find this double bind that we will find the meaning of 
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memory as the involution of politicization (or de-politicization), even in the appearance 
of the political. I will try to show this a bit more clearly with reference to other types of 
memorial arts and then show how this affects Black political theory. 
 
2.  Counter-Memory as Countering Anesthetic Memory 
Instead of examining what claims the memorial makes in its representation, which 
appears to be its least active form in relation to memorials violence done against itself, I 
want to trace the anesthesia of memory as a clue as to how our aesthetic relationship to 
history is altered.  I will argue that what only appears as absence, and what simply fails to 
ever appear as representation, constitutes a de-politicizing change in the public’s aesthetic 
relationship to history. This means we need to trace how memory finds its most objective 
meaning in forgetting. But I also want to show this through contrast with similar political 
contexts of memory. Toward this effort, I will examine a few examples of memorials to 
Holocaust memory in Germany, and the Rwandan Genocide memorials. My purpose is 
not to point out that the post-racial dynamics in America are not operative in other 
cultural contexts—post-raciality may be, but it would need to be understood along with 
the way racism designates a particular political domain. What can be gained from 
examination of how other cultures address this challenge provides us with enough leeway 
to resituate the way we think of memorials in the American context. 
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a) Returning to Memory’s Suffering  
If we consider ourselves to be amnesiacs to the memory of horrors of our own 
violence, then Germans are antiquarians. Memorials to the Holocaust, in particular, have 
been largely dedicated to recognition and remembrance. The majority of these memorials 
are said to bear witness or provide images to capture the lives, times, and tragedies of the 
Holocaust. Many sites have been left as is to remain a permanent reminder of the places 
and times in which the Holocaust occurred. But, memory in this context seems to mean at 
least two things. First, there is a mimetic value. The repetition of the past as aesthetic 
remembrance functions as analogous to a continual remembrance. Memory becomes 
synchronous with the image. However, there is something effaced in this, where memory 
is also transmuted. Moreover, memory becomes static in its representation. The second 
meaning of the activity of memorialization is preservative. The representation that 
contains the sign of memory is not meaningful in itself or by itself, but only becomes 
meaningful in how its act preserves or traces the present’s distance from the past. 
Testimonials, preservation of sites, and any act that bears witness, is equally valuable 
here.  
  However, there is a central problem that becomes clearer if we focus on how 
Holocaust memory only bears witness. What is meant by the Holocaust cannot be 
remembered—or, a remembrance of it seems to reduce what ought to be remembered to a 
collection of acts, activities, events. What is remembered in the Holocaust, whether in 
and through images, or in spite of them? While the Holocaust means a burning out of the 
human, it signifies a liquidation of the human in form. The Holocaust signifies the 
violence of bringing a human totality to its end. The pre-Holocaust Jew is not the post-
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Holocaust Jew. Something ended and cannot be repaired or restored. Something did not 
end and remains despite the violence, namely the endless self-referring vulnerability to 
death in absence of law. And this is the violence that sparks anew the presence of an old 
suffering; a pain that persists always already as both background and foreground. The 
memorial does not reconcile, but announces the presence of an old pain that predates 
your individual arrival, and whose meaning is disclosed neither in your being nor in your 
memory.  
We should also ask a slightly different question: we cannot only ask what is 
disclosed through memory, but also what is closed through memory, since the activity of 
memory seems to be dependent on this closure. If, for instance, one never experiences, or 
there is erased from reflective experience, the immediacy of violence, then what is 
remembered is what results from the violence. If the mechanisms of violence itself are 
comparable to an apparatus, we never suffer from violence itself; we suffer under its 
activity (unter Leiden). If we look a bit closer at the meaning of the traditional memorial, 
its active perdurance is a way of apologizing for the past, or a public suffering. The 
German expression, Es tut mir Leid literally means that when there is an object that 
suffers, my suffering is there too. What suffers in memory is my present.  But what do we 
suffer from in the present? Is it the past violence of a present-memory between past and 
present? No, the negation of memory signals the objective aftershocks and aftereffects of 
the violence that alter the meaning-structure of the present. This has been the meaning 
that escapes the traditional memorial, but it is also the meaning that must be restricted 
unless the memorial itself only retains a commodity value. The commodity value of a 
memorial changes every return to suffer into an it that does the work of suffering. Every 
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apologetic gesture is changed into an it suffers, signifying the negation of memory into an 
object of neglect. What suffers is not the subject encountering the memory, but the 
memorial. Critical memory is replaced by a critique of aesthetic history in the way it 
interacts with the public sphere.  
Moreover, what is closed to memory produces the grounds for what turns away 
from the traditional forms of memory, but not away from memory. For instance, the 
contemporary Holocaust memorials called counter-memorials turn against the images of 
history and instead attempt to use the memorial as a way of evoking the suffering of 
absence. This means that the memory of the Holocaust is one contemporary Germans 
grew up with, but not one that stems from their past. These memories are often shrouded 
in silence or ambiguity, or communicated through a felt sense of loss and a memorial 
sense of what undergoes an aesthetic transformation of sense of memory that makes 
present the anesthetics of memory.   
Many of these works attempt to structure the memorial sites with a sense of 
absence. They highlight that aesthetic aspect of history as an interruption. For this reason, 
counter-memorials tend to violate the restrictions of mimetic representations and the 
serene placement associated with memorial arts in general, by not depending on the static 
image or the contemplative setting to enact the memorial.
12
 This makes abnegation, or 
self-consumption, the tool for making memory critical. For instance, Jochan Gerz and 
Esther Shelev-Gerz’s “Monument against Fascism, War, and Violence—and for Peace 
and Human Rights,” achieves this by establishing the first abnegation and self-effacing 
memorial. The memorial was forty feet high, three foot square, made out of hollow 
aluminum in the middle of Harberg’s commercial center. Members of the community 
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were encouraged to etch their names into the slate to show solidarity with anti-fascism. 
Thus, it was a temporary monument that was intended to represent the voices of the 
present community “against the process of forgetting Fascism.”13 Young writes that over 
the course of ten years the monument was lowered into the ground and resides beneath 
the city. While this monument served to interrupt and now displace memory from its 
traditional mode of representation and site of construction, it also interrupted everyday 
lives and replaced that interruption with absence as a type of interruption—making the 
effects of extermination sensible.  
With the Gertz and Shelev-Gertz memorial, there is no meaning in the site of 
memory, only an activity or aftereffect of the present depoliticization of memory. Young 
argues that “in effect, the vanishing monument has returned the burden of memory to 
visitors.”14 The retraction of the iconic structure and any reference to the object of 
memory makes sensible that process of erasure, and the responsibility of memory itself. 
The monument itself is buried or absent, depending on the visitors’ perspective. What 
this monument achieves is that absence is brought into the aesthetic space of political and 
cultural recognition. But it also places in the space of memory the way the present attends 
to its own condition of absence as a form of suffering. The memorial negates itself as the 
subject to do the work of memory and the work of suffering. Young points out that “[The 
Gertzs] have likened it…to a great black knife in the back of Germany, slowly being 
plunged “in each act of commemoration.” 15 What this shows in relation to discreet 
violence is that it is the objectivity of violence that is generally muted in memorialization, 
and this is exactly what a counter-memorial is in opposition to. 
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 If counter-memorialization is a turn toward the presence of violence in its own 
abnegation, as it inverts our relation to memory in representation, then it is equally a 
return to the inhuman that remains buried in our relation to history in the way that 
highlights the suffering of the public sphere negating memory and negating history. In the 
“Aschrott-Brunnen Memorial” at Kassel, 1987, Horst Hoheisel recreated the original 
“Aschrott-Brunnen Fountain,” but it is not simply a recreation of a symbolic fountain. 
While the fountain was originally a gift to the city by a well known Jewish family, it was 
also formerly known as “The Jews’ Fountain” during the Nazi regime. At one point it 
was the place where many Jews were gathered for deportation to work and death camps. 
And, finally, it was destroyed as part of Nazi destruction of Jewish artworks and culture. 
Hoheisel’s recreation is a negative monument in the sense that it is a concaved version of 
the original fountain that allowed the viewer to look into the hole where the “Aschrott-
Brunnen Fountain” once stood. By blowing up parts of the infrastructure in order to re-
create the fountain, the monument retains the violence of the former destruction. Young 
points out that the inverted fountain was intended to be “a mirror image of the old one, 
sunk beneath the old place in order to rescue the history of this place as a wound and as 
an open question, to penetrate the consciousness of the Kassel citizens so that such things 
never happen again.”16 Thus, Young argues that it was to function as a reminder of the 
former violence and a reminder to remember this memory itself.  
As reminders, we must ask: what do they record as memory of the nation’s 
violence against itself? They seem to record a public iteration of suffering in a state of 
amnesia. The fountain makes present all of the histories of that fountain. One meaning 
had to be buried for the other meaning to step forth. It is the enumeration of names, 
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events, and meanings that had been underwritten, traumatized, and suspended in history 
that appear in the concave fountain. Moreover, it allows the residues of anti-Semitism, 
the discreet violence that contorted between the first significance of the fountain, into the 
present. That is, the fountain lets the broken relation to the past is what makes the 
reminder also a reference to the present. What these arts in general underscore is that the 
traumatic cannot aesthetically be written in or written out of memory, if can only be 
gleaned, upon its movement between past and present, politics and aesthetics, or in how 
we return to history and efface history in the same movement. Likewise, the traumatic, 
according to Freud, can only be approached through interpretation of what makes itself 
known in how the symptom interrupts the present as a residue of the past. He advises that 
the analyst must seek to re-produce a trauma in the analysand as a “remembrance” 
(Gedenken) that is also being relived as “now” (Jetztzeit).17 The traumatic content uses 
memory as a manner of approach; memory is the configuration that allows for the trading 
of relations.  
 
b)  Memory Suffers the Present (Jetztzeit) of Forgetting  
Let us take another example. In 1994, between April to July, the Hutu, an ethnic 
majority in Rwanda, killed somewhere around 800,000 Tutsi, the ethnic minority. At one 
site, in Murgambi, Tutis and other people were led to believe through radio broadcast that 
they could take sanctuary. The Murgambi site became a place of mass slaughter, but now 
is the site of a memorial composed of the bodies, frozen in the position that they died. Is 
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the memorial a reminder? Is it responding to the danger of forgetting? Is it representing 
the unrepresentable? All of these questions seem secondary.  
The Murgambi Memorial, which consists of the main campus buildings where the 
massacres occurred and the mass grave where most of the bodies were dumped is not 
simply representative or non-representative, it does not do the work of remembering or 
reminding, or forgetting or reconciling. It seems to work by making the breakage that 
appears where political becomes inaesthetic via the memorial, the complete exposure of 
memory itself. Within the main buildings everything was preserved virtually untouched.
18
 
The bodies of approximately 1,000 children and adults who sought refuge at the 
Murgambi site were exhumed from the mass grave.
19
 The bodies of the children were 
presented with brief descriptions of the lives of each child. The memorials bring the 
space of former violence into the politically present. This is what stands at the foreground 
of the remains themselves and is what goes unrepresented within the children’s fragile 
bodies that bear the marks of the machete that severed limb and life—and further 
reflected in the frozen expression of terror on the people’s faces and submissive and 
protective postures.  
What is unique about the Murgambi memorial is that it makes suffering present in 
all its moments. It is the present-to-death, or the memory, that suffers, that violates the 
representation’s activity of being solely memory. What would one encounter if one 
traveled from site to site? Bodies? Persons? Lives? No, one would encounter a montage 
of death in its parts, in its moments. Here, death is seen as an arm, there, as a torso, over 
there, as a head, mostly intact. This is death made objective, or rather, the violence of 
history frames the scene. And we could say that in memory it amplifies something that is 
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present (Jetztzeit), frozen in tormented faces petrified in suffering. It is not the horror of 
one or two instances, or of an abstract process, but the horror of everything all-at-once. 
The memory that closes itself is disclosed in all of its segments, all of its parts, at one 
time and the same time—every start is also its termination point. This torso was no more 
or less than the entry point of violence, no less than the totality of violence that we still 
suffer. 
Memory is only a return to the past when the former violence of the public sphere 
is no longer present. When this is not the case, memory is that interplay between closures 
and disclosures, it is the aesthetic condition of the activity of politics. Achilles Mbembe 
argues that Africa is a place where negation is the rule. He suggests that the Post-Colony 
is the place where even memory is put to death.
20
  But, we should notice that the 
Murgambi memorial also brings the massacred people into the present as a reflection of 
their liquidation. The bodies make present every momentary presence to death, not only 
as a “then,” but also as a “now.” The memorial is the absence that makes history and 
mourning intertwined into a social form of mourning. In mourning, however, the 
memorial does not simply remember, recall, or recount, but it petrifies that initial event 
that works as an example of the extremes of politics and violence, due to a long 
indebtedness to a social body anesthetized. As a countermovement, the memorial 
prolongs suffering. It makes aesthetic that which is structures the anesthetic of violence 
and thus, it makes present what Mbembe calls the spirit of violence as a rupturing 
memory and of that special domain of legitimate memoriability. He writes “This spirit 
makes violence omnipresent; it is presence—presence not deferred (except occasionally) 
but specialized, visible, immediate, sometimes ritualized, sometimes dramatic, very often 
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carictural.”21 In the memorial, the sickening signification of violence is frozen, as if 
caught by the gaze of the deaths-head, in a plurality of motions. Moreover, the half-
hacked body, the fearful expression before the slaughter, the body in tremors succumbing 
to force, the last hope of escape—all frozen and consummated, all at the same time. It is 
through memory that violence becomes hollowed out. But it is in its dialectal death throes 
that mourning transfigures memory, and aesthetics transposes politics.  
This is to suggest that the involution of our sense of pastness itself is a suffering. 
It makes the memorial signify a movement from a suffering object to a suffering that is a 
condition of the public.  More succinctly, every memorial is a repetition of interruption; it 
is what Benjamin referred to as the power of origin (Ur-sprung). Origin is the breaking 
off of a tradition that then must reconfigure the mundane. He writes, “Origin is not 
therefore discovered by the examination of actual finding, but it is related to their history 
and their subsequent development.”22 The memorial directs a form that momentarily 
liquidates legitimate relations of present and past, normativity and violence. This is to say 
that where memoriability violates memory, we are disenchanted to that domain of 
violence that has normatively operated as structuring social relations. Benjamin writes: 
[Historical materialism] is a process of empathy. Its origin is indolence of the 
heat, that acedia that despairs of appropriating the genuine historical image as it 
briefly flashes up. Among medieval theologians, acedia was considered as the 
root cause of sadness. Flaubert, who was familiar with it, wrote: “[Few will guess 
how sad one had to be in order to resuscitate Carthage!]” The nature of this 
sadness becomes clearer if we ask: With whom does historicism actually 
sympathize? The answer is inevitable: with the victor. And all rulers are heirs of 
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prior conquerors. Hence, empathizing with the victors invariably benefits the 
current rulers.
23
      
The larger context of memory is that it, too, displays a larger relation to the public sphere. 
This larger relation is history, and our relation to history is always a matter of politics. 
What we pull out of memory is also what makes this whole sphere appear as an anxiety 
in the present insofar as what is pulled out is also what the present suffers to avoid.  
With an eye toward our own aesthetic relationship to history, we need to ask, how 
much sorrow is required to resuscitate Trayvon Martin, Emmitt Till, and the victims of 
the Tulsa Oklahoma massacre—and all the victims of anti-Black violence? But these 
memorials stand not only against the suffering that is restricted in traditional forms, but 
against that whole set of breakages that can be seen in the depoliticization of history. This 
appears not only in memorialization but has shaped a distinctly troubling trend in Black 
political philosophy as well. The eternal return of the amnesiacs is just as much a matter 
of aesthetics as it is a matter of politics in post-racial politics. 
What do any of these counter-memorials amount to, other than a way of situating 
memory in its most alienated form? Memory, in the act of memorialization, must be 
reduced to an it suffers, which is to say memory is presented in its de-politicized or most 
alienated form. What aesthetic analysis shows is that there is a significant domain that is 
continually withheld from the domain of representation, even in representation. However, 
I want to distinguish the aesthetic sense of absence from this parallel political domain as 
a domain of neglect. While absence may be comparable to aesthetic forms of exclusion, 
the political sense of neglect is not reducible to the political state of exclusion. The 
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neglected are always out of place, out of history, and outside of the political form of 
recognition. Neglect, in its political sense, is not only a lack of value, but also an 
indifference to the other, or a way of leaving something in its state. But, what is left is a 
meaning that is political, and it is only political because it interrupts the particularity of 
the present with the weight of history, a history in negation that mourns without 
mourners. 
 
3. Post-Racial Memory and the Depoliticization of the Suffering of the Past 
I want to return to Till because in many ways the whole of the human/civil rights 
movement and much of the development of black politics, is indebted to the memory of 
the public memory and mourning of Emmitt Till’s death. Moreover, The Untold Story of 
Emmitt Louis Till (2003) is regarded as a type of memorial to his lynching. But, now we 
need to ask, what does that mean in a post-racial context? What suffers memory and what 
suffers forgetting? I want to return to this example to examine how aesthetics relates to a 
negativity that shapes politics. Our question, however, has changed from what is the 
meaning of memory in relation to violence, to what is the meaning of the public sphere 
disclosed in the dead. What does it mean to suffer history as a suffering of the present? 
 
a) Mourning a Present Suffering through Black Memory  
In The Untold Story of Emmitt Louis Till, we see the convergence of a variety of 
tellings of the life of Emmitt Till. We also see something that tells on, or reports on, 
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White violence. The memories that make up the content of the film move between the 
poles of the political as the representation of the elated politics of the civil rights, and the 
personal memory of deep regret, grief, and loss.  And it is within this production of 
memory that the boundary between memorialization and aversion or neglect is traced 
with particular acuity, and exposes several contradictory moments that dissolve into the 
cultural normative characterization of pre-civil rights memory. On the one hand, this was 
done to such an effective extent that it re-launched an investigation into the 1955 
lynching of Emmitt Till in 2004. On the other hand, much was left unexplored. What was 
left was the public’s memory of mourning, and that can be explored in terms of its 
philosophical meaning.  
The philosophical meaning of mourning reconfigures the meaning of this activity as a 
form of work. In Freud’s “Mourning and Melancholia,” for instance, he holds that 
mourning is the way in which the psychic life works through loss by redefining external 
relations to activities, objects, and social groups.
24
 Freud concludes that this liberates the 
ego from the love-object in that it works through a present ego that forms because of the 
former loss.
25
 Thus, mourning is the way the ego integrates loss into the new ego-
formation dealing with the present.
26
 Mourning is not, however, a way of “getting on 
with life” as usual, but a way of letting absence spring-forth (literally, Ur-sprung) as the 
psychic life in mourning undergoes the repetition of loss. Mourning suffers from the past 
now, not as a past, but rather as that uncanny past that is also a present. 
In this other philosophical sense, The Untold Story of Emmitt Till goes a long way to 
memorialize mourning rather than memory, but it leaves this in the interpersonal domain. 
Where Till’s mother looks for something for memory, for recognition, she continually 
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finds no memory, only the residue of violence. What once signified a face became a 
surface beyond recognition, save the severed tongue that had been cut out and then 
shoved back into the orifice. His ears that were just like hers now appear only as what 
had been torn off, the eyes that showed how bright he was, now gouged out, or the face 
that she remembered, now swollen and resembling nothing human. She tries to figure out 
what killed him, but she is left enumerating the many ways he could have died: his head 
was split in half, gunshot at close range, blowing a hole through his head, drowned by 
being tied to a cotton mill by barbed wire. The erasure of White violence itself traces the 
memory of a present suffering. 
What does suffering mean when it discloses itself only as memory? What does the the 
tension between memory and mourning underscore beyond the suffering of a group at a 
particular time? How does either memory that cannot mourn, or mourning that cannot 
remember,--that is, how does post-racial memory—efface the personal significance of 
loss, for a political one? When one of Till’s cousins recalls a mixture of feelings of anger, 
sadness, and disbelief; he characterizes this as a “strange feeling,” suggesting that these 
words are inadequate to disclose the totality of his memory. The condition is both past 
and present, determined by an inability to recognize what is in conflict with a desire to 
reconcile.  One of his cousins recalls that he, “never felt any sadness, I just thought he 
would come home.” Moreover, the other cousin recalls, “To me, it is as if he never died. I 
never had any sorrow or remorse, because I always thought inside that I would see him 
again. I don’t know if I was in a state of shock or what. But when they said they found his 
body, it was like ‘Whose body? He’s not dead.’ I went to the funeral, the same thing.” He 
states that he always thought that he would see him again. That White violence petrifies 
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instead of letting death pass, underscores its effect as a continuum. It is the petrification 
of suffering that makes memory transition into mourning. Mourning, likewise, appears as 
a broken relation to history trying to settle itself and find meaning in the presence of loss.  
What post-racial memory implies is that there is no reparation, nor any restoration, 
that could possibly account for the history of anti-Black violence. We suffer historically 
what we depoliticize aesthetically. To transpose absence as memory breaks with the 
merely subjective signification of mourning and makes the public sphere appear at odds 
with itself. 
I do not want to downplay the emotional and cultural relevance of Emmitt Till; I 
merely want to amplify how his symbolic significance discloses the structure of White 
violence in relation to Black politics. This is particularly important for us post-racials, 
who remember and forget all at the same time. It is particular for us who, in searching for 
solidarity against oppression, forget that the aesthetic and political sides of memory are 
also potentially engaging in a public act of forgetting. While we remember the civil 
rights, we forget the present’s distance from this politics. While we remember the 
atrocities of the Jim Crow south, we forget this past’s reiteration in White privilege. We 
forget these pivotal moments in our country’s past as meaning more than a memory of 
horror, and in a distinct way, we become knowing and willful amnesiacs to our own 
history as well as to our own present violence.  
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b) The Amnesiacs of Black Political Aesthetics 
We have drawn out the characteristics of the Cassandra complex from the broad 
sphere of public memory and its regressions. This confusion seems to be repeated in 
contemporary Black political philosophy in how (philosophy of) history has played a 
decreasingly significant role. For many Black thinkers, history and memory has always 
played an important role for situating political theory, illuminating white supremacist 
ideology, or motivating political activity. Memory works as a foundation for positivist 
politics. In contemporary Black political philosophy, memory is still used in order to 
form a positive politics out of oppression, but it is only regarded as a background for the 
present; memory is important, but it is passive. For instance, Tommie Shelby argues that 
one needs to find a basis for solidarity, despite negative social meanings of group 
identity. For Shelby, the political identity for Blacks resides solely on the ability to form 
in-group solidarity. The problem he addresses, however, is that for Blacks, there is no 
coherent center to form solidarity around. One’s history becomes metaphysical in how it 
determines one’s current political commitments; class is always a matter of shifting; and 
culture does little to define or refine the basis of the group. Shelby argues that a Black 
political philosophy in general should include commitments to antiracism, antipoverty, 
and substantive racial equality.
27
 While he critiques recognition politics, he counters it 
with a subtle form of identity solidarity (alternatively called “collective identity theory”) 
based in a form of pragmatic nationalism.
28
 He argues that “a shared identity is essential 
for an effective black solidarity whose aim is liberation from racial oppression, and thus 
blacks who are committed to emancipatory group solidarity must steadfastly embrace 
their distinctive black identity.”29 However, Shelby also includes the embracing of Black 
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goals, values, and the value of dismantling racism as essential as well. While Shelby 
argues for a pragmatic basis of solidarity, he does not take this argument to its end.  
Shelby takes historical factors as reified, but it is not clear when we shift to thinking 
about racism as cast in history, but reproduced as present violence, that what is suggested 
correctly apprehends the situation. We might be comfortable with Shelby’s thought if and 
only if racism appears in the way it historically has—at least in its external expression as 
blunt discrimination, interpersonal and mob violence, incarceration, and discrimination in 
terms of employment. While the inner violence may still be there, the external is exactly 
what seems to be shifting. The solidarity of Black politics forms out of its history, but we 
see that the identity it is predicated upon depoliticizes the present. The past is given as a 
reified objective past from which its meanings are already determined, its story basically 
complete, and its value reduced to a utility value. History is considered one-sidedly in its 
form of historicism, which means that history stands in for representation.  
While the former view lets historicism overdetermine its politics, the next addresses 
itself to a Black political climate. Eddie Glaude argues that “America must confront the 
fraudulent nature of its life, that its avowal of virtue shields it from honestly confronting 
the darkness within its own soul.”30 In regard to history, he argues that Black politics 
cannot be predetermined as emancipatory politics based on its past. History 
overdetermines the content of the political in order to reduce it to a fixed identity. But 
this approach attempts to identify history solely as a result of human (political) activity.
31
 
He argues that history really is a matter of aesthetics over politics. It matters only to the 
extent that it informs us, orients us, and lets us know who we are.
32
 He amplifies its 
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meaning as a background, but not as a foreground in a critical sense. It is valuable 
because of what use it has. But what use has the history of racism served as?  
According to Glaude, we have told a bad story. There is no fixed self, but if this is 
true then what follows is the suggestion that all we need to do is to tell a better or more 
useful story. This is far too simplistic and gives too much credit to the trend of revisionist 
history. How or why is it that even in the revisions of history, we still have a bad story 
being told—or rather an impoverishment that takes place? Let us assume that we now 
include slavery, the indebtedness of the country to African American ingenuity, work, 
labour, etc. as part of our story: have we really resolved the problem? How does this 
revision become relevant now? How does it contribute to the struggle to undermine the 
present content? Or, have we more effectively addressed a former sign of violence by 
repressing the social juncture that revealed the problem to begin with? Have we simply 
depoliticized memory by reducing its meaning to a representation of the past? Glaude’s 
view similarly depoliticizes history by reducing its meaning for the present to how and 
what about its content makes it useful. In depoliticizing the history, and making it about 
the stories a culture tells itself, he reduces its content to cultural relativism without further 
allowing a Black political use of history the leverage it might need to challenge a White 
normative history that is underwritten with White violence.  
This is not to suggest that history is a-political or unimportant to Glaude. In fact, he 
argues that history has a severe disciplining effect. He states, “Most young African 
American men, for example, have been told how to behave in the presence of police 
officers. We are told to speak respectfully, to appear nonthreatening, and to keep our 
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hands in full view at all times.”33 But, history holds another dual significance for him in 
that it makes us debtors to our collective past. He writes:  
References to the black freedom movement thus serve two purposes: First, they serve 
to call forth a particular political orientation; the listener is urged to take up a calling, 
to fight for, or at least to support, civil rights. …Second, they refer to loss and 
sacrifice. Many died for our current freedom, and recognition of this fact obligates us 
to act so as to honor their sacrifice.”34  
According to Glaude, history appears as a disciplining force. And, again its meaning is 
twofold. First, it overdetermines a political orientation by virtue of recognition and debt. 
Second, it trains one to respond to current problems through the lens of past struggles.
35
 
This is Glaude’s main objection to the uses and abuses of history in Black political 
philosophy: there is no way to understand the present problems solely within the confines 
of the past. 
However, this is not a problem of activity and motivation, nor is it a problem of a lack 
of imagination,
36
 but a problem that is at the basis of Glaude’s own method: politics 
depoliticizes itself in the very effort to make the public recognize the political. His view 
of history, and his criticisms of it rest within the confines of thinking history as utility, as 
representation, as a collection of images. In short, his own failure to rethink history 
beyond historicism cuts short the way in which his political suggestions can raise the 
problem of politics to where they can be rethought. 
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4. Critical Memory Revisited: Critique and Mourning 
Unlike memory, critical approaches to history have always already included a relation 
to politics. History has always already been politically problematic insofar as it has been 
used to erase the violence of a dominant group by telling the version of the past that is 
most favorable to that group’s interests. White violence has not been an exception to this 
rule. It was on this basis that W.E.B. Du Bois explicitly critiqued the politics of history to 
this end in his late work, Black Reconstruction in America. He argues that the attitude 
guiding the “objective view” of the history of Reconstruction relies on the status of the 
Negro as exempted from history. He observes, “The chief witness in Reconstruction, the 
emancipated slave himself, has been almost barred out of court. His written 
Reconstruction record has been largely destroyed and nearly always neglected.”37 
Therefore, history takes as its truth the exempted subject of the events of history, on the 
one hand, and produces a present form of violence toward the subjugated group, on the 
other.  Du Bois continues, “The result is that the most unfair caricatures of Negroes have 
been carefully preserved; but serious speeches, successful administration and upright 
character are almost universally forgotten.”38 Thus, what is produced is history as a form 
of amnesia.   
Du Bois further argues that the truth of the period of Black Reconstruction was to 
determine the effectiveness of mass rule through the “failed” attempts at real democracy 
from the outset.
39
 He argues that the ideology of the history of Reconstruction was 
motivated to show “objectively” that Negroes were ignorant, lazy, dishonest, and not 
responsible for their own emancipation.
40
 This image found its validation in the process 
through which it was reproduced, namely through academic reproduction. For Du Bois, 
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this means that science doubled itself also as propaganda. Du Bois continues, “The real 
frontal attack on Reconstruction, as interpreted by the leaders of national thought in 1870 
and for some time thereafter, came from the universities and particularly from Columbia 
and John Hopkins.”41 Propaganda presents the truth of history as a violence that 
continues to reintroduce the same destructive forms in the present, but under the 
normative laws of science itself. Thus, history as a science becomes the rationalization of 
the perversion of history.
42
 In this way, propaganda doubles as a tool of cultural distortion 
and as that which amplifies the discreet violence operative at the level of aesthetics. I 
want to argue in the next chapter why this doubling of the history and memory forms 
both a symptom of White violence and a response. I want to argue that critical history or 
critical memory has taken an even more radical turn toward aesthetics.  
While this critical juncture between aesthetics and politics cannot warrant a return to 
critical histories, we should carefully assess what the post-racial means for history. This 
break is prefigured in what Paul Taylor calls the “Post-Black” era of art. Taylor states 
that the post-Black artist works to redefine notions of Blackness by inverting historical 
categories, while at the same time denying the categorization of being a Black artist.
43
 
The post-Black artist seems to make Blackness as defined culturally, a matter of 
propaganda. Taylor argues that post-racial art is defined by that activity that provides a 
space-clearing act that rejects the assumptions of the past placed on Black culture. The 
Black artist rejects the shared enterprise that gives strength to these cultural assumptions, 
but also that draws or connects the present oppression to the past in a new way.
44
 Taylor 
claims that the post-Black artist should reject the idea that “…if they do not draw 
principally on, say, black vernacular cultures, or express perspectives on racialized 
74 
 
themes like lynching, slavery, or civil rights, then they aren’t black enough to gain entry 
into the art world by the only means available to them—as participants in specialized 
“diversity” exhibits.”45 The condition imposed on Black artist is itself conditioned by 
race-thinking, which the post-Black artist complicates, if not rejecting it wholesale. 
Therefore, the post-Black is a sign of the liquidation of race-thinking.
46
 But this end cuts 
in two directions: it is the end of identity politics of a certain brand and an end of the 
necessary connection of Black politics to its history. Taylor concludes that this end is 
then the new platform on which Blackness is free to define a set of pluralisms.  
What seems most significant in Taylor’s discussion is that the post signifies that 
something has been brought to its end. To bring something to its end, Taylor notes, does 
not mean it goes away, because its practices may remain.
47
 The end of something may be 
brought about in two meanings: annihilation of aesthetic meaning and the annihilation of 
political meaning. These two meanings are often intermingled. What Taylor fails to 
address is how despite the happy advance over race-thinking, race-practices continue 
anew as the reiteration of White violence. What needs to be underscored is that the 
liquidation itself makes the violence in its older form meaningless, but not discontinuous. 
Continuance in its anesthetized form may be a more efficient means of disseminating 
violence. Taylor is right to the extent that the post-Black may signal the end of race-
thinking, but it does not give an account of the residue of race and racist-practices. 
Furthermore, on Taylor’s account, post-Black aesthetics is a sign that refers to a 
particular rupture between politics and tradition, yet he does not attend to the way this 
rupture also signifies the de-politicization between aesthetics and the politics of memory. 
In the post-Black, one does not simply move away from history, without also altering the 
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way social normativity appears in the present and how its history appears to this 
movement. There can be no new platform without consideration of the search for political 
meaning.  
As we have talked about memory, we have also talked about what makes the present 
meaningful. What is the situation of meaning relative to post-raciality? What it means to 
be a post-racial, post-Black, or post-political thinker is to take history to its critical edge. 
The post therefore is not simply an after, as in an announcement of a liquidation of race. 
But it is equally not a post as in a position from which to reexamine race.
48
 Still, Taylor is 
right to point out that it does demarcate that something is undergoing its end, suffering its 
loss, and that there is a context through which we need to re-examine this. Unlike Taylor, 
though, I think that post-raciality does depend on a history and memory of race 
discourses; it depends on them now because it is not clear which forms of race thinking 
and race language facilitate the politicization of history and which facilitate the 
depoliticizing of history. I think we need to return to a way of thinking a type of history 
in its political implications. For the moment, I want to reject the idea that history is 
simply important because it retains a set of facts, but rather it is history or memory that 
intervenes in the present. History prepares the present for what it must suffer.  
In our tracing of the objectivity of violence, we have run up against tradition and 
history, in both its alienated and politicized formations. I want to suggest that this is the 
very same aesthetics that wed history to representations. I have talked about a post-racial 
memory within post-Black politics because its post-status is part of what hides it, what 
negates its recognition, and sits at the basis of its violence. The negation it hides by is 
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also what defines the Cassandra complex, since this is the complex that makes our own 
violence illegible to us and it achieves this by making history simply a matter of pastness.  
There is also something sublime in history and tradition as well. But what does this 
sublime heightening rest on? For us, in post-racial discourse, absence must be returned to 
even in representation. This means that the present memory is marked with an aesthetic 
form of forgetting.  And, every political gesture of reconciliation is marked with a 
suffering that transposes sorrow within the public sphere. I think it is fair to further 
suggest that such an undertaking has the power to move the it that suffers to a present 
suffering of what we have become insensate to; it is a form of apology that suffers the 
forgetfulness of the present. Moreover, mourning is the reverse of the anesthesia of post-
racial memory. It is in this context that aesthetics receives an altogether different meaning 
for situating politics. Over the course of the next two chapters, I will argue that the 
political value of aesthetics is not in what it represents or what it idealizes, but what it lets 
suffer. The next chapter will develop the politics that lets suffering suffer, through an 
examination of Du Bois’s aesthetic discussion of the Negro sorrow songs and Billie 
Holiday’s song “Strange Fruit. 
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CHAPTER III 
SORROW AS THE LONGEST MEMORY OF NEGLECT: 
AESTHETIC SORROW AND ALLEGORICAL MEMORY 
 
We were stolen, sold, and brought together from the 
African continent. We got on the slave ships together. We 
lay back to belly in the holds of the slave ships in each 
other’s excrement and urine together, sometimes died 
together, and our lifeless bodies thrown overboard 
together. Today, we are standing up together, with faith 
and even some joy. A quote from Maya Angelou inscribed 
on “The monument to the forgotten slaves” memorial in 
Savannah, Georgia by Abigail Jordan
1
 
   
I chose to begin this chapter with a quote that exemplifies the extremes of the 
memory of sorrow and the memory of neglect. Maya Angelou articulates a deep fissure 
that marks and demarcates the difference between Blacks and any other people—Blacks 
start their history in negation, in violence. Angelou writes from the standpoint of a 
universal “we” who begin together in a complete state of vulnerability that is also a state 
of closure. She implies that ‘we” begin, paradoxically, where “we” are broken. We 
remain in the aftermath of a great sorrow, broken from tradition, relatives, and 
communities, and this sorrow is transmitted by a history that continues to be torn from 
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history. Because this history has no place, it relates the sorrowful. At the same time, the 
passage seems to suggest that that history has come to a close. It implies that today, we 
stand together to overcome that oppression. If this means that we are ready to dismantle 
the operations of anti-Black oppression, then I think that the statement falls into the 
historicism critiqued in the last chapter. However, if it means to call attention to the 
changing situation required to go to battle with oppression in its changing form, then it 
maybe truer now than it was before. But, this last passage was added to the original 
placard to quell social anxiety. It speaks, but what it has to say seems restricted.  
I quoted this Maya Angelou passage from Abigail Jordan’s memorial to the un-
remembered slaves that made the journey of the Middle Passage, in Savannah, Georgia. 
The passage is inscribed at the base of the memorial to underscore the great debt Georgia 
owes to the history of slavery and to highlight the extent to which present day Georgia is 
indebted to forgetting this past. Abigail Jordan is not African American, but she felt that 
the success of the city owed much debt to the memory of the slave trade. Instead of a 
memorial that represented slavery or the slave trade, she intended to utilize the space of 
the River Front to produce a memory, or a reminder, exactly where memory is erased. 
Derek Adlerman writes that for Jordan, the legacy of slavery in Savannah had become an 
invisible story that had “been publically forgotten for too many years.”2 This seems to be 
the anxiety of forgetting, a forgetting that is as much a present activity as it is a decisive 
moment that broke with the past, which I want to thematize in this chapter as aesthetic 
sorrow. I will argue that that aesthetic sorrow has as its corollary, allegorical memory.  
The Savannah memorial depicts a family of four, with broken chains at their feet. 
There are no references in the representation itself to those people who lost their lives 
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during the Middle Passage, but rather to a presence of memory of that institution. The 
memorial is placed directly on the pier in Savannah Georgia, where slaves were traded. 
Maybe it counters forgetting. More importantly, it suffers, it sorrows, and it makes 
anxiety appear to become a memory.   
Furthermore, up to this point, I have described the way a Cassandra complex makes 
its own violence unintelligible, despite representations. I have argued that the complex 
itself is a product amplified as a post-racial context. Post-racial memory in particular 
depoliticizes the past, regardless of whether the social body is attempting to dismantle 
racism or reinforce it. This chapter will develop aesthetic sorrow and its connection to 
allegorical memory. I will argue that allegory is the way what has been torn out, 
forgotten, or erased, communicates itself to a present that is invested in continuing the 
former violence. To do this, first I will focus on W.E.B. Du Bois and Walter Benjamin’s 
aesthetics. Next, I will consider what allegorical memory means in response to the 
Cassandra complex. My example for this is Billie Holiday’s song, “Strange Fruit.” For all 
of these, I argue that what makes them suited responses to post-racial memory, 
specifically, and the Cassandra complex, in general, is that they pull away from and 
negate their dependence on representation. They put on display a state of affairs, a set of 
conditions, and a limit to the public sphere. 
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1. The Present Memory of an Old Sorrow   
If the Cassandra complex traced the way that post-racial memory obscures relations 
to history, we can say that it relied on deeply entrenched negligibility. While in former 
times, this was taken up as whole scale exclusion, now it seems to shape the way we 
include alternate histories, perspectives, and representations. However, something more 
is needed at this time. Neglect still constitutes a memory, though.  And it is this form of 
memory, which is neither a representation, nor a point of unrepresentability, that seems to 
cause memorial arts to be shrouded in anxiety. Aesthetic sorrow is attached to African 
American memory in a specific way that is worth considering in our context, because it is 
directed at public memory that only unfolds a public neglect.  
 
a) Du Boisian Aesthetics and the Politics of Sorrow 
While Du Bois is generally praised for his astute analysis of cultural history and 
memory, or his incisive contributions to political activism, his aesthetics is often 
characterized as under developed, at best. In his brief 1926 essay, “Criteria of Negro 
Art,” he argues that art that has no political content has no concern for him, thus reducing 
the importance of art to its significance in relation to politics.
3
 The fact that he does not 
give much space to the arts furthers this characterization. Following this sentiment, 
Arnold Rampersad holds that Du Bois had little judgment in terms of appreciation of art, 
and thus regarded art as insignificant.
4
 Likewise, Keith Byerman argues that Du Bois’s 
idea of art is primarily concerned with social, political, and historical realities and not 
with philosophical aesthetics.
5
 According to both commentators, art for Du Bois is only a 
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tool for politics rather than a distinct domain of human and social experience. Byerman 
argues that “art,” according to Du Bois, is for the purpose of transcending human 
suffering and is significant in that it produces an image of an ideal beyond the constraints 
of present suffering.
6
 But, this is not a rejection of how aesthetics relates to politics or to 
memory. Du Bois rejects discussions of art, or the philosophy of art, without rejecting 
aesthetics. I want to show that his thought is thoroughly concerned with aesthetics, while 
conceding that it is not concerned with the philosophy of art. 
 The Souls of Black Folk is a thoroughly multi-layered text. It is sociology, history, 
and philosophy all at once. But, at the head of each chapter, Du Bois places a phrase of 
music. Nothing more is said about this until the closing chapter of the book. In Du Bois’s 
last essay in The Souls, “Of the Sorrow Songs,” he argues that the central importance of 
songs to African-American lives is two-fold: these songs are songs of memory and the 
first truly American music. He writes, “They that walked in darkness sang songs in the 
olden days—Sorrow Songs—for they were weary at heart.”7 The songs shaped a texture 
of life in memory and out of place. They served as much for memory as they did for 
community.  Shannon Zamir argues that for Du Bois, the use of the sorrow songs and 
spirituals are a “living recollection that continues to speak to the disgraces of the present 
that has by no means severed its link” to the past.8 But, recall that the songs are songs of 
sorrow, and not simply songs of memory. They are songs that suffer (unter Leiden). The 
present becomes shaped by loss, or the sense of the sorrowful, just as much as a past 
remains present through its traces. Further, since the sorrowful does not form a continuity 
with anything, what sort of memory or signification can it bear?  
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This question can be approached in yet another way. For most of Souls the goal of Du 
Bois’s political work is to seek to recover a history that has been left out, and, at the same 
time, to correct forms of social misperception that underlay much of the racism of his 
time. “Of the Sorrow Songs” does not seem to achieve the end of recovery, however. 
Rather than recover a past that has been lost, it seems to expose a present as broken. He 
states, “They are the music of an unhappy people, of the children of disappointment; they 
tell of death and suffering and unvoiced longing toward a truer world, of misty 
wanderings and hidden ways.”9 Even if one can see the traces of social progress, one can 
also see a tendency to make public memory a matter of a voice becoming inept. Aesthetic 
sorrow seems to start from this point, and its work seems to be a subtle way of disrupting 
the power of tradition. Likewise, according to Zamir, the sorrow songs are a form of 
resistance to reconcile community within a totalizing ideal.
10
 If music is the transmission 
of memory, then it is a memory without content. He states, “The child sang it to his 
children and they to their children’s children, and so for two hundred years it has 
travelled down to us and we sing it to our children, knowing as little as our fathers what 
its words mean, but knowing well the meaning of the music.”11 But, what are they really 
resisting? What is its end? What is the meaning that is being resituated with aesthetic 
sorrow? There is no such thing as African-American history, according to his thought, 
because most if not all Black folk have lost connection to their origin and are continually 
treated as if they are out of place. What are they drawing into the space of memory in the 
present? What are they pulling away from as memory, in the present?  
As Keith Byerman argues, we might suggest that these historicized slave 
expressions are really counter-histories to dominant culture.
12
 Second, as Robert 
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Goodings-Williams argues, the present is justified, but only to the extent that it is asked 
to respond to this message. He writes: “To respond to the message of the sorrow songs, 
white Americans must acknowledge their implications in the lives of black Americans by 
heeding the message of the sorrow songs and extending to black Americans their civil 
and political rights.”13 But this is the claim that needs to be challenged because it reduces 
the meaning of memory to our most comfortable reference point.  
The claim that the message of the sorrow songs offers a counter-history or a 
politics of civil rights is fundamentally problematic. Both Gooding-Williams and 
Byerman tie the meaning of the songs to a distinct “message,” but that is exactly what is 
never articulated. Du Bois holds the opposite, in that the sorrow songs make the present 
strange. Furthermore, according to Byerman and Goodings-Williams, Sorrow restores a 
sense of former times, without abandoning the present. But, this is to forget that 
according to Du Bois the music of the slave does not have a message distinctly shaped for 
our past, but rather to the world. Its message is one that iterates a past suffering in the 
present. And because it alerts the present to a crisis, its meaning is found only in the way 
we reinterpret the present in light of what the music unsettles.      
The politics that we become aware of in this alternative movement are not the politics 
opposed to the dominant form, but one that displaces the significance of aesthetics from 
its former place. This displacement seems to be what is significant in Byerman’s 
observation that Du Bois’s aesthetic employs increasing sensitivity toward a sense of 
distance, when one of proximity would be expected.
14
 What is expected, given a politics 
of recognition, rather than sorrow, appears confused, or inverted, but it is just this 
inversion that takes us to the radical potential of aesthetic sorrow. Du Bois states, “The 
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songs are indeed the siftings of centuries”15 and that they are the “voice of exile.”16 But 
they speak to the present as that which is continually exiled. And thus, aesthetic sorrow 
traces a memory underwritten by politics, although it itself is not a memory, but a 
movement between the politics and the aesthetics of memory, in the politics of the 
present. Aesthetic sorrow challenges us to be able to think of erasure and of what is 
brought to silence as both constituting memory as well. They communicate allegorically, 
however. Aesthetic sorrow depends on allegory because allegory is able to express the 
forgotten in memory.  
 
b) Memory Exiled 
What Du Bois’s aesthetics achieves is that transition of history into philosophy, 
from the study of the conditions of human development and life, to the resituating of 
concepts and problems. The philosophical sense of sorrow itself designates a specific 
aesthetic domain that is within the present, but out of place in this present. Sorrow is that 
which lingers on in the present by moving inward, or positioning itself out of the space of 
representation.
17
 Aesthetic sorrow is not simply the negativity of loss launched into the 
public sphere. In “Of the Passing of the First-Born,” Du Bois writes,  
All that day and all that night there sat an awful gladness in my heart,—nay, 
blame me not if I see the world thus darkly through the Veil,—and my soul 
whispers ever to me saying, ‘not dead, not dead, but escaped; not bond, but free.’ 
No bitter meanness now shall sicken his baby heart till it die a living death, no 
taunt shall madden his happy boyhood. Fool that I was to think or wish that this 
little soul should grow chocked and deformed within the Veil!
18
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Accordingly, sorrow exposes a condition that normatively is there, but has gone 
silent. And it is because of this that what was broken comes to stand in as the sign of 
what remains broken. Aesthetic sorrow marks the breakage that continues within the 
present as a continuation of the social fabric that unites the cultural memory of the past. 
Therefore, aesthetic sorrow is the aesthetic that retains that which remains as the remains 
of former times. Sorrow reminds in order to form a response. Thus, Du Bois writes:  
Within the Veil was he born, said I; and there within shall he live,—a Negro and a 
Negro’s son. Holding in that little head—ah, bitterly!—the unbowed pride of a 
hunted race, clinging with that tiny dimpled hand—ah, wearily!—to a hope not 
hopeless but unhopeful, and seeing with those bright wondering eyes that peer 
into my soul a land whose freedom is to us a mockery and whose liberty a lie.
19
 
  
Indeed, aesthetic sorrow, in this sense, is not simply absence, but that which pulls 
away from history. It is that absence that structures oppression at the level f sensation in 
such a way as to reflect how the past political commitments continue forward discreetly 
in the present. Du Bois emphasizes this point when he writes that, “Mother and Child are 
sung, but seldom father; fugitive and wearily wanderer call for pity and affection, but 
there is little wooing and wedding; the rocks and mountains are well known, but home is 
unknown.”20 What is aestheticized is not recovered, but left in its present state of distance 
and disrepair. It is left as a sorrow that sings its own suffering in place of memory. 
 Aesthetic sorrow makes the present strange, which is to say that it reminds the 
present of what it always already is suffering, even as it avoids this suffering. This 
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avoidance is also disclosed in aesthetic sorrow to the extent that it reveals that the 
progress of the present is prefigured by its own degree of being in a state of erasure. 
Indeed, aesthetic sorrow indicates that condition in the present that is continuous with a 
radical break, first explicitly indicated in the past. It is underwritten by a sense of 
haunting and silence. Memory in this sense is not involved in the production of memory 
proper, representations of memory, but retains the sense in which the present displays 
various forms of breakage, disavowal, denial, and active forgetting or suppression. 
Sorrow communicates indirectly; it relies on those signs that carry with them something 
completely outdated, which is to say that sorrow communicates allegorically. Allegory 
has its value because it communicates through symbol over narrative. It tends to build its 
meaning by requiring one to read the present as giving meaning to the past rather than the 
past giving meaning to the present. This is why Walter Benjamin claims that allegory has 
always been present in times of social change and political crisis; it is a way of exposing 
the limits of the public sphere toward the social formation of its own anxiety.  
 
2.  Allegory at the Limits of the Memorable  
I will argue that out of aesthetic sorrow we find allegorical memory. Allegory and 
allegorical aesthetics have often been devalued as political tools. First, allegory is the art 
of symbols. As such, it is often indirect, interpretative, and self-referential. One can argue 
that allegory overly subjectivizes its object. But allegory makes everything interior and 
exterior a matter of a sign. For instance, it may represent an image from Christian history, 
but its meaning signifies a present as well as a past condition. Thus allegory 
communicates directly what cannot be placed in the discursive space of the public sphere. 
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Second, it is hampered by archaic images, derived from the past, or overwrought with 
historical references. But, its architecture is such that it shows directly what is implied in 
the present, through an image of the past. Third, one might argue that allegory is a mute 
art form; it depends on reading more than interpreting; it is passive more than it is active. 
However, it traces what has gone mute, what is made to be only in its being silent. But 
we need to examine this a bit closer, how silence is a form of expression. 
 
a) Sorrow’s Silence and Allegorical Memory 
By examining allegory as an art of silence, we will see how close Du Bois’s use 
of sorrow is: sorrow is that memory that goes silent. Walter Benjamin argues that 
allegory is descriptive of the way aesthetic absence is turned into the politically active. In 
his early study of an obscure form of late baroque German drama, called mourning plays 
(Trauerspiels), he argues that allegory is the philosophical and aesthetic form that is 
employed in times of political crisis—that is, in times when authority, power, and 
organization are in the process of, or in need of, transformation.
21
 In general, allegory is 
thought of as a stylistic variation of art, or a technique of reading and interpreting that is 
heavily symbolic. But contrary to this, Benjamin writes, “Allegory… is not a playful 
illustrative technique, but a form of expression, just as speech is expression, and, indeed, 
as writing is.”22 Allegory un-writes, or rather it does the obverse of writing. For Benjamin 
this is significant because it constitutes a decisive break with the material from other 
traditions, recast in new relations, holding different significances, and ordering different 
patterns, and thus requiring a different interpretation. For Benjamin, allegory works by 
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disjoining images, domains, and references to normative forms of representation. It is, in 
a sense, a representative art that does not represent representations, but retains that 
aesthetic sensibility that pulls away or exceeds the image or representation. Thus 
Benjamin argues that the Baroque mourning plays depend upon allegory because it is the 
art that exposes the decay or inversion of the representational itself in the sense that a 
representation represents a totality. 
Like aesthetic sorrow for Du Bois, allegorical arts are always out of place, and 
disruptive. Inversion and decay are not just the main themes in allegorical arts. They 
depend upon the expression’s that are most significant but often mute, inept, or in a state 
of arrested development. Allegory resists representation, resists forms of appearance, but 
all the same, does not fail to communicate its essential content.
23
 Susan Buck-Morss 
points out that for Benjamin this requires seeing history as continual transition and 
reproduction.
24
 It is also in this sense that Benjamin argues that allegory needs to be seen 
as an indirect communication of the content that does not become incorporated into 
history. Rather allegory is that which is left out, left in neglect, or undergoes the ruinous 
result of history.  
While aesthetic sorrow makes the present strange, allegory makes the silence and 
exile a suffering in the present or public sphere. Benjamin argues that in Trauerspiels, 
history itself comes to a standstill. Thus, he states that allegory can be seen as an 
intrusion that could be described as “a harsh disturbance of the peace and a violation of 
law and order in the arts.”25  And it is this violation of the genre type that forms a new 
combination or constellation through its own ruptures. We can say that allegory shows 
where fractured relations are maintained in order to efface the fracture itself. Likewise, 
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John McCole describes this quality of Benjamin’s aesthetics as the mode of non-synthetic 
dialectics that renders the present as being pinned between two contrary traditions where 
a harmonious or totalizing synthesis is denied, but a link between how they constitute an 
exclusion of one another is formed.
26
 In the same way, the state’s relation to legitimate 
space is challenged, legitimate memory is challenged by the allegorical as well—but only 
based on the way it inverts a set of relations. But allegory is not only an art form 
independent to the same degree as other art forms, it is a form of expression and a form 
of aesthetic experience that expresses the extremes of the private within the public and 
the extremes of the public within the private.   
For this reason, Benjamin claims that allegory is charged with a philosophy of 
history, but rather than resituating the past within the present, it seeks to situate a sense of 
the political within the aesthetic, which is why Benjamin’s theses “On the Concept of 
History” build toward an aesthetic sense of acedia against the motifs of redemption. 27 As 
Buck-Morss suggests, Benjamin’s philosophy of history brings the object of history out 
of infinite distance and into infinite proximity.
28
 The response to the public sphere in 
allegory can be linked to a philosophical development of the concept of mourning. We 
cannot characterize mourning as related only to psychology or interiority. Mourning is a 
particular name for a response to a context, and our context is the post-racial.  
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b) Mourning and Politics  
What is mourning to allegorical memory? First, mourning is a substitute for 
memory when memory is removed from its public significance. Mourning is a search for 
public meaning in spite of loss. Similarly, this is what distinguishes Walter Benjamin’s 
notion of mourning (trauer) from other more psychologized notions. Benjamin argues 
that the Trauerspiels show a violation of boundaries as a convergence of distinctions that 
appear in these works as arbitrary. Mourning politicizes the present by way of aesthetic 
memory that produces the appearance of inversions. He argues, “For these are not so 
much plays which cause mourning, as plays through which mournfulness finds (findet) 
satisfaction (Genügen): plays for the mournful.”29 According to Benjamin, they are plays 
in which mourning is the mode of expression, which is to say that what mourns places the 
forgetting of memory in place of where there is no longer memory, it communicates a 
silence that finds its expression as it mourns.
30
  
Likewise, Findet is a ‘finding’ or an attempt at ‘founding’ in the sense of 
discovery. One does not discover something that never was, but reinterprets what has 
always been. Discovery calls for the resituating of a set of related (and sometimes 
unrelated) concepts. Likewise, in mourning, one discovers what has always been there, 
but now requires that common and normative concepts undergo further reworking. 
Mourning does not cease in its finding, but begins its work as a re-grounding and re-
membering of the meaning and significance of former terms and laws. Similarly, 
Genügen is a form of ‘satisfaction.’ In this sense, satisfaction means that what is 
discovered entails or relates what is to be done. But, satisfaction is also a limit because 
what is required also articulates the extent to which something can be done. It operates as 
94 
 
a term of seeking “just enough and no more.” Mourning responds by making the settled 
questionable and thus is a type of activity or work.
31
 However, in making a settled state 
of affairs questionable, mourning is determined by resistance, and it is this resistance that 
makes the public appear in its strangeness since public reconciliation with the past is 
withheld.  
Allegory is that mode of expression—and more than a mode of expression, but a 
mode of experience—that traces where the expressible goes silent. When we think of the 
violence that marked the Martin case, while memory governs the public discourse, there 
is much that is left to be communicated only through the allegorical. Notice the number 
of representations that alleviate the activity of resistance from its responsibility. It is a 
responding without responsibility. At some point, we will be left to mourn, and mourning 
is a suffering now and for a long time to come, a meaninglessness in the public sphere 
that also suffers its own incommunicability, its own context, in its most alienated form.   
Now more than at other times, attention to allegorical memory and aesthetic 
mourning is important. These are the responses available to us, but notice that they do not 
stop or circumvent post-racial discourse. They put on display the conditions under which 
we suffer now from an ineptitude of suffering. They trace a silence that contains the 
memory of what we sorrow, and in doing so make us responsive, if not to an object or a 
condition, then to a limit of the public sphere. 
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3. The Strangest Fruit: From Aesthetic Sorrow to Allegorical Memory  
I have suggested that mourning makes the public appear in its strangest posture, 
as if caught in its most embarrassing activity. I will return to this point in the next 
chapter. But for now I want to trace that initial response of aesthetic sorrow through the 
post-racial. I began to argue that aesthetic sorrow was initially what constitutes one of 
Black America’s innovations to aesthetics. I think it is within this tradition that a long 
history of radicalism is unveiled. In Angela Davis’s critical aesthetic work, Blues 
Legacies and Black Feminism, she works out much of this tradition along with the 
significance of early female Jazz artists.  In Blues Legacies and Black Feminism, Davis 
examines the political importance of several early blues women and argues that their 
aesthetic impact influences the political domain of possibility. But it is her focus on the 
work of Billie Holiday that relates to the aesthetic of sorrow. For us, her reading of 
Holiday’s music as a political landscape offers much for us to think about as we situate 
Holiday in the tradition of aesthetic sorrow. I will focus on “Strange Fruit” as an example 
of aesthetic memory that weds aesthetic sorrow to allegorical memory.
32
 
 
a) Davis’s Political Billie Holiday 
Angela Davis’s work on Billie Holiday and other Jazz figures goes to great 
lengths to provide a way of discussing the intersection of history, politics, and cultural 
aesthetics. Through Jazz, she philosophically situates a type of proto-feminist aesthetics. 
This is clearest in her reading of particular songs and aesthetic aspects of Billie Holiday’s 
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work. From Holiday, Davis develops the political potentiality of her music, but it is 
developed in large part along the lines of aesthetic sorrow. 
In relation to Billie Holiday, Davis focuses on the strong, defiant, and surprisingly 
subversive nature of her musical style, fusing themes of hope inverted by disappointment. 
Davis argues that the music itself transformed a set of social relations that were and are 
politically rigid and often lack sites of expression or representation.
33
 She states, 
“[Holiday’s] message is able to escape the ideological constraints of the lyrics. In the 
music, in her phrasing, her timing, the timbre of her voice, the social roots of pain and 
despair in women’s emotional lives are given a lyrical legibility.”34 She argues that these 
songs articulate a life that, prior to this, had no forum for articulation. Similarly, Davis 
views Holiday’s music as enfolding and disclosing a politics within its aesthetic 
dimension. Thus, her music prefigures forms of consciousness-raising and many other 
themes that became part of civil and human rights era politics, providing a context of 
history where transformative to the politics of the 1960’s. 
According to Davis, Holiday’s music reveals a social texture that originates out of 
the uncertainty of a time and place of expression that had no former place in time, 
because the expression had no former place in the present. The aesthetic sorrow of 
Holiday’s music is not directly sorrowful either, but based on that which could find no 
expression anywhere else. The aesthetic dimension that Holiday’s music contains is a 
type of performative rupturing of time and space that plays in a domain of inversions. 
Davis argues that the play of inverse relations and stylistic innovations that forms the 
basis of Holiday’s unique music also prefigures the tone of revolutionary politics. 
Holiday’s music destabilizes norms and forms a fluidity of boundaries, between happy 
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and sad, song and language, past and present.
35
 Therefore, while Holiday had the ability 
to transform a song that was full of clichéd images into a critique of its own content, she 
cleared the space for the expression of life gone silent.
36
  
Davis argues that in Billie Holiday’s music, a simple love song becomes a critique 
of anti-Black racism to the extent that Blacks are not integrated into the “American 
Dream.”  For example, in “Some Other Spring,” Holiday makes a song about longing to 
find love once again, a song that is mournful. Developing Herbert Marcuse’s aesthetics, 
Davis holds that it places the tension between Eros and Power within a political dream 
that African Americans have no part in.
37
 Likewise, the sorrowful is communicated by 
remembrance of neither an illuminated past, from the stand point of the present, nor from 
a compellingly politicized present from which the past is brought to bear. In 
“Yesterdays,” Holiday’s wordplay fumbles through sound-pairings of a happy past at 
odds with a present. It is this tension that suspends a fixed state of reconciliation, making 
the present a fluid boundary through which a transformative reconfiguration takes place. 
Aesthetic sorrow dissolves of the line between the aesthetic and the political to the 
illumination of the political through the aesthetic. In this sense we can say that it is 
aesthetic sorrow that makes Holiday’s music so poignant and refigures memory as an 
ambiguity intruding in the present sensibility of time, space, and place. Furthermore, the 
aesthetic dimension for Davis is fundamentally historical and collective—it “represents a 
symbiosis, drawing from and contributing to an African American social and musical 
history in which women’s political agency is nurtured by, and in turn natures, aesthetic 
agency.”38 But there also something that unsettles this sphere of the public as well. 
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Davis follows this line of thought through to her interpretation of Holiday’s 
politically charged “Strange Fruit.” Davis first handles “Strange Fruit” as a song that is 
out of place in Holiday’s oeuvre. Despite the many subversive songs of Holiday’s, this is 
the only one with an overt political theme. Davis holds that Holiday’s “Strange Fruit” is 
primarily Holiday’s protest song against the anti-Black violence of White supremacy that 
Holiday lived through. Davis is right based on the politics of the time, but this does not 
identify in what way the song aesthetically continues these protests.
39
 Davis errs in that 
she displaces the aesthetic significance for a political significance. She argues that the 
significance of the song remains in the fact that “Strange Fruit” evokes the horrors of 
lynching at a time when Black people were still passionately calling for allies in the 
campaign to eradicate this murderous and terroristic manifestation of racism.
40
  
While the song may be thought of as a reflection on the terrors of the past, and 
still may refer to her present time, this does not explain why it has and continues to be an 
unsettling song that reminds the present of its bestial past and yet still is cause for 
anxiety. Likewise, this explanation does not provide a way for interpreting how the song 
evades reference to any specific time, but rather refers to areas of sensation that are 
closely associated with both presence and memory. It allegorizes even when it is 
representing, and it mourns even when it is remembering: in short, it reminds us through 
how it makes us suffer a present that is strange.  
This potentiality is further obscured in the way Davis places its significance on 
the level of personal biography and points out that it is a work stemming from deep 
childhood memories. While this serves to show that Holiday was aware of the political 
significance of the song at the time she was presented with it, both in terms of her 
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biography and from her involvement and support of anti-lynching campaigns, Davis’s 
interpretation comes at the expense of retaining the song’s import solely as a historicized 
artifact. And because of this, the song loses its power as something that augments the 
politics it was a precursor for. In post-racial memory, the political significance of the 
song dies with the civil rights movement. And this loss de-legitimates the use of the 
aesthetic dimension, since rather than retaining its connection to the political, it is rather 
an artistic presentation of a recollection.  
This point is further problematic because Davis interprets the song as a precursor 
or originary expression of the seeds of a political movement. It is a song that remains at 
odds with the political conditions of the present, even though it is situated as a precursor 
to a past moment. Rather than simply indicating this particular injustice, it indicates a set 
of injustices relationally exposed in the memory. Indeed, “Strange Fruit” is not really a 
form of memory in the classical sense, since it displaces a present politics by opening up 
the discursive space where discreet systemic violence appears as the reiteration of a 
former displacement. It is closer to allegory or a type of mourning of its time (and ours), 
insofar as we are not able to adequately memorialize and put it behind us, a history that 
forms and reproduces its violence. Thus, in what follows I will argue that “Strange Fruit” 
is not just a model of aesthetic sorrow, but also a model of allegorical memory. As long 
as we fail to think of it as a song about or responding to lynching, it pierces the public 
sphere with a tracing of the residue of White violence. 
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b) “Strange Fruit” Reconsidered  
Because of aesthetic sorrow and its relation to allegory, let us rethink of the 
relation of memory of a violence that a nation commits against itself the other way 
around. Let us think it from the side of allegory via Billie Holiday’s “Strange Fruit.” 
First, the way this song relates to the present is as allegorical memory, which requires an 
inversion of the social dynamics, through which the political becomes estranged from its 
relation to memory. We can achieve this estrangement by reading the song as allegory, 
which inflects its pastness with the present. Second, to think of the song this way also 
implies that “Strange Fruit” is a prophetic song, but not because it forecast a future 
political situation, and neither is it prophetic because it has a message to the world that is 
still in need of being deciphered. Rather, it is prophetic in the sense that it expresses 
something that has gone silent. “Strange Fruit” calls to mind a present where memory has 
gone sorrowful. If “Strange Fruit” is a type of memory, it is a memory estranged, and its 
“progress” is seated right at the expense of what must be repressed. In the same way, the 
memory of lynching, of anti-Black violence, forms as a memory of a history that is 
compulsively forgotten. I think that the song needs to be reinterpreted along the lines of 
an aesthetic sorrow and as allegorical memory. We need to trace where its allegorical 
meaning displays memory as a type of mourning that marks out the aesthetic relations of 
a present that spark anxiety. This is done in the way that the song places an emphasis on 
the broken relation of a present to its history, and to what has gone silent by letting 
absence of voice and absence of image become an intimately decisive emphasis about in 
the song. Every image in the song is a decayed image, resting against a memory that is 
supplied only allegorically. 
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She sings Southern trees; bear a strange fruit/blood at the leaves and, blood at 
the root, /black body swinging in the southern breeze/Strange fruit hanging from the 
polar trees. Pastoral scene of the gallant south, / the bulging eyes and the twisted mouth. 
The images symbiotically rest against one another and shatter the sense that each retains 
on its own. It is expressly what does not get amplified and what is not made explicit that 
retains a political register. What goes silent is a question of repair, limit, and recognition. 
All of these questions seem odd and out of place.  
We might also say that strange fruit reveals a political dream. It is as much a 
recasting of a political dream as it is a response to the violence itself. The body of the 
lynched victim is a displayed object and a waste object, in either case prepared for 
consumption, which pairs its status with that of fruit.
41
 The lynched body, much like fruit, 
is produced, and then consumed in the local shop as trophy, or hung in the center of town 
as manufactured memory. Therefore, White violence is paired with the cultivation, care, 
and growth of the poplar tree. The pairing shows the way the South has benefitted from a 
history of exploiting black bodies for its own profit, as if this violence were a product of 
nature, sharing the same origin and representing two sides of the same thing. This 
conflation of human-made violence to nature results in a pairing of violence with nature, 
which is the long memory of neglect that is intertwined with the long memory of sorrow. 
This pairing does not resolve itself in the face of the victim, but the way the face 
dissipates into parts, displacing any notion of face with the inhuman “twisted mouth.”   
I mentioned that the rest of the song seems to retreat from this image, but it might 
be clearer to say that it hesitates, or brings her singing to its silence. One could say that 
there is a voicing that is expressed in this silence in the sense that something is withheld, 
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held in within the present, but without representation. Or, to say this in another way, with 
the present as a petrified object, one that petrifies if it were not suppressed from the start. 
Thus, in the face of eternal sadness, the present is continually petrified. Despite this 
hesitation, the music continues, or rather it lingers on—which means where there is a 
vocal withholding. There is also a tonal taking of time. This time stands inversely related 
to voice. It continues where the other continues inversely and is a time that moves 
outward or onward, while the voice moves inward or elsewhere. 
Holiday’s song illustrates the becoming of a silence that one is required to be 
present, much like the way the closed casket brings one closer to one’s own death than 
the sight of the corpse. We should recognize in all this that a silence resulting from the 
inability to speak is different from the silence resulting from a will that will not put itself 
into words. If the context invites words, then silence is a struggle and a resisting within 
the context. The same can be said about the choice of imagery, which from this point on 
is not visual, because the withholding of voice and reducing of vocalization mimics the 
withholding of the visual.  
The lyrics then defer to the sensual referents that flee from visibility. She sings, 
Scent of magnolia, sweet and fresh/sudden smell of burning flesh. While the scent of 
magnolia may mask the smell of burning flesh, or the smell of burning flesh may cancel 
the scent of magnolia, neither are cancelled and both are embedded in one another. 
“Smell” is used as a parallel sense, but smell is a primary sense of memory. Smell recalls 
a past, or a position where something was, and a dispersal of presence, and in this sense it 
shares a similarity with involuntary memory. Smell is also primarily a trace, it lingers 
even when the event and the body have been removed. In this way, it haunts, or hangs on 
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as a memory or trace that has yet to be repressed. Or, the smell is that object that 
generates a sense that is always already not here. The smell of burning flesh is the smell 
of the diffuse atmosphere of White violence. It is that quality that links the image of a 
past moment to a present state of affairs. Moreover, the smell of burning flesh is also 
sudden, unexpected, disruptive shock. The time of lingering is the time that interrupts, 
interferes with, or hangs on longer than it should within the present. 
The last stanza of the song traces a fragmentation. She sings, in a way re-
naturalizing the scene, Here is a fruit for the crows to pluck/ for the rain to gather, for the 
wind to suck/for the sun to rot, for the tree to—drop/ Here is a –Strange—and bitter fruit. 
Just as Benjamin focused on the ruin, the fragment, and the removal of material history 
that leaves traces in its removal, Holiday’s version of this song breaks each appearance of 
nature with regard to it consuming the memory of violence. This removal of a body does 
not end the history of what is removed, but places it within a context of 
countermovement, preserving it as a reproduced removal .This is not simply the erasure 
of death, but its perseverance as a countermovement against the abyss of forgetting, 
against a repairable moment, and against a present that could recover—and requires 
empathy. It is in this sense that involution makes the present strange. Aesthetic sorrow 
reflects the political training of the present to confront terror as it turns the political 
toward its inward condition of potency.
42
  
Despite the fact that the song addresses the death of a person, this is not a song 
that mourns any particular person—it is not personal in that sense. The death is public, 
impersonal, and from any time. It is allegorical at the same time that it is memorial. By 
rejecting the expression imposed in the form of representation, the song draws into its 
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scope the social pathology of White violence. It does this by making the meaning and not 
the image audible. White violence makes the sayable not worth saying or only worth 
representing allegorically. By rendering the words sung, spoken, murmured indifferently 
or powerfully beside the pastoral and elegant imagery, all of this lays bare a social 
contradiction on which White violence still operates. Just as, for Benjamin, a frozen 
landscape of the present and of history, or rather, as that which “breaks off in the middle 
of the process of resounding…which was ready to pour forth, [and] provokes mourning,” 
the song works as a memory that amplifies a present that is silencing a sensitivity to 
loss.
43
 It is a fire alarm that sounds for sixty seconds every minute.
44
 
 
4. The Sublime Residue of Sorrow  
I have argued that there is no real response against a Cassandra complex other than 
what exposes the complex itself as an exterior condition conditioning our contextualized 
aesthetic relations to domains of politicization. Aesthetic sorrow and allegorical memory 
simply make the aspects of the complex appear in their fragmentation and awkwardness. 
They put on display the activity of hiding what the complex wants to keep hidden. 
Allegorical memory that replaces memory with mourning goes a bit further in how, if we 
thematize mourning, it places images in the place where it is also withholding something. 
If the song or memorial must represent, it will throw up a representation, but within the 
representation there is also a publicizing of how the present suffers its own forgetfulness. 
This has a meaning for politics in that it makes public that which is anestheticized.  
If “Strange Fruit” is a form of aesthetic memory that is allegorical, it must fail as a 
direct memory or representation. This failure would seem to find its resolve in provoking 
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the sense of dissent, or reorganizing the senses toward the sorrowful. Much like other 
works of allegory, the domain of representation and the domain of allegory encounter one 
another as limiting factors, or extremes of one another. The singing of “Strange Fruit” 
allows it not only to operate as memorial aesthetic sorrow, but as a critical 
memorialization of what has undergone decay and become the object of a progressive 
insensitivity. As a memory, it reveals the way racist memory unfolds as a detritus of 
representation and representability (or, recognition). It reveals either the condition in 
which social consciousness has become numb even to this type of violence (which is the 
same as listening to “Strange Fruit” for enjoyment or as dancing music), or in which this 
type of violence has come to be abolished. Likewise, what aesthetic sorrow seems to be is 
a memorial art that makes the allegorical expression of memory present. In a sense, the 
illegitimation of the memory of this past reveals a dynamic of the politics of the present 
in a memory that nobody wants to remember. Likewise, Benjamin points out that 
“Ghosts, like the profoundly significant allegories, are manifestations from the realm of 
mourning; they have an affinity for mourners, for those who ponder over signs and over 
the future.”45 The future, in this sense, is always undetermined in that it is pitted between 
abolition and repetition. In this way, the political sense of mourning is the work of 
making the public sphere restless in reference to the way past loss refers to a present 
oppression. 
I argued that aesthetic sorrow is not a new form of aesthetics, nor is it a different 
form of memory, because it resituates a particular question of violence relative to history, 
on the one hand, and the present context, on the other.  Memory becomes allegorical 
where representation appears as only representation, and thereby inadequate. In this 
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context it challenges the present not only to regard the present as shot through with the 
ruptures of the past, and in so doing, bear the weight of our violence, but also to see the 
past as shot through with the present. This is what has been left unsaid in Du Bois, 
Benjamin, and Davis. To think of the past as being shot through with the present means 
that former absence aesthetically un-determines the significance of our positive notions 
of politics in which neglect is not only an instance of a political failure, but the 
symptomatic structure of a political complex.  
Furthermore, allegory resists domination that governs its importance. It is in this 
domain that silence appears as a type of speaking; it is the negative relation to speaking 
that pulls away from audibility and yet makes it possible all at the same time. Silence is 
not found on its own, but only where voice is present. I have tried to show that the same 
can be said for sorrow. Where progress asserts that history and tradition are advancing, 
sorrow appears as that which can only appear in its implied form.  Mourning is the 
double of aesthetic sorrow; it amplifies the presence of memory’s anesthesia.   
We need to ask further about what aesthetic sensibility outstrips the public sphere 
in such a way that what anxiety reveals is a system of relationality that is in negation. I 
think that Kantian aesthetics achieves this with his revision of the aesthetics of the 
sublime, but the sublime has further implications. I am neither returning to a Kantian 
aesthetics that applies his notion of the sublime to politics, nor am I rehabilitating a 
version of Kant for this project. I will focus on a few insights on how the aesthetic and 
the public sphere relate to one another from Kant’s aesthetic and political writings. For 
this reason, I am also not reviving a postmodern Kant. I am only in search of a tool, a 
scrap, or a lever that responds to post-racialism and can be used to respond to the 
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Cassandra complex.  If this does damage to Kantian aesthetics, so be it. But, I will focus 
on the Sublime in its first and initial moments, which is to say, that I will focus on the 
aesthetic relationality of the anxiety of the Sublime. I do this not to erase the previous 
work that scholars have done on Kant, but to show that while the aesthetic of the Sublime 
is important to aesthetics, it is also important to politics, and not only in its reactionary 
form. In its first moments, the Sublime appears at the same time as the Beautiful 
emasculating the Beautiful and calling for a resituating of cognition. I think this is 
significant to examine in the context of politics and our post-racial relation to history. 
Where the Sublime turns away from the Beautiful, a negative relation to the public sphere 
appears—and this can only be developed further as a more fundamental political sense of 
mourning.  
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CHAPTER IV 
POVERTY OF THE AESTHETIC AND THE SUBLIME 
SILENCE OF MOURNING 
 
 
We have followed White violence as it relates to post-racial memory and found 
that, in memory itself, the post-racial remembers by making the traces of White violence 
appear as mere memory in the public sphere. But the memory goes silent. We found that 
the memory aestheticized the object of memory, while depoliticizing the activity of 
memory, on the one hand, and the present’s relation to history, on the other. We 
characterized this by saying that post-racial memory anesthetized the present. The 
anestheticized character itself left the traces of the erasure of white violence as a memory 
of sorrow. Aesthetic sorrow and allegorical memory were then suggested as responses to 
the post-racial problematic.  
I want to suggest something further that appears at the edge of memory and 
aesthetics. I want to suggest that what appears aesthetically as response clarifies the 
political anestheticization of memory by bringing its effects, its displacements, its 
strangeness into the public sphere. Thus, what appears as aesthetic poverty retains 
something of the sublime in its meaning; it raises the poverty to a condition that mourns. 
While this chapter will focus on Kantian aesthetics, it also focuses on the meaning of an 
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aesthetic poverty that makes that forgotten matter something that appears even when it 
goes silent. 
There is still a valuable counter-argument to my position that I have done little to 
address up to this point, other than suggest that it rests on a particularly political 
anesthesia of memory. One may still want to argue that violence against Blacks is not as 
extreme as it once was, because the expression of this violence has changed. Let us 
consider this point more carefully to illustrate the main themes of this chapter. For the 
most part, contemporary violence is not the violence of pre-civil rights era politics.  In 
1934, for instance, a Florida newspaper publicized the details from eye-witnesses to 
Claude Neal’s lynching. It reported that Neal died in part by auto-phagy. The eye-witness 
reports,
First they cut off his penis. He was made to eat it. Then they cut off his testicles 
and made him eat them and say he liked it.  
Then they sliced his sides and stomach with knives and every now and then 
somebody would cut off a finger or a toe. Red hot irons were used on the nigger 
to burn him from top to bottom. From time to time during the torture a rope would 
be tied around Neal’s neck and he was pulled over a limb and held there until he 
almost chocked to death, when he would be let down and the torture begun all 
over again.
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Neal’s body was tied to a rope on the rear of an automobile and dragged over the 
highway to the Cannidy home. Here a mob estimated to number somewhere 
between 3,000 to 7,000 people from eleven southern states was excitedly waiting 
his arrival…A woman came out of the Cannidy house and drove a butcher knife 
into his heart. Then the crowd came by and some kicked him and some drove 
their cars over him. What remained of the body was brought by the mob to 
Marianna, where it is now hanging from a tree on the northeast corner of the 
courthouse square. 
Photographers say they will soon have pictures of the body for sale at fifty cents 
each. Fingers and toes from Neal’s body are freely exhibited on street-corners 
here.
1
       
One would claim that while such violence still occasionally happens, it does not happen 
as a public affair. The violence that is directed against Blacks is largely secondary 
violence or systemic violence. However, one wonders how we can be sure that the 
dispersal of violence indicates a cessation of violence. This type of progress seems to be 
undercut by the more efficient and more discreet violence I have been describing. What is 
the meaning of social change when we see, in each advance, progress in the available 
forms of expression, as well as regression in the activity of public responsiveness? One 
might argue that the progress that eliminates public lynchings of the magnitude described 
is a matter of White violence becoming more efficient. We do not need to hang bodies by 
the courthouses anymore. We merely need to post a sign that reads: “Trayvon is a 
Nigger” on a public street as a reminder of the presence of White violence. More 
accurately, we merely need to accompany racial violence with the discourse that puts 
questions of race out of play. 
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In any case, the history of anti-Black violence is the history of aesthetic 
anestheticization of the public sphere. Let us recall that in W.E.B. Du Bois’s time, even 
though the violence of Jim Crow, lynch laws, and lynching was present, the violence that 
shook him most was the discreet presence and symbolic reminder of the anesthesia of 
White violence. In Dusk of Dawn, he recalls that he overheard some White folks talking 
about a nigger who was just lynched. Not unlike Neal, the victim’s knuckles were on 
display in the window of the local shop. Du Bois knew he had to cross this store in order 
to get to where he needed to go to make an important meeting he had. He recalls that the 
news stopped him in his tracks. Cold with fear, he returned home and cancelled all his 
appointments that day. Now, we might focus on the psychological effect that this had to 
have for Du Bois and any African American at that time. But, I think something else 
sparked this response. The problem was not that someone who looked approximately like 
Du Bois was killed. The problem was not that Du Bois was afraid of encountering the 
grotesque display of human violence; he feared encountering that reminder of the 
anesthesia of the violence itself. He writes,  
Lynching continued in the United States, but raised curiously enough little 
protest. Three hundred and twenty seven victims were publically murdered by the 
mob during the Years 1910 to1914, and in 1915 the number jumped to one 
hundred in a single year. The pulpit, the social reformers, the statesmen continued 
in silence before the greatest affront to civilization which the modern world has 
known.
2
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White violence is not foreign to silence, to anestheticization; it is born of it. It is reiterated 
as a memory of forgetting when that very silence comes to structure the limits of 
discursivity around the anxiety of White racism about its violence. 
The memory of lynching is a memory caught between the elevation of the 
particular to its broader social meaning and the reduction of social meaning back into its 
own form of aesthetic poverty. When a black body is lynched, the desecration that occurs 
on the body prepares it for being forgotten, for being that thing that is sought for, but not 
responded to. The torture is almost scripted with the binding of the body and the removal 
of organs such as the genitals, the tongue, and the eyes. The body is bound by rope, often 
in a fashion resembling the binding of sacrificial animals, or it is held in place by many 
people, while others beat the will to resist out of it. The genitals are removed and often 
force fed to the victim. The tongue is cut out and sometime shoved back down the throat. 
The eyes are usually burned or beaten out. The castrations achieve three negations: logos, 
or language; skopos, or observation; eros, or unity (fertility, productivity, power, etc. are 
also implied). Don’t speak, don’t see, and above all don’t link yourself to a past or a 
future—which is to say that for all three symbols the message is: Don’t remind us.  
Moreover, all three castrations work to anesthetize response. We can see this if 
we briefly juxtapose this form of murder against the frenzied violence of Greek antiquity. 
This violence is just as brutal in its explicit form as that of lynching. But it is contrary in 
that it does not castrate responsiveness as part of its means: the violence can always be 
stopped in the act of supplication. Here again, the victim is in a position of complete 
vulnerability, but the supplicant can place his or her hand on the chin of the aggressor, 
allowing the meeting of the eyes to interrupt the activity of the violence, a prayer or plea 
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can be made, and some gesture of atonement, compensation, or unity is promised linking 
the present to a past or a future. If the victim is female, she may bear her breast to remind 
the aggressor of his own indebtedness to a mother. Notice that the victim interrupts 
violence by precise means. She displaces a ‘now’ with a ‘now that must remember;’ she 
replaces that individual “I” with all of history. This too shows that to remember 
(Gedenken) is to respond—which means that one also has to keep something in the 
sphere of one’s thought or concern. But it is just this reminder, in the slightest form, 
which appears as a mobilizing anxiety, casting White violence always as part of a public 
neglect. Since this is done as compulsion, rather than tactic, the lack of concern is more 
of a sense of aesthetic poverty than anything else—it makes the conditions of loss 
accompany the appearance of loss.   
To think back is an activity that keeps the present in hand, and thus a memory of a 
past without the present in hand is memory in its most alienated form. I will argue that 
while the activity of White violence lies in producing aesthetic poverty insofar as it has 
always been the use of aesthetics that anestheticize the ability to respond, this too has its 
limit in aesthetics. In this chapter, I will focus on the theme of aesthetic alienation in how 
it is shaped in the public sphere and responded to in aesthetics. I will argue that Kantian 
aesthetics traces the sociability of temperament and feeling, depends on a philosophy of 
history, and further retraces the limits of a rational aesthetics, first through the beautiful, 
and then through the sublime.  
While Kant intended to settle the question of how a private feeling could result in 
a public judgment in unified consciousness, for us the questions are different. How does 
this condition relate a public form of anxiety to aesthetic poverty? First, I will ask, what 
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is it that iterates itself when its articulation has been made impossible in the public 
sphere? Next, I will ask, where does this appear when we remember in order to forget? I 
will address these questions by developing aspects of Kant’s aesthetics in relation to the 
philosophical racism that appears in his aesthetics, anthropology, and philosophy of 
history. I will argue that the contrast that he develops in his aesthetic of the sublime is 
even more pronounced in reference to post-racial discourse, in general, and post-racial 
memory, in particular. Thus, by sketching out the sociability of aesthetics in Kant, we 
will have a clearer idea of how and in what way aesthetic terms like the beautiful and the 
sublime are at work in the way post-racial memory relates to the public sphere. 
 
1. Aesthetics and Anesthetics in Kant 
The problem of anesthesia that defines the post-racial is contained in the Kantian 
welding of aesthetics to politics. Let us break from that issue momentarily to consider the 
construction of Kantian aesthetics, which predates the critical period (1780-1789) by at 
least a decade. In Kant’s early writings, around 1769, he was concerned with a central 
problem; how does a taste, which is determinative of a private sensation, raise itself to the 
level of an all encompassing universal Taste? How does the inner become the outer, or 
how does the private become the public? What is the sociability of sensation that stands 
behind the elevation of a particular set of tastes to actual judgments? The sociability of 
sensation has a long and not altogether clear genealogy in Kant’s thought, from 1769 up 
to some point in the late 1780’s, as Kant sought to develop a critique of taste and not a 
critique of judgment.
3
 This suggests that Kant intended to develop the sense of sociability 
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within a point of view particular to it, but found that sociability exceeded this domain and 
required the development of judgment in a more expansive sense than he considered it to 
have at the close of the Critique of Pure Reason.
4
 But what does this mean other than 
that, from the standpoint of aesthetics, Kant worried about particularity and universality? 
I think it means that Kant’s aesthetics are concerned with relationality in the public 
sphere, which is cut short by social forms of anxiety. The tension that develops between 
pleasure and un-pleasure, representation and the non-representable, eudaimonic and 
abderitic, and the beautiful and the sublime, are all many ways of underwriting and 
responding to the same anxiety. But this is an anxiety that structures the public sphere 
and makes the normativity of the public sphere something to be defended.  
  
a) Sociable Universality 
What makes Kant distinct from other thinkers working in aesthetics is that he starts 
aesthetic inquiry by asking how pleasure, a private sensation, is also public, a matter of 
taste or judgment. His aesthetics are about the limits of that public sphere I have 
frequently referred to throughout this discussion. In the Critique of Judgement (hereafter 
referred to as the third Critique), Kant distinguishes pleasure by its sociable activity. 
Pleasure, when stripped of its privatized meaning, takes on a public sense; it is not simply 
what pleases, but what appears as the expansion of life or the feeling of life. Likewise, 
Roldophe Gasché points out concerning pleasure that, “The feeling of life predicated in 
judgments of taste is a non-cognitive awareness of being alive. The pleasure predicated of 
representations in judgments of taste is the pleasure of coming to life, as it were.”5 What 
is strange, however, is that the activity that gives pleasure its meaning is the activity that 
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requires that it withdraws aesthetic primacy of the content, to replace this content with its 
relation to form.  
Indeed, what facilitates life is what agrees with or is in harmony with the faculties of 
cognition. The word translating “agreement” and “harmony” are the same: 
übereinstimmung, which literally means to speak within or over all with one voice, mood, 
or tone. This constitutes its primary relation to sociability. The beautiful bears the force 
of agreement within all knowing, and is thus a domain of relations to its aesthetic ideal. 
What can be known as appearance, in appearance, and represented in its clarity 
(scheinen) is a relation that comes close to the aesthetic ideal of the beautiful (Schönen). 
The comparative gestures of the judgment derive the ideal not as perfection but as a 
standard from itself whereby the beautiful is both determined and determines itself by 
itself.
6
 He concludes that, “To feel one’s life, to enjoy oneself, is then nothing else but to 
feel constantly impelled to pass beyond the present state (which, consequently, has also 
to be a frequently recurring grief).”7According to Kant, the feeling of life is the ability to 
represent the increase of life as a whole and not as a particular, whereas pain is the 
displeasure of sensation and is found in the loss of life.
8
  
But is the agreeable feeling of life really a type of pleasure? How does this feeling 
relate to the sociability of pleasure? Kant asserts that “gratification” is the pleasure of 
advancement of life, while pain that of hindrance of life.
9
 Life, therefore, is eudaimonic, 
if it is expansive. On the contrary, too much pain is a hindrance to growth and 
productivity. Pain precedes pleasure, and thus makes the pleasurable possible and moves 
life into the state of activity.
10
 This suggest that pleasure is active in recognition of unity 
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in the public sphere. Pleasure marks out the exterior of discursivity that instantiates 
meaning, and in its most radical form it is harmony (übereinstimmung). 
Could the activity of harmony could be a type of knowing that potentially is 
recognized by all as an interest?
11
 Thus, recognition of community may be at the basis of 
Kantian aesthetics. But it is communicated in the form of the feeling that harmonizes all 
subjective cognition toward its object, which must be pleasure. Pleasure is the feeling that 
is a quickening of imagination and understanding
12—which is a type of interplay or 
enlivening of these two abilities. Pleasure, therefore, is the result of the abilities of 
knowing determining a representation.  Representation only has force insofar as it pushes 
cognition towards eudaimonia.
13
 Eudaimonia is significant to Kant’s understanding of 
the public sphere and to history, both of which underpin his discussion on race. Let me 
leave this point to the side for now, in order to situate Kant’s discussion of appearance 
and beauty. I will return the problem of Kant’s racism in the following section. 
 
b) The Limit of Appearance  
If the activity of pleasure is based in the founding of community in agreement with 
universal appearance, then how does this situate the activity and meaning of 
representation? In the third Critique, Kant develops judgment’s ability to exceed the 
determinations of beauty within form by enacting a secondary erasure: We move from 
appearance, which is a representation of the agreement of my cognitive faculties, to mere 
appearance. This is what seems to make judgment the focus of his aesthetics over tastes. 
But also according to Kant, reflective judgment requires that representation, in the formal 
domain, find a limit that is also the requirement of appearance. Kant repeatedly refers to 
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the Bloss (mere or dumb) appearance of the thing. Roldophe Gasché points out that for 
Kant, “Bloss designates a state that is exceptional, out of the ordinary. What is said to be 
bloss is distinct from, and even opposed to, the fullness that ordinarily characterizes 
something.”14 Mere appearance is appearance in its dumb and almost completely 
incommunicable state. Kant argues that aesthetic judgment results in comparing 
appearance that is deprived of all coverings, and is produced on its own, within the 
domain of representation.
15
 But appearance is nothing other than the composite play of 
force, resolving in form. Mere appearance is only force or a pressure; it is an appearing 
without the distinction of being a representation (vorstellen).  Mere appearance appears 
as a force, while representation is an accomplishment of cognition. Jean-François Lyotard 
puts it this way: A representation is not simple, but a complex set of conditions of 
appearing and appearing as, a process of situating of existants in existence.
16
 Thus, 
representation requires that we refine the sense of political discursivity to reflect the 
relation that situates the private domain of existence relative to the appearance of 
sociability of the public sphere. 
To address the way appearance and judgment relate to the aesthetic and political 
limitations of the public sphere, let us reconsider the status of representation on Kantian 
grounds a bit more closely. According to Kant, representation is the result of how 
Erscheinen (the phenomenon) scheinens (shines or shows itself), and at the highest level 
this condition is determined as schönen (as beautiful). What stands in negative relation to 
the aesthetic of the Beautiful is not non-representation, but appearance particularized, or 
sensation. Representation is required to be reflective and its function is to be comparative 
in that it draws from sensation to appearance the experiential basis that produces a law 
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and gives it to itself as a representation.
17
 Reflective judgment is based on a comparative 
form of knowing that finds justification in comparative agreements in lieu of a 
universal;
18
 it is a self-relation that reflects the whole. Insofar as reflective judgment is an 
ability of cognition, it is the development of power (Macht) as a result of sociability. 
Reflective judgment is based on a comparative form of knowing that finds justification in 
comparative agreements in lieu of a universal;
19
 it is a self-relation that reflects the 
whole.  
But Kant argues that this power develops by way of a negative relation to sensation in 
that it determines whether the particular is consummate with a principle or a 
representation (a state of affairs) or whether it hinders or obscures these.
20
 In subsuming 
the particular under a rule or principle,
21
 mere appearance manages to stand against a 
crisis that comes to be understood as representation. The primary object of reflective 
judgment is no longer sensation, but the aesthetic category of appearance. Therefore, 
reflective judgment not only depends on the primary erasure, but enacts a second and 
final erasure that determines the aesthetic of the beautiful within the domain of 
representation. This time the erasure, however, only appears as force (Gewalt).
22
 Or, what 
appears also has its double, which is the concealment of its own violence. And violence is 
what goes silent in regard to the publicality of the Beautiful. This situates a limit to public 
discursivity, limited by the domain of agreement. 
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2. The Weakest Signs: Culture, History, and Race in Kant’s Aesthetics 
While the recognition of life is dependent on eudaimonic drives displayed through 
temperaments and feelings, Kant’s anthropology is based on an aesthetic reading of the 
present community’s relation to history. History is, then, also a matter of aesthetics that 
traces the boundary between sensibility, discursivity, and the potentialities of the public 
sphere. And it is here that Kant develops both his cosmopolitanism and his intellectual 
racism.  
Kant’s racism, unlike that of many thinkers of his time and thereafter, is not 
problematic for the reason that it shows a moral failing in a prominent moral philosopher. 
Rather, the way in which meaning is retained in the conceptions that frame and disclose 
the political seems to reproduce the very violence that the social is supposed to be ridding 
itself of. This perfection is bound to the residue of a sign’s determination as a political 
meaning of weakness. Kant writes, “All the culture and art that adorn mankind, as well as 
the most beautiful social order, are fruits of unsociableness that is forced to discipline 
itself and thus through an imposed art to develop nature’s seed completely.”23 This basic 
power is considered representation, and it is in this form of representation that Kant’s 
racism is deeply embedded in his conceptual determinations when it is used as a sign of 
history related to geography.
24
 This is decidedly embedded in the way the eudaimonia as 
a historicity of sociability is wedded to the determinations of sensus communis, which 
determines the limits of a public sphere of cognizability. This means that in his critical 
writings, Kant attempts to articulate the way the public sphere defines its limits given the 
limits of human cognition. The results are a clarification of what we mean by Truth, 
Morality, and Beauty. By contrast, in his anthropological writings, Kant attempts to 
124 
 
articulate the way the public sphere is limited by its traditions and habits. The result is a 
clarification of the social meaning of Culture (Bildung), History, and Politics. At the 
center of both is a development of how aesthetics determines or unsettles a public sphere 
burdened by its traditions, and challenged by its history. Thus, for Kant, we should 
consider how he challenges us to think of tradition and history as useful to the progress of 
the culture—especially since this is intimately linked to the sociability of his notion of 
temperament and feeling.    
 
a) History and the Feeling of Life 
Kant’s notion of history is intimately linked to his aesthetics, especially in terms 
of how he develops the social significance of temperament and feeling. To see this 
parallel let us return to Kant’s use of the term eudaimonia. Since Kant holds that 
reflective judgment transforms the feeling of pleasure into the feeling for life from the 
point of view of aesthetic judgment, it defines the eudaimonic in the same terms from the 
point of view of pragmatic judgment.
25
 Therefore, there is a two-tiered politics at work in 
the same way that appearance and non-appearance form a symmetric relationship with 
the sociable and the insociable and both relations indicate the interplay between the 
powerful and the disempowered. That which appears otherwise presents a contradiction 
and hinders the expansion of the sociable; it also appears as that which weakens life. 
Of course, Kantian thought is aimed at the question of knowing in its clearest and 
most unified public sense. This often takes the form of Kant giving attributes to 
temperaments and feelings, such as strength and weakness, when all he is talking about is 
a relationality. But in his anthropology and his philosophy of history we see something of 
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the notion of weakness that is made public. Weakness is not only a temperament that 
moves from the public inward. Allan Wood, for instance, argues that the social 
development of Kant’s thought is heavily interlaced with the need for a way of sharing 
history as propæduetic of culture and as a resistance to the unsociable impulses in 
society.
26
 By contrast, eudaimonia is judged against the concept of perfectibility that is 
the sign of the strongest aspects of the species. However, Kant also argues that there is 
much in society that is caught in-between, or mixed, which he calls the unsociable 
sociable impulse. He groups war in with these signs and argues that they designate a 
feeling for life, but this feeling is a deadening. Similar to the feeling associated with the 
anesthesia of memory, intertwined with eudaimonia is a feeling that is counter to the 
feeling of life. What public does weakness stand in relation to other than a public that 
fortifies itself against it, configuring it as weak, but a strong weakness that is cause for 
anxiety? It is within this sphere that Kant’s thought situates his racism in aesthetics, and 
takes a turn toward the post-racial. 
 
b) Kant’s Aesthetic Historical Transcendentalism  
We can see the way anesthetic and anesthetic limits form political relations in Kant’s 
anthropological writings. Thus it is significant that these are the writings that form the 
basis of his early aesthetics. These writings can be grouped together as Kant’s 
observations on mankind. These writings interlace and sometimes shift the focus of the 
critical writings, but at least in part they retain many of the deep and highly developed 
concepts that the critical works painstakingly develop. They closely follow the 
development of his philosophy of history and aesthetics. Likewise, if his political use of 
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history and political use of anthropology mirror the meanings established in the 
aesthetics, then we ought to be attentive to the way in which a deep structure of racism is 
disclosed within the political determinations of Taste, eudaimonia, pleasure, or Beauty.   
In these writings, the central terms are temperaments and feelings, which have precise 
meanings. While both feeling and temperament are general, temperament is more 
sociable than feeling, since feeling indicates the interior representation of the whole, and 
temperament represents the exterior relation. Feeling is a relation to life in that the feeling 
that can raise itself to sociability is pleasure. But, the feeling that cannot raise itself out of 
the self-referring circuit cannot indicate the expansion of life, but only the closing in of 
life. For instance, in his Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, he 
writes that “The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above the 
trifling.”27 The fact that Kant thinks that the feelings sometimes stall on the way to 
temperaments further suggests that feelings must be thought in terms of the whole or the 
general. For some groups or cultures, they possess (at the level of publicality) feelings 
and temperaments that weaken life, disclosing a history within the present that has 
become anestheticized as representation.  
For Kant, history includes that movement of appearance toward representation, which 
is a power of appearance, and toward mere appearance, which is disempowerment of 
appearance. He casts both within his philosophy of history. Thus, he argues that physical 
geography produces a rational and teleological structure, and reveals a force rendering 
place as a type of agreement. He argues that nature places those characteristics in humans 
who find their place in the environments characteristic of periods of human 
development.
28
 In this context Kant states that, “the Negro, who is well suited to his 
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climate, namely strong, fleshy, supple, but who, given the abundant provision of his 
motherland is lazy, soft, and trifling.”29 Kant’s idea of the “feeling” that weakens the 
feeling for life allows him to be able to use the lack of sociability of feelings as the basis 
for a deep form of cultural racism, writ large in his philosophy of history.
30
 But let us be 
clear: the trifling temperament is still public in that it further discloses the sensate 
extreme, configured as a momentary sensation or relation of the public sphere to anxiety.  
The temperaments, however, tell the same story with different implications. 
According to Kant, temperaments are a sign for the geopolitical scene. For Kant, 
temperaments are signs of nature in the form of physical geography as well, and we can 
see that this retains the same structure as feelings, but writ large on the scale of the 
political as such. Kant states that, 
The inhabitant of the temperate parts of the world, above all the central part, has a 
more beautiful body, works harder, is more jocular, more controlled in his passions, 
more intelligent than any other race of people in the world. That is why at all points in 
time these peoples have educated the others and controlled them with weapons.
31
  
 
He holds that when humans mainly occupied and flourished in hot deserts, dark skin was 
produced as the trait for humanity.
32
 Therefore, according to Kant, the Negro is the trace 
of life of the past, which is to say that the political apprehends Africans, slaves, and what 
comes under the social rubric of “savages” within a discursive frame of the past. The 
Black body shows the ends of history: it is configured as an elevated motif on the past, 
and the most stubborn of relics of the present. 
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c) The Ends of History 
I will suggest that, for Kant, history is the working out of public anxieties because of 
the way sociability is tied to perfectibility. This seems to be why perfectability is also a 
form of influence on the development of character held within the limits of a political, 
translated as history and defined against the appearance of the unsociable social drives.
33
  
We should add that this is significant because, for Kant, history is the representation 
of the power of representation and recognition within us, of a public sphere beyond our 
particularity.
34
 In his aesthetics, we have the basis for the movement of relations in the 
public sphere, which, at its highest point is representation, and representation as the 
eudaimonic.  
Eudaimonia becomes an important term for Kant’s philosophy of history, but I 
also want to point out how it is used as an aesthetic term as well. In “On the Use of 
Teleological Principles in Philosophy,” Kant argues that the history of the human race is 
derived not from different types, but in a way that underscores the unity of a human 
race.
35
 What we typically call ‘race’ are varieties disposed differently to history, 
environment, and organization. Kant argues that this is a sign of nature in that generation 
in other places offers equal adaptability. Therefore, non-whites are historic, in the same 
sense that a relic has a weak relation to the present.
36
 It is not that this determines their 
existence in any actual way, but it does make clear their relation to the public sphere. 
Likewise, history works out the anxieties that appear in relation to one another in 
the public sphere. In “Idea of a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent,” Kant 
argues that aims of history stand in opposition to the effects of human society, in that the 
two are composed of a contradiction: a sociable unsociability. He states, “For along this 
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course of human affairs a whole host of hardships awaits man. But it appears that nature 
is utterly unconcerned that man live well, only that he bring himself to the point where 
his conduct makes him worthy of a life and well being.” 37 Therefore, for Kant, the end of 
these antagonisms results in law-governed order in society, as a sign of freedom that only 
means that the sign of life is fused within political discursivity.
38
  
For Kant, then, history is governed by the power of representation, as a circumstance 
or situation joining synthetic domains.  In the second part of Conflict of the Faculties, 
called “On an Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing 
Forward?” Kant shifts his point of view (Hinsicht), from the idea of universal history 
with a cosmopolitan intent, to reflecting on the form of the history a culture employs 
toward the production of a general will. He still makes history a matter of the power to 
represent or appear. But, unlike when eudaimonia is governing the political, he shows 
that again appearance can have a negative representation.  
The relation to the concept of life to the sphere of public discursivity is more explicit 
in terms of its relation to a political form of racism. Kant argues that there are three ways 
of representing history: one that moves forward from dependency to independence and is 
called eudaimonistic; one that moves backwards towards its own destruction and is called 
the terroristic; and one that does not progress at all and is called the abderitic.
39
 Kant 
holds that while the eudaimonistic form of representing history can help the other two, it 
can also be hindered by them. On his view the form of history a culture has is determined 
through a nation or state’s ability to achieve a form of autonomy (a capacity for 
freedom).
40
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Therefore, Kant holds that progress can only be made from the eudaimonistic 
culture’s influence on the other two.41 In this we can see that despite any change in 
Kant’s own personal opinions about race, his philosophy of history remains deeply 
racist.
42
 This means that as long as he has not altered his views on eudaimonia or the way 
his critical project conceives of temperaments and feelings, his politics remains 
disturbingly racist. Temperaments are the active habits of a culture and what it can and 
cannot produce for itself. It is thus mapped back onto the Kantian physical geography and 
naturalized as a product of nature, but as a social reality of the political asserting 
legitimacy through a form of agreement.
43
 This seems to be the exact way in which the 
political must be configured to omit its own contradictory apprehension of its own 
violence. 
What we have seen here operates without a dependence on Kantian notions of the 
beautiful or the sublime. Rather, unity, agreement, and harmony are all notions that trace 
iterability and history. They trace recognition and representation as the exterior activity 
of politics. However, we are also interested in the interior, and this should be seen in the 
light of the aesthetic of the beautiful and the sublime. 
   
 
d) The Unbearable Dialectic of the Beautiful 
All of this is to say that the aesthetic of the beautiful voices the ideal of universal 
consent. It does not achieve it, represent it, or result in it. It is the possibility of making 
accords, harmony, agreement, part of a public sphere. These are all terms rendered by the 
übereinstimmung and are inflected with a sense of the political. But, in what way is this 
related to the Beautiful, rather than merely to representation? The Beautiful is defined as 
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a power (Macht) and not strictly as representation, and it is the negation that expands the 
domain of representation in a two-fold way: It expands it as a sign of the enhancement of 
the feeling of life, and it exceeds this expansion as a sign of the limit of discursivity.  But, 
if the Beautiful is that which enlarges and enlivens, then it is this activity of eliminating 
what negates and choosing or reproducing what is agreeable that makes or facilitates the 
sociability of the senses toward life. But it also bears the traces of what weakens life at 
the same time. In this way, Kant aesthetic of the Beautiful does not concern itself with 
what appears in or as representation. The Beautiful is not representable, but what appears 
in accord with itself situates the public sphere as becoming attuned toward Beauty (which 
parallels Truth or the Moral law within us).
44
 Kant argues that the Beautiful is 
“something that is neither nature nor freedom and yet is linked with the basis of freedom, 
the supersensible, in which the theoretical and the practical power are in an unknown 
manner combined and joined into a unity.”45  Thus, the force of the Beautiful situates the 
public sphere of accord aesthetically, while the Beautiful itself remains inaesthetic.     
We see that Kant designates the Beautiful dialectically through the avoidance and 
withholding of tensions; the Beautiful is a movement away from tension toward 
illumination, away from representation toward truth of appearance, and also away from 
particularity toward universality. In this way, we should point out that the Beautiful is a 
withholding, but it is also a clearing. It is a measure of power against that which goes 
silent, but this means that it is also a measure of aesthetic poverty. There is nothing 
Beautiful in art unless we put it there ourselves by translating elevated image by the 
Understanding. What is beautiful other than that movement that clears, on the one hand, 
and allows for an alternative form of appearance, appearance of negation as catharsis, on 
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the other? Clearing and silencing in this sense are ways to ready the public sphere. But, 
this form of clearing is also implied in Kant’s Aesthetic of the Sublime.  
 
3.  The Sublime and Its Shadow  
If the Beautiful situates the public sphere by clearing away the space for the public 
sphere to appear in agreement, what appears at the edge of, or as the condition that 
disappears in, this appearing?  If the appearance of the Beautiful is cognition attempting 
to formulate its unity in the transformation of its past into a eudiamonic drive, then what 
appears even in the most successful attempt at this is its failure, its point at which the 
image or narrative goes silent. While the Beautiful is that which we arrive at, come to 
know, or understand as a critical condition for the sake of the unity of the whole, the 
Sublime takes the same position, but it is not for the sake of the unity of the whole, and it 
is this not for the sake of that constitutes the ground of its response to the de-politicizing 
tendencies of post-racial memory.   
If the aesthetic of the Sublime is a going silent, a quieting, then we should understand 
what is meant by this a bit more carefully. One is quiet if one restricts one’s voice or has 
one’s voice restricted. But, one that also goes quiet because words no longer express 
anything worth saying. I think it is in this sense that the Kantian aesthetic of the Sublime 
is said to exceed all boundaries and at the same time come to indicate a limit concept. 
The aesthetic of the sublime is a resituating of the structure of normativity toward a 
problem that exceeds that normativity. It is a resituating of knowing toward a different 
sense of meaning. 
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a) Situating the Aesthetic of the Sublime  
Kant’s aesthetic of the Sublime is often characterized as an aesthetic that embraces 
the limit of the aesthetic as such; it appears as an anti-aesthetic. Erhaben is literally that 
force that exceeds what can be had (haben); it is that which outstrips appearance and 
representation. If the aesthetic of the Sublime is characterized as being formless, 
excessive, and beyond the bounds of cognition, then it seems to describe a subject-object 
relation to objectivity, rather than a subject-object relation to subjectivity. But the relation 
of form and content does not exceed representation in that it marks and demarcates only 
the unrepresentable. Rather it indicates a representation that bears its own alienation or 
otherness with it, and its object is aesthesis as such. Kant writes, “Hence sublimity is 
contained not in anything of nature, but only in our mind, insofar as we can become 
conscious of our superiority to nature within us, and thereby nature without us (as far as it 
influences us).”46 The Sublime indicates a relation to what exceeds the relation of form 
and content in the sense of not being determined by a set of normative relations.
47
  
One can argue that Kant’s aesthetic of the sublime is a form of an anti-aesthetic, since 
the sublime is determined as such by way of negating the grounds, the conditions, of the 
meaning of appearance, representation, sensation, etc. For instance, in the Mathematical 
Sublime, Kant describes this as the representation of that which is absolutely powerful 
and brings imagination and the understanding to their limit.
48
 He writes, “Sublime is what 
even to be able to think proves that the mind has a power surpassing any standard of 
sense.”49 The Sublime is an anti-aesthetic in the sense that it forms in between the 
aesthetic and the inaesthetic, or rather it brings the inaesthetic relation to bear on the 
public sphere in terms of where it fails to be responsive. 
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The Sublime presents two types of silencings. First, it makes normativity go silent in 
light of what it constitutes as its limit-concept. What aesthetic judgment brings to bear on 
sensibility, or rather on subjectivity, creates an unbearability or indeterminability 
(Unbestimmung) of an in-between-ness, which requires a different attunement toward its 
own limit or limit-concept.
50
 Unbestimmung is the negation of voice, underscoring the 
presence of voice. In the same way, this is the Sublime’s relation to harmony, accord, or 
agreement (übereinstimmung). But again, this is not a direct negation, but the in-between 
that does not form its meaning in the accord between form and content, between past and 
present, or simply within the aesthetic or within the political. For example, while the 
aesthetic of the Sublime is marked by a sense of “excess,” Kant holds that it cannot be 
thought of as that which stretches beyond what can be sensed.  
However, the negation of aesthetics in the aesthetic of the sublime itself forms the in-
between that is not for the sake of any end. It forms that interstitial point where meaning 
is voice as strained with silence; where a pleasure is so pleasurable that it is also a pain. 
Rather than thinking of the Sublime as opposed to the Beautiful, the Beautiful must be 
present for the Sublime: it is that which brings the representation into view, and from 
which the two forms of aesthetic judgment re-figure the juncture between aesthetics and 
politics and mark where the aesthetic becomes inaesthetic.  
But the beyond of sensibility that the Sublime indicates is not outside the circuit of 
sensibility. Rather, it is at the basis of it, rooted in it privately and publically. Thus, the 
aesthetic of the Sublime, in being found in relation to negative pleasure, or a pleasure so 
pleasurable it is pain-pleasure, or a pain so painful it is a pleasure-pain, makes silent the 
duality. The negative pleasure is not for the sake of a particular result, but keeps in play 
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the tension. Ruth Ronen argues that while aesthetic pleasure can only be located in its 
proximity to universal agreement, the psychoanalytic notion of anxiety is located to what 
stands neither as agreement or disagreement.
51
 Anxiety, while a type of displeasure, as an 
indication of the limit of the public sphere, subsumes both pleasure and displeasure.
52
  
Indeed, the Sublime marks that cognition that responds to something that appears in 
how it does not appear to that which does not appear only to make the anxiety that 
represses appearance appear. Furthermore, aesthetic judgment cannot determine its 
meaning in the public sphere, and it thus withholds meaning, or keeps its meaning in 
abeyance between two senses that contradict the grounding of the aesthetic itself. For this 
reason, Kant holds that the Sublime appears as an intrusion of the minimal form of 
intelligibility that de-contextualizes every formative context.
53
  
Anxiety, then, is the negative condition conditioning aesthetics. It marks the Sublime 
as that boundlessness in relationality. Gasché argues that “Only when formlessness is not 
merely a lack of form or a negative modification of it but instead a formlessness entirely 
different from a simple opposite of the beautiful is it possible to find sublimity in it.”54 
Therefore, aesthetic judgments of the Sublime are not opposed to what appears or what is 
represented; they are not opposed to harmony or accord, which are the conditions of 
appearing—rather, the aesthetic judgment of the sublime surpasses the conditions of 
appearing, putting the meaning that occurs in this distinction within a boundednesss and 
out of this boundedness at the same time. This is to say that not only within any 
determination is the sublime that which is always a bit more than what appears, but in-
between the meaning of what has a determination, or a for the sake of which, and that 
which the sake of which is not the issue. The aesthetic judgment of the sublime is not 
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purely a negation, but the aesthetic of the Sublime requires an interstitial constitution 
within the conditions of representation itself. 
  
b)  Sublimity and Its Unbounded Dialectic 
I want to underscore that Kant holds this paradoxical relation of the Sublime itself, 
since much like the aesthetic of the beautiful, the aesthetic of the Sublime emits of an 
interstitial point of convergence that makes every appearance reducible to a zero-point of 
representability. This paradox implies that loss suffers the public, sets the stage for the 
public sphere to be the site that mourns, even when it forgets. We can see this clearer in 
how the Sublime is violent to cognition, in that it is unbounded. 
Kant holds that violence marks the force of the Sublime to render reason over the 
imagination, or “because it is a Gewalt that reason[Grund] exerts over sensibility only for 
the sake of expanding it commensurately with reason’s own domain (the practical one) 
and letting it look outward toward the infinite, which for sensibility is an abyss [ab-
grund].”55 The relation of the power of reason, which is involved in the determination of 
concepts,
56
 the determination of meaning, relates sensibility to an abyss, or the 
indeterminable. The Ungrund is considered as the grounding of reason, but only insofar 
as aesthetic judgment requires a limit concept. The negative relation itself is a negative 
productivity. Thus, violence that relates Grund to aesthetic sensibility is its own negation, 
or limit concept, the un-grund. If the aesthetic of the Sublime is the rational part of the 
Kantian aesthetics, then it must be so through a general, and not specific, negation. Kant 
states,  
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For it is precisely nature’s inadequacy to the idea—and this presupposes both that the 
mind is receptive to ideas and that the imagination strains to treat nature as a schema 
for them—that constitutes what both repels our sensibility and attracts us at the same 
time, because it is a dominance (Gewalt) that reason exerts over sensibility only for 
the sake of expanding it commensurately with reason’s own domain (the practical 
one) and letting it look outward toward the infinite, which for sensibility is an abyss.
57
  
 
The Sublime is not simply what appears in opposition, but what appears as the 
residue that displaces the mechanisms of dominance. The meaning of aesthetic judgment 
does not simply point to what exceeds it, but attempts to situate meanings relative to 
oppositions. The meaning of the aesthetic judgment survives the in-between-ness that sets 
the conditions of subjectivity as it relates to its production of objectivity. Likewise, the 
survivor is not excessive to appearance, but cannot exactly find his/her meaning within 
the past or present. Kant argues that “Sublime is what even to be able to think proves that 
the mind has a power surpassing any standard of sense.”58 This can also mean that the 
aesthetic of the Sublime is more than a sign or the presence of a conflict, but it is the way 
we present the aesthetic becoming inaesthetic within the domain of representation. Thus, 
Kant writes, “If a [thing] is excessive for imagination (and the imagination is driven to 
[such excess] as it apprehends [the thing] in intuition), then [the thing] is, as it were, an 
abyss in which the imagination is afraid to lose itself.”59 It is the way the public sphere 
forgets its pastness, while retaining a relation of public memory to history, and thus 
frames a way for identifying the social dynamics of the aesthetics of post-racial memory. 
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c) Negative Pleasure and Its Political Counterparts 
So far I have suggested that Kant’s aesthetics of the Sublime disclose a quieting that 
is resisted by cognition, because it can only appear as violent to cognition— it presents 
representation at its dialectical limit. He calls this aspect of the sublime a negative 
pleasure. I want to further develop the implications of the negativity of the Sublime by 
focusing on how it can be represented in two ways. First, it is that in-between feeling that 
is a pain, so painful, it is pleasurable, or a pleasure so pleasurable that it is painful.
60
 But 
it is also that feeling of pleasure or pain that is neither pleasure nor pain. Thus, the 
sublime exceeds the category of pleasure (Lust) and displeasure (Unlust). Rather, the 
feeling is interstitial—which means it is defined without giving it a set, a domain, or a 
place. This characterization of the Sublime implies that the domain of pleasure and 
displeasure reach their discursive limitations and are outstretched by the negative 
pleasure of the Sublime. What is called “Sublime” is not within the domain that furthers 
life, but it is equally not within the domain that liquidates life or brings it to its end. Kant 
argues that what is the Sublime momentarily inhibits the feelings of life, overpowering 
cognition, or makes that domain of legitimation strange in itself.
61
 The Sublime is that 
feeling that unveils the public sphere as estranged from its own anxiety. Therefore, 
pleasure that is apprehended only by means of displeasure is a pleasure that is foreclosed 
by political discursivity, which is disclosed only by its restriction.
62
 But this movement 
itself is only the disclosure of a condition that forecloses something that goes silent. 
What I find significant about all of this in relation to post-racial memory is that Kant 
challenges us to rethink the significance of what forms at the juncture of the aesthetic 
becoming silent, or anesthetic, outside of the domain of aesthetics and inaesthetics: this is 
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an unprecedented aesthetics that finds its way into aesthetics. For this reason, Kant argues 
that indeterminability is a type of grounding that grounds what has meaning, but from the 
side of that in-between that does not act out of or find its meaning relative to that which is 
for the sake of some other end. It is disinterested, in that it shares none of the determined 
interests. And third, what appears only appears as the momentary aesthetic interruption of 
the public sphere, and for that reason Kant writes that the aesthetic of the sublime is “the 
momentary inhibition of the vital forces.”63 But, interruption is not simply resistance, and 
we cannot assume that the Sublime is what resists appearance.
64
 Thus it is clear that the 
Sublime indicates a relational limit. It is equally clear that it indicates a relationality that 
is also an inhabitation, a going silent that is always already present.
65
 What goes silent is 
not the result of inhibition or weakening of the ability to speak, nor is it only the 
withholding of speaking. Rather what goes silent is the appearance of the condition that 
makes speaking or not speaking amount to the same thing. The domain where speaking 
can constitute a public act appears as its own dumb show. The silence that goes silent is 
not simply a loss, but forms not for the sake of in every relational point that appears 
between appearance and representation. Since it cannot be an object, an event, or even a 
set of circumstances, it must be that relationality that negates its own basis. It is that 
relationality that shares the features of the psychoanalytic meaning of anxiety and thus 
introduces a dialectical indeterminancy into the aesthetic and political space. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
140 
 
4. The Dialectics of the Sublime and Post-Racial Memory 
 
What concerns us at the juncture of the political and the aesthetic is the survival of a 
type of memory of forgetting. I have argued that this appears as a public form of anxiety. 
It also situates a politics that is without a for the sake of which orientation toward the 
political. What appears under the rubric of the Sublime is a public sphere that is 
confronting the unprecedented. The unprecedented is that point in the aesthetic 
movement toward the Beautiful, where it feels its own poverty—and this poverty is a 
poverty that anesthetizes all of cognition, all of knowing as such. 
 
a) Sublime Poverty  
There is a unique quality of the sublime in that it does not depend on recognition or 
appearance, but rather on a sensing that is impoverished and senses its own 
impoverishment in other things. However, as soon as we start to talk about politics or 
responses to political conditions, we have lost the sense in which a Kantian aesthetic of 
the sublime operates as a negative relation that discloses the whole without being for the 
sake of some other end. The critical negation that indicates the sublime as sublime seems 
dependent on the fact that it is not disclosed in the unwitnessable, or the unbearable, but 
that in what we have come to witness over and over again, something unwitnessable 
appears. It is not that we fail to remember or attempt to remember something so great that 
our cognition fails to grasp it, but exactly what we remember appears as a failure of 
memory as such. In similar sense, Peg Birmingham argues, “The crisis of truth that 
testimony bears witness to is not the crisis of relativism, as if anything could be said in 
the testimony. The doubt concerning historical accuracy and the uncertainty of the verdict 
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have to do with the unpredictability and unprecedented nature of the events 
themselves.”66 To take up the Kantian sublime in this context is to show that the sublime 
is the unprecedented in everything that we bear witness to. But it is this insofar as it 
appears through the impoverishment of what appears. Moreover, what is born in the 
public use of memory that is at a loss also marks that activity that continues forgetting 
into mourning.  
What seems most significant here is that in the poverty of the aesthetic, the sublime is 
also a type of suffering. It marks that condition where we suffer not only our own 
anesthetization and inability to respond, but we suffer it as it is a condition for us. We 
suffer it as the condition for the possibility of what defines the public sphere. This 
suffering illuminates the negations of the past while presenting the unrepairability of the 
present. There is no reparation that could be meaningful, no grounding as yet as to what 
would make the past forgettable. The post-racial suffers its forgetfulness in its memory. 
b)  The Sublime Presence Suffering in Memory 
While the sublime demarcates the aesthetic disjuncture of social meaning that 
indicates where the politically unbearable terminates in the aesthetically unrepresentable, 
the same thing can be seen in relation to post-racial memory if the Sublime is translated 
into a type of mourning. But what I have been discussing has been the obverse side of 
memory. I have been discussing a type of memory that, because it is only the disclosure 
of a public forgetting, gives up playing witness to the past and instead witnesses the 
mournful in the present. The sublime is not the unrepresentability of great magnitudes, 
but the suffering of a great and expansive ineptitude; it is that suffering of a limit that 
defines the public sphere itself.  
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This seems to me to be the relation of the sublime to memory insofar as memory 
can form a response to post-racial discourse. The Sublime is not the presentation of 
horror, nor does it bring us closer to the weight or debt we owe to history. The Sublime’s 
relation to the public sphere is found in how it clears the space for a present memory of 
forgetting. In a present state of aesthetic poverty, we confront our own inability to 
remember even that which has been committed to public memory. Much like allegory, 
the Sublime is not communicated in the image or representation, nor in what cannot be 
represented, but in the activity of aesthetic poverty that allows mourning to open a great 
suffering now.   
The memorial is no longer a tracing of the past, it no longer seems to be able to 
apologize or repair the past. This seems just as true of Holocaust memory as it now is for 
post-racial memory. For instance, the invisibility of the murdered Jews of Europe is 
placed on display in the empty rooms of Peter Eisenman’s memorials.  Eisenman argues 
that his interest has been primarily in the disruption of the space and time continuum. 
Thus, aesthetic remembrances disturb the public by a primary act of displacement.
67
 Such 
an act is essentially one that disturbs the political by disturbing the aesthetic. The effect 
of this is that remembrance becomes a politicized activity achieved at the border of 
visibility. But the aesthetic attention given to the visibility of invisibility also seems to 
escape the post-racial problem insofar as it depends on an analogy to the political form of 
disappearance, invisibility, and erasure which conceals these modes as mechanisms of 
violence.  
Furthermore, Eisenman’s work points to another layer of the aesthetic-political 
relation that is worth considering in relation to how I intend to frame our discussion of 
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the Kantian sublime. Eisenman holds that the relation of community to space and time is 
significantly blurred in relation to certain structures.
68
 This blurring is neither the effect 
of the building, nor the subject in the presence of the building, but the subjectivity that 
encapsulates both, or the in-between that survives as neither subject-subjective 
relationship, nor as subject-objective relationship. Likewise, Andrew Benjamin points out 
that Eisenman’s architectural concerns rest on the incorporation of the terms blurring and 
interstitial into his work.
69
 Benjamin argues that the work of Eisenman relies heavily on a 
productive negative that forces a blurring of the determinate. What appears as proper to 
the past is blurred with the present, and negative to both. He writes, “[Eisenman] says 
that the proposed spatial organization blurs the distinction between new and old, where 
new pushes into old and old into new.”70 The interstitial, then, is the in-betweeness of 
subjectivity in its political form, it is neither and both the subject-object relation and the 
subject-subject relation, while not being either. Likewise, we can characterize this as 
what survives in the dominance of the new and the annihilation of the old, in the 
preservation of the old, and the devaluation of the new, in-between. It is what makes the 
pathological return appear in anxiety as a negative presentation. 
The same thing can be said of the way the history of slavery and the history of 
racial violence are memorialized in the United States. A memorial to Martin Luther King 
Jr. or to the slaves in Savannah Georgia, may be meaningful in itself for many reasons, 
but for no reason more than it demarcates a confusion of aesthetics and politics that 
reveals a memory that forgets and a forgetting that remembers.  In Washington D.C., as 
much as in Savannah, Georgia, the works of memory are significant in how they present 
forgetfulness. What is more, though, is that the spaces in which they intervene disclose 
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forgetfulness at every step beyond the memorial space, into our history that can only 
remember itself, but does not suffer itself—we suffer our forgetting in post-racial 
memory. The Sublime is not a response in the form of a resolution; rather it is a way of 
altering our engagement with the past, and it alters it to encompass that form of mourning 
that makes the discursive limit that goes silent in the public sphere, translated as legibly 
present suffering, bringing that political life of Kantian eudaimonia into the domain of 
the Sublime as the inhibition of life. Let us follow this sign of the Sublime further as it is 
fundamental for understanding the political significance of mourning in light of the 
problem that post-racial memory poses. 
 
c) The Mournful as Remembrance 
Since remembrance is marred with problem’s in post-racial memory, mourning is a 
primary response to the Cassandra complex in that it is through a sublime disturbance 
that what appears shows its own pathology. While Benjamin held that mourning marks 
that activity, whether psychological or political, of setting meanings, from a Kantian 
point of view, we should conclude that mourning also makes the social poverty aesthetic 
in its anesthetic state. This suggests that mourning responds in this privative way: what is 
appears as the sign that conceals the depoliticization of memory or history, and it appears 
impoverished. In its own impoverishment, it indicates the task of unearthing pathological 
tendencies. But this is why the response must be first a resituating of our questioning and 
concern toward this same old question and same old problem. 
The problem we attached to the objective meaning of memory seems to have inverted 
itself. From a Kantian perspective, we can no longer say that a memorial, no matter how 
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sophisticated or anti-traditional, contains any meaning. To argue otherwise places too 
much dependence on the memory or meaning of the memorial or artist. It would mean 
that the memorial remembers, suffers, or mourns—but this leaves the public sphere out of 
the circle of concern. We want to point out that the memorial is founded on a social 
aesthetics that fails in remembering, putting on display a breakage that cannot be 
repaired. We might not remember pre-civil rights memory, but it is not the work of the 
memorial to do so for us. We suffer its amnesia, but more to the point, there is a public 
sphere that suffers this amnesia as well, and it is this that makes the depoliticization of 
history an iteration of a memory of sorrow, or a memory of our present forgetting. 
Now we might still wonder what ought to be our response or what line of action 
ought to be taken if we concede that a Cassandra Complex is operative and post-racial 
memory is its symptom. We might wonder what practical philosophy or practical politics 
actually follows from what I have said so far? However, I have also argued that this is not 
the place for such speculation. First and foremost, the Cassandra Complex only spells out 
a set of circumstances that need to be exposed. The aesthetic responses critique practical 
political activity based on the way post-racial memory makes normal practical addresses 
ineffective. It is not that these methods and efforts should be disbanded, but they do need 
to be taken critically.   
Also, let me be clear, the responses forged in aesthetics are not simply speculative. To 
say that the memory is enwrapped in a circuit of sorrow, or the the Sublime discloses a 
form of mourning, means that we need to be attentive to that level at which a response is 
required. Mourning and Sorrow respond to the complex in the way that they take on a 
different significance politically. They imply that the public sphere that suffers its own 
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forgetfulness in direct proportion to an overproduction of memory. These are practical 
responses in that they open new ways of thinking about the meaning of violence, racism, 
and memory. These are responses in that they require that we interpret the same old 
questions, anew. And, finally, I argued that these are responses because they require that 
we attend to the critical line that emerges between political and aesthetic ways of 
responding and reading history in memory and memory in history. I have argued that the 
Cassandra Complex is necessary to remove a particular blockage, a blockage that 
conceals White violence. The removal itself is critical, but it is not as satisfying as a 
politics of recognition. There is no repair, but there may be ways to release or manage the 
public sphere’s anxiety, on the one hand and to confront the way White violence 
continues discreetly in the present, on the other.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
I have argued that the Cassandra Complex is conceptually necessary for 
understanding many of the ways that White violence continues in the present as a discreet 
form of violence. While I have focused on post-racial memory, I have also developed 
how and why a political sense of mourning is necessary to formulate a response to post-
raciality. Ultimately, these theses may still be unsatisfying to the reader, because they 
result in a critique of present politics, without proposing a positive course of political 
action. They may also be unsatisfying because they warn against a politics committed to 
a view of the past or future.
1
  
Both forms of disappointment are warranted, and I think we are at a moment when a 
different approach to anti-racist politics is necessary.  Along with efforts to address 
racism and violence, I think there is a need to resituate our understanding of racism 
relative to forms of White violence that tend to escape recognition as violence.  
I have also argued that we must be attentive to the extent to which what goes silent in 
the public sphere communicates through a negative representation. We saw that this 
resulted in an aesthetic disenchantment in politics and that it reveals where memory 
appeared as forgetting and forgetting appeared as the brokenness of memory. That 
negative representation is what the Cassandra Complex underscores, because the present 
is in a state of forgetting. It is exactly the breakage of the public sphere in relation to its 
present.    
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I have drawn into the arena of suspicion the status of the representations that mark 
racial social progress. Out of them, I suggested that there was memory that suppressed 
meaning. The violence of the past never found itself resulting in a state of mourning in a 
way that affected the public sphere.  
The suppression of mourning is justified as the necessary means to transform violence 
into order, into a past history, or into a justification for certain laws. Much like the way 
Athena changes the meaning of the name of the Furies into the Eumenides, or the Kindly 
Ones, a suppression of meaning even with access to memory facilitates the forgetting 
needed to assert there is social progress without further ramifications for the public 
sphere.
2
 The domain that they govern is the same but their history is negated only to 
allow for a new history and meaning to begin. 
Cassandra is important to develop this point because she is not mourned over the 
course of the play; her death is not accounted for in any real way. This has the political 
significance of underscoring that her role relative to power is that she is not for the sake 
of the past political order or the present. Cassandra is absolutely other to the present 
political situation and yet she bears the memory of that politics in bearing everything that 
is forgotten. She emerges as a prophetess, who must speak to others plainly about what 
they know but fail to remember, and thus her words and speech are familiar and strange 
at the same time. And further, it is in the conditions in which the living smells the 
normative as if it were an open grave, covered by an ideological investment in forgetting, 
concealing, disfiguring, or disseminating the present and the past as memory, or 
forgotten, as absence or lack. But, the lack of mourning is due primarily to the fact that 
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she has no investment, and can find no meaning in either political framework. But, what 
is the value of such an approach? 
I began this dissertation by suggesting that the philosophical importance of this line 
of questioning lay in how and what types of questions it resituated. At least two things 
have been achieved toward this effort. First, the Cassandra Complex called into question 
our relation to memory and our relation to history. In doing this, the complex produced 
several paradoxes that required that we rethink the boundaries of what we call violence. 
We can say that its value is that it makes violence a questionable issue again. Second, the 
Cassandra Complex provides a way of articulating a particular anomaly that is at play 
between racism, memory, and the public sphere. I called this anomaly post-raciality, in 
general, and focused particularly on post-racial memory. The value of this relies on the 
way what goes silent forms aesthetic reports on the extent of White violence. In many 
ways, this required that the memory of past violence also be read as an interruption of the 
public sphere, insofar as it also doubled as a type of forgetting.  
I have interpreted the meaning of this interruption from the side of aesthetics and 
argued that mourning is a political response. I have not gone so far as to say that these 
responses constitute actions; instead, I think they respond to the way anti-Black violence 
is situated in the present. I want to close this dissertation by suggesting that each 
interruption founds a line of questioning to be pursued toward practical actions. That 
said, I think there are several questions that follow from what has been suggested by this 
study. I will only briefly mention these.  
First, I have argued that memory memorializes its political past and at the same time 
forgets its memory. Post-racial memory puts out of play the political meaning of 
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memory. We might, however, wonder if there is a recovery of this meaning that could be 
positive, or, is there a positive sense of mourning? I think that there have been many 
attempts to reconstruct a positive political notion of mourning. Jean-François Lyotard, 
Jacques Derrida, and Judith Butler have already undertaken this project.
3
 They think of 
mourning as a way of redressing the political violence of displacement. For all three 
philosophers, there is a positive side to mourning because it works to foreground forms of 
reconciliation, restoration, or reparation facilitating or providing the ground for 
forgiveness. A parallel could be drawn for us to align mourning with reparations. The 
groups and conditions they have addressed have a similarity in that they are addressing 
recent or intermediate violence. They are not addressing that violence that has shaped the 
people it has oppressed by tearing them out of history, and continuing that condition in 
the present. Unlike that kind of tearing out of history the positive side of mourning results 
in reconciliation, but sometimes it means that there is no amount of reparation that could 
repair the great loss. This should not be interpreted as suggesting that reparations are not 
needed or that acts of reparation are not important. Just because one cannot pay off a 
great debt does not mean that efforts toward that end are not needed and are not 
meaningful. It just means that we need to understand the meaning of the activity in more 
ways than we have become accustomed to.  
Second, I have focused on aesthetics as the main way to describe how discreet forms 
of violence are identified, but what does this imply about the political potential of art or 
the philosophy of art? What does this imply about the political violence of racism and 
art? I am not sure what would follow for how or in what way we might use the discussion 
to reinterpret the relevance of Black art. However, I have suggested that aesthetics can 
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critically engage politics in the way that it agitates the public sphere. I have also 
suggested that a philosophy of art may be wholly inadequate to the task ascribed here to 
aesthetics for two reasons.  
Philosophy of art is in itself a positivist endeavor. It describes positive relations of 
society or history to the significance of artworks or art genres. Its scope is in line with 
other positive philosophical endeavors like the Philosophy of Liberation or Post-Colonial 
Political Philosophy. However, this positivism is not appropriate to a philosophical 
approach to a symptomatology, since a symptomatology can only be described 
negatively. Moreover, a philosophy of art runs the risk of reifying the art, artist, or 
artwork as political in and of itself, without critically situating the phenomenon under 
discussion. We might look to African American art, or to Black artists, to see how they 
illuminate the social sphere that impinges upon them as a group. I have not argued that 
this is the most effective way of understanding White violence. I am not assuming that 
Black artists or Black arts have epistemic privilege over other art or artists. I am not 
objecting to this view, but aesthetics does not seem to assume it. I have used art examples 
that display how a negative, i.e., critical, aesthetic juncture exposes White violence. The 
racial identities of the artists have largely been Black, but this has not always been the 
case and the race of authors has not mattered, either. For instance, in chapter three, I 
focused on Billie Holiday’s “Strange Fruit”—I focused specifically on her version of the 
song because it haunts the present in ways no other version of “Strange Fruit” does. But, 
it was not her race that mattered here. If it was, then the point would be lost since the 
song was written by a Jewish high school English teacher, Abel Meerpool, but these facts 
do not matter.  The aesthetic of the song as it is performed by Billie Holiday is one that 
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allegorizes history, on the one hand, and foregrounds White violence, on the other. 
Likewise, in chapter four, I use Abigail Jordan’s memorial to illustrate a memorial to 
forgetting. Again, the fact that she is not Black is not a real concern for the validity of the 
analysis.  
Moreover, Black artists already bear a heavy burden in the arts. We cannot and 
should not expect that the works they produce also function to educate a public about 
White violence. This places the burden of that violence back on the group most explicitly 
violated by White violence. For the time being, there is no clear way to square this 
analysis with the aims and potentials of a philosophy of art, other than that I am 
suggesting that there is some value in making a stronger distinction between aesthetics 
and the philosophy of art than has been maintained in contemporary philosophy.     
Third, we might wonder if there is relevance of post-raciality beyond this analysis of 
White violence. I think the answer to this question is ambiguous. The idea that we are 
haunted by a history of colonialism, or colonial subjectivization, is still very present. But, 
I have underscored how this is not only a form of White violence, it is also that part of the 
American imagination that it fails to remember the past of anti-Black violence when in 
fact it has been engaged in memorializing this past for quite some time. It is a hallmark of 
the American imagination that its memory facilitates a forgetting. That being said, I am 
not confident enough to claim that White violence performs the same feats relative to 
other groups or in other places. I am confident enough to say that post-raciality is 
potentially operative in all contemporary aesthetics of memory.  
Kant may have been endlessly fascinated by the cosmos above us and the moral law 
within us. I want to voice almost the opposite sentiment: I want to suggest that we all 
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need to be just as deeply repulsed by the aesthetic poverty that appears in each of us in 
relation to White violence. With the present rise in anti-Black violence in America, one 
may not worry about large scale termination, enslavement, or the reemergence of 
segregation; we worry only about the lifelong lasting effects of a great indifference to 
Black suffering—which is a violence that always already structures our aesthetic 
proximity to present and past violence. 
1. Notes 
 
1
 My view is not that we need to “not act” but rather that acting requires some regard for 
how we are situated in the present. Thus, my view is not the same as Slavoj Žižek and 
Judith Butler, who argue that we do not need to act in the present. They base their claims 
on the political relevance of critical philosophy. Thus, they both argue that inaction is a 
type of action. Both draw on Walter Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence” and employ his 
notion of a general strike, or the removal of interest in the political sphere, to defend their 
argument. Unlike them, I have argued that critical philosophy is deeply tied to a 
development of the philosophy of history (historical materialism in particular). Because 
of this, I am arguing that our former modes of action may appear as responses to present 
forms of violence and injustice, but they may also be further modes of inaction. What 
was formerly critiqued as politically inept, namely a politics of mourning or allegory, 
seem like the only real responses to a violence that seems to operate but never really 
appears. See Walter Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence” in Walter Benjamin: Selected 
Writings, vol. 1 1913-1926, trans. Edmund Jephcott. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2004, 236-252. See Slavoj Žižek’s discussion of this essay and 
his development of his political critique in Violence: Six Sideways Reflections. New 
York: Picador, 2008, 193-205. Also see Judith Butler’s explicit discussion of Benjamin 
and implicit discussion of Žižek in Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? New York: 
Verso, 2009, 176-184.   
2
 Aeschylus, “The Furies” in Oresteia, trans. Peter Meineck. Indianapolis/Cambridge: 
Hackett Publishing Co., 1998, 158. 
3
 Derrida’s work on forgiveness seems to be directly related to his work on mourning. 
The problem of Europeanism is that it forgets colonialism, or it forgets to ask a question 
about its history. This view is important, but it only particularly addresses the question of 
violence and history. See Jean François Lyotard, “The Sign of History” in The Differend: 
Phrases in Dispute. He develops Kant’s aesthetics of the Sublime as a type of mourning. 
Similarly, Jacques Derrida develops a way of talking about the after-violence of 
displacement in terms of mourning and haunting in Specters of Marx: The State of the 
Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf. New York: 
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Routledge, 1994. In this work he focuses on that after-effect of political violence that 
leaves a sense of being out of joint with time and with politics. Judith Butler underscores 
the same aspect of the after effects of violence by arguing that the framing out of violence 
continues the former violence by way of instituting a non-discursive space of 
interminability. She argues that the fact that the lives of Guantanamo prisoners cannot be 
made grievable and have not been mourned underscores a particular violence. The way 
they are framed out of public discourse is a type of violence. Butler argues that this 
“framing out” also implies that the ungrievable life is the life that has never really lived. 
Again, like Derrida, there is something important here, but she has not carried the 
analysis to its radical end. The life that is not grievable is the life that has never really 
been alive, and yet, it is or has been alive. How is it a life that is not grievable and yet is 
memorable? If it was truly the radical framing out that she describes, then the life would 
either not be memorable, making the analysis speculative only, or it would indicate a 
present state in which the ungrievability facilitates a present mournability—but not 
toward a repairing or resituating of the present. It would not result in the inclusion of 
what has been left out. This is only a radical move if and only if the peoples under 
discussion have had a past in which they were not the object of violence. This may be 
true for many groups, but it has never been true for Blacks in America, and thus 
postmodern mourning is inadequate. For Butler’s development of the theme of mourning 
one should also consult her earlier works, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in 
Subjection. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997 and Precarious Life: The Powers 
of Mourning and Violence. New York: Verso, 2004.   
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